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Habitat destruction and pollution are two of the main causes for the decline of the planet’s 
biodiversity. Yet environmentalists are now recognizing that illegal wildlife killings, both 
poaching and retaliatory killings due to human-wildlife conflict, are perhaps the next major 
threat. Biologists have researched illegal killings and their effect on species conservation, but 
few researchers have applied criminological principles of crime reduction to them. This research 
will explore the situational factors that drive retaliatory leopard killings in parts of South Africa, 
Kenya, and India. These factors, human and environmental, include local expectations from 
wildlife, sensitivity to environmental issues, communication between conservation actors, 
leopard abundance, land-use overlap between humans and leopards, and poor leopard habitat 
conditions. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (interview and media article 
content analysis and logistic regression and non-parametric tests) are used to understand which 
factors best predict where human-leopard conflicts will arise and deteriorate into retaliatory 
leopard killings. Strategies to reduce the incidence of retaliatory leopard killings are suggested 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Problem Statement 
	
Human-encroachment on wilderness and pollution from industrial activities are two of 
the main causes for the rapid decline of the planet’s biodiversity. Yet, environmentalists are now 
recognizing that illegal wildlife killings, including poaching, are perhaps the next major threat to 
biodiversity (Al-Johany, 2007, p. 1; Clarke & de By Rolf, 2013; Ghoddousi, Hamidi, Ghadirian, 
Ashayeri, & Khorozyan, 2010; The Huffington Post, 2012, January 24; Wikramanayake et al., 
1998). Accurate figures on how much illegal wildlife and wildlife products are smuggled 
internationally are hard to come by because of the secretive nature of the trade, but a 2011 
estimate by the Center for International Policy suggests these products bring in $7.8 to $10 
billion U.S. dollars annually (Haken, 2011, February). 
Biologists have researched illegal killings and their effect on species conservation, but 
few researchers have applied criminological principles of crime reduction to them (Green, 2011; 
Mfunda & Roskaft, 2010; Pires & Moreto, 2011). The few criminologists who have studied 
illegal wildlife killings have tended to focus on the markets for poached goods, arguing that 
stopping the demand for such goods would take away the incentive for illegal killings 
(Schneider, 2008). Unfortunately, this framework only applies to offenders wishing to sell or 
trade the animal they illegally kill. 
Illegal leopard killings do not entirely fit this profile. Although leopards are illegally 
killed for the traditional medicine trade and trophy hunting (where leopard parts end up on a 
market), human-wildlife conflict (H-WC) appears to drive the majority of leopard killings. For 
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H-WC cases, the goal is to get rid of a “problem” leopard and destroy any evidence a kill took 
place. 
This research will explore the situational factors that drive retaliatory leopard killings in 
parts of Kenya, South Africa, and India and determine whether the majority of these killings in 
the study areas are a result of H-WC. These situational factors, human and environmental, 
include local expectations from wildlife, sensitivity to environmental issues, communication 
between conservation actors, leopard abundance, land-use overlap between humans and 
leopards, and poor leopard habitat conditions. They have ecological significance for leopards and 
represent human and environmental conditions under which human-leopard conflicts (H-LCs) 
are likely to occur. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (interview and media 
article content analysis and logistic regression, spatial analysis, and non-parametric tests) are 
used to understand which factors best predict where H-LCs will arise and deteriorate into 
retaliatory leopard killings. This study will use small-scale collared leopard data from a local 
conservation non-profit organization (NPO) for its spatial and statistical modeling, one of the 
few reliable and systematic records of unnatural leopard deaths. The ultimate goal of this 
research is to use the techniques of situational crime prevention (SCP) to reduce the number of 












Table 1.1. Table of abbreviations and acronyms 
 
Phrase or organization Abbreviation or acronym 
Case-control design CCD 
Community-based conservation CBC 
Human-leopard conflict H-LC 
Human-wildlife conflict H-WC 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature IUCN 
Kenya Wildlife Service KWS 
Non-profit organization NPO 
Situational Crime Prevention SCP 
South African National Biodiversity Institute SANBI 
The Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species 
CITES 
The National Vegetation Map of South Africa 
Project 
VEGMAP 
The Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 (India) WPA 
World Wildlife Fund WWF 
 
Defining illegal killings 
 
 Illegal killings are part of the broader category of environmental crime just beginning to 
be recognized within the field of criminology (Pires & Moreto, 2011). Interpol defines 
“environmental crime” as “any breach of a national or international environmental law or treaty 
that exists to ensure the conservation and sustainability of the world's environment, biodiversity, 
or natural resources" (Interpol, 2010-2011). This type of crime includes the illegal wildlife trade, 
illegal logging or fishing, environmental degradation through pollution and negligence, and theft 
of natural resources. 
Within environmental crime, the term “illegal killings” refers to two separate phenomena: 
poaching and retaliatory killings. Although the two words refer to the same action, killing 
wildlife illegally, they represent different reasons for the behavior. 
The New Oxford American Dictionary (2007) defines poaching as “illegally hunting or 
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catching (game or fish) on land that is not one’s own, or in contravention of official protection.” 
This definition does not include whether the killing or catching is for profit, but the word’s 
connotation suggests the poacher benefits financially from the behavior (hence the motivation to 
kill). The term can also be applied to flora, as is the case for illegal cacti trading for xeriscaping 
in the Chihuahuan Desert regions of the United States (U.S.) and Mexico (Green, 2011; Robbins 
& Barcenas, 2003, January). 
The definition originates from the first recorded discussion of poaching which took place 
in feudal England under the early Saxon Kings (Farnsworth, 1980). At the time, landowners 
owned the wildlife passing on their land. The King owned any remaining non-cultivated land and 
its wildlife. Wealthy merchants living in town could not hunt because they did not own large 
rural lands on which to do so. Discussions and on-going rebellions eventually led to rule changes 
to accommodate the hunting needs of the more powerful urban political and economic figures of 
the time (Farnsworth, 1980). 
Although this definition provides a basic understanding of the word, it overlooks 
different forms of poaching. The term “poaching” can be applied to a range of behaviors, from a 
tourist buying an ivory figurine in a country where ivory sales are illegal, to a smuggler carrying 
hundreds of live reptiles in his suitcase through customs with the intent to sell them to collectors. 
Lin (2005) groups poaching behaviors into four categories: 
 (1) Low volume, low value tourist poaching cases 
 (2) High volume, low value opportunistic poaching/smuggling 
 Example: parrot poaching by local residents in Bolivia (Pires & Clarke, 2011) 
 (3) High volume, high value poaching/smuggling by organized crime syndicates 
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 Example: abalone poaching in South Africa (Wildlife warden 1, personal 
communication, August 4, 2011) 
 (4) Low volume, high value “poaching to order” cases for collectors 
 Example: the exotic “status pet” trade for big cats in the Middle East (Warchol, 
Zupan, & Clack, 2003) 
Retaliatory killings are illegal wildlife killings undertaken in retaliation for some form of 
H-WC, generally animal attacks on livestock or people or destruction of crops. Some examples 
of retaliatory killings include crop farmers who attack elephants that trample their fields or 
livestock farmers who illegally kill wolves in North America or leopards in Asia or Africa when 
they eat their livestock (Bakano, 2011; Bjorge & Gunson, 1985; Ogra, 2008). Retaliatory killings 
also take place after animal attacks on humans, including leopard attacks on humans in Indian 
villages (Gupta Kashyap, 2012, March 6). 
In contrast to “poaching”, retaliatory killings are not done for profit. Individuals who 
engage in these H-WC driven killings do not consider themselves poachers because they kill to 
get rid of a problem animal (or “pest,” as they call them), not to profit from its carcass (NPO 
worker 1, personal communication, July 31, 2011). Most often they dispose of the animal’s 
carcass in the bush to get rid of any evidence of the killing. Their objective tends to be self-
preservation, to avoid future crippling losses of farm animals, and/or anger at being attacked or 
having their property attacked (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011). Some 
NPOs suggest that leopards killed in retaliation are trafficked for profit, but these cases remain 
anecdotal (NPO worker 2, personal communication, September 2013) (World Wildlife Fund & 
Global Species Program, N.d.). 
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The impact of illegal killings 
 
Illegal killings tend to have large measurable economic costs for communities and 
countries because of lost revenue from natural resources (Gettleman, 2012b; Interpol, 2010-
2011; Lin, 2005). Environmental impacts, though, are also a major concern, especially as 
citizens, governments, and industries are now coming to the conclusion that “it is impossible to 
separate economic development from the environment and that environmental degradation can 
undermine economic development” (U.S. Geological Survey, 2007, p. 1). A simple example of 
this is that decreasing numbers of leopards due to illegal killing results in less tourism revenue as 
fewer tourists go on safari and visit reserves where wild animal populations are dwindling. Less 
tourism means fewer job opportunities for local residents while tourism profits cannot be used to 
build up the nation’s economy. The following section describes some of the economic costs of 
poaching, which have been measured in the literature (while the costs of retaliatory killings have 
not), and then moves on to the less tangible environmental costs of both poaching and retaliatory 
killings. 
 
How much does poaching bring in? 
 
The trade in wildlife and wildlife products is, first of all, a legal trade (TRAFFIC, 2012c). 
In the 1990s, TRAFFIC (2012c) calculated the value of legal wildlife products imported globally 
to be around $160 billion U.S. dollars, but, as of 2009, it had grown to over $323 billion. 
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It is difficult to accurately estimate of how much poaching takes place worldwide 
because it is an underground economy. Even when estimates are made, they tend to differ 
widely. A 2011 estimate by the Center for International Policy suggests that the sale of illegal 
wildlife and wildlife products (excluding timber and fisheries) brings in between $7.8 and $10 
billion U.S. dollars in annual profits (Haken, 2011, February). Other estimates put that number at 
anywhere between $5 billion U.S. dollars and $20 billion U.S. dollars a year (Wyler & Sheikh, 
2008) and $30 billion U.S. dollars a year (Bauerlein, 2005, August/July). 
 
Illegal leopard killings and species conservation 
 
The current main threats to leopards are habitat loss and fragmentation through human 
encroachment and illegal killings, primarily retaliatory killings, both of which are intrinsically 
linked since encroachment contributes to H-WCs that trigger retaliatory killings (Al-Johany, 
2007; Ghoddousi et al., 2010; Wikramanayake et al., 1998). As with many other species, the 
impact of these threats on leopard populations is difficult to assess because they often occur 
conjointly and aggravate each other (Pires, 2011; Poudyal, Rothley, & Knowler, 2009). 
Studies of the consequences of illegal leopard killing have long overlooked its broader 
ecosystem impact. These broader ecosystem impacts include infanticide1 and less successful 
breeding (Balme, Hunter, & Slotow, 2007; Chapron et al., 2008; Packer et al., 2009). Leopards 
depend on stable long-term inter-leopard relationships to maintain their territories and insure 
																																																								
1 The killing of a female leopard’s litter by an incoming and non-related male. This behavior 
ensures that only a dominant male’s genes will be passed on to the next generation. After an 
episode of infanticide, female fertility drops until they are sure no new male take-over will occur 
(Balme & Hunter, 2013). 
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their own survival. The poaching of a male (or female) leopard leaves a territory vacuum that 
increases strife among surrounding leopards and can have serious consequences for population 
survival (partly because of infanticide) (Balme, Slotow, & Hunter, 2009). 
Illegal leopard killing can also impact the survival of co-dependent species in the food 
web and ecosystem (Packer et al., 2009). Current research has only looked at single predator-
prey dyads to determine the ecological consequences of poaching within the food chain 
(Graham, Beckerman, & Thirgood, 2005), but Graham et al. (2005) suggest that poaching likely 
has consequences for trophic2 and symbiotic3 species that researchers should explore. 
Adding to the biological difficulties of determining the impact of illegal killings on 
leopards and their ecosystem is the lack of reliable leopard population counts (Al-Johany, 2007; 
Liberg et al., 2011). A few researchers, including Ghoddousi et al. (2010) & Hussain (2003), 
have documented leopard densities in specific areas, but accurate leopard population estimates 
do not exist for many other locations, including South Africa (NPO worker 3, personal 
communication, July 2011). The International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) 
Red List of Threatened Species currently rates the leopard (Panthera pardus) as “near 
threatened” with population numbers “decreasing,” but their evaluation dates from 2008 and is 
based on population counts from existing research studies (Henschel, Hunter, Breitenmoser, 
Purchase, et al., 2008). 
																																																								
2 Trophic species eat the same prey and are eaten by the same predators (Martinez & Dunne, 
n.d.). 
3 Symbiotic species are species that need to interact with each other to survive. Symbiotic 
relationships can include mutualism (where both species gain something), parasitism (where only 
one species gains something and the other is harmed), neutralism (where neither species gains or 
loses anything) and commensalism (one species benefits and the other is not harmed) (Meyer, 




Beyond ecosystem impacts though, researchers are now realizing that concern for the fate 
of species and their ecosystems, on which society relies for resources, is no longer limited to 
earth scientists and environmentalists (U.S. Geological Survey, 2007, p. 1). Governments are 
now realizing that the flow of poached goods between nations has serious economic and social 
consequences beyond localized degradation of ecosystems (Gettleman, 2012b; Interpol, 2010-
2011; Lin, 2005). For example, Security Council members officially recognized “the harm 
caused by wildlife poaching and trafficking to conservation efforts, rule of law, governance and 
economic development” at the United Nations’ General Assembly in September 2012 
(TRAFFIC, 2012b, p. 1). 
 
Where do illegal killings occur? 
 
The majority of poaching occurs in third-world countries where biodiversity is high and 
enforcement of export laws is low (Duffy, 2010; Lin, 2005). Yet, more than half of poached 
wildlife then ends up in large industrialized countries and regions like Europe, Japan, and the 
U.S., which account for 60% of the market (Bauerlein, 2005, August/July). Another 25% of 
market is in Southeast Asia because of the region’s strong reliance on animal and plant-based 
traditional medicine and its large population (Bauerlein, 2005, August/July; Lin, 2005). In 
addition, many wildlife rich countries also have their own national trade, such as the illegal 
parrot trade for pets in Bolivia (Pires, 2011). 
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Retaliatory killings also tend to occur primarily in third-world countries where wild land 
is rapidly being developed because of industrialization and population growth (Schaller, 2011). 
In these countries, wild animals are being pushed out of their natural habitat and rural 
populations are ill equipped for living with these displaced animals (Alexander & Winter, 2011). 
With no or little infrastructure in place to deal with H-WCs and limited law enforcement 
resources to enforce environmental laws, retaliatory killings can become commonplace. 
 
Where do illegal leopard killings occur? 
 
Leopard poaching and retaliatory killings occur throughout the leopard’s range in mid to 
southern Africa, parts of the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (see figure 1.1) (Henschel, Hunter, 
Breitenmoser, Pruchase, et al., 2008; Kurvits et al., 2011). In parts of this range, leopard killings 
are opportunistic and clustered in areas of H-WCs between farmers/villagers and leopards (J. C. 
Ray, Hunter, & Zigouris, 2005, December). Seizure information compiled by the wildlife trade 
monitoring network TRAFFIC suggests that there is a commercial trade for leopard skins and 
parts, especially in Southeast Asia, but also in parts of Africa (Henschel, 2008; Henschel, 
Hunter, Breitenmoser, Pruchase, et al., 2008; Roberts, 2010, October 10; TRAFFIC, 2011). In 
the KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa, religious groups like the Shembe, use leopard 
skins for religious ceremonies (Roberts, 2010, October 10). For example, in Eastern Africa, 
military personnel are known to buy leopard skins and illegally import them into Europe 









Illegal killings are currently one of the major threats to this planet’s biodiversity. The 
term “illegal killings” refers to two separate phenomena with different objectives: poaching and 
retaliatory killings. Poaching generally refers to the illegal killing or catching of fauna and flora 
for profit. Its severity can range from opportunistic poaching of a few parrots by local residents 
to organized crime syndicates smuggling 40 rhino horns through customs. Retaliatory killings 
are not for profit and take place in retaliation for some type of H-WC, like wildlife attacks on 
crops, livestock, or humans. 
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Illegal leopard killings occur throughout the leopard’s range but not all these cases fit the 
traditional “poaching to sell model.” A large part of illegal leopard killings are retaliatory 
killings for livestock predation where the leopard carcass is destroyed to avoid prosecution. This 
study will focus on identifying the human and environmental factors that influence where 



















Chapter 2: Factors contributing to illegal killings generally and illegal leopard killings 
 
 The following chapter is separated into sections based on the main motivations for 
poaching versus retaliatory killings. The latter part of the chapter then discusses how these 
motivations play a role in illegal leopard killings. 
 
Motivations for poaching 
Bushmeat hunting 
 
Rural populations illegally hunt a number of species to eat and sell. This phenomenon is 
mainly documented for Africa and Southeast Asia (Bikya Masr, 2012; Mfunda & Roskaft, 2010; 
Watson, Becker, McRobb, & Kanyembo, 2013). The meat of wild ungulates is less fatty than 
that of domestic livestock and its annual weight varies less. It therefore provides a richer and 
more stable food source for rural populations (Carpaneto & Fusari, 2000). For some local agro-
pastoralists, the number of livestock they own is a token of wealth and they invest any money 
they make into buying more livestock. These families would never kill their livestock for food 
and obtain all their protein from bushmeat (Mfunda & Roskaft, 2010). 
Fuller and Johnson (2005) also found that Zambians consume bushmeat as a show of 
status and respect for tradition, much like westerners will pay extra for free-range chicken. In 
Zambia, bushmeat is surreptitiously sold door-to-door to trusted customers (along with ivory) 
(Fuller & Johnson, 2005). Depending on the location and the cultural practices of its population, 
bushmeat hunting can therefore be a strong motivator for poaching. 
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The pet trade 
 
 Certain species are illegally harvested primarily for the pet trade. These include a large 
number of reptiles and amphibians destined for collectors, but also a range of other species that 
are sold as part of the exotic pet trade (Webster, 1997, February 7). For example, a 2011 seizure 
at Los Angeles International Airport revealed 55 turtles hidden in snack food boxes in two men’s 
carry-ons and meant to be sold in the United States (Ng, 2011). Certain species, like the 
Mangshan pit viper, are even exclusively poached for the pet trade because they are such a hot 
commodity among collectors, bringing in about $1800 to $3250 U.S. dollars per specimen 
(TRAFFIC & IUCN, 2008). During CITES’ 40th anniversary meeting in March 2013, delegates 
increased the protection of a number of turtle species illegally caught for the pet trade, noting 
that the demand for exotic pets is on the rise and that this trade involves more species than the 
traditional medicine trade and bushmeat hunting (Bottollier-Depois, 2013). 
 
The traditional medicine trade 
 
The traditional medicine trade drives a large demand for poachers’ illegal wildlife 
products in many countries. Traditional healers view health issues as being related to 
supernatural forces, social relationships, and relationships with ancestors and use traditional 
medicine to cure both medical and symbolic4 ailments (Bye & Dutton, 1991; Whiting et al., 
2011). It is this faith in supernatural forces and the lack of reliable access to Western medicine in 
																																																								
4 Symbolic ailments include ancestral conflicts, relationship problems, poor fortune etc. (Bye & 
Dutton, 1991; Whiting, Williams, & Hibbitts, 2011).  
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many areas that guarantees a continuous and lucrative demand for poached wildlife (Interpol, 
2010-2011). About 80% of the world’s population relies on traditional medicine (Akerele, 1993; 
Botha, Witkowski, Shackleton, & Fairbanks, 2004), 27 million of which live in South Africa 
(Botha et al., 2004; Mander, 1998), and that number is increasing (Botha, 1998). 
What animal species are poached for the trade depends on the beliefs of local 
populations. At least 232 species of wild vertebrates and several species of marine mollusks are 
used in South Africa for the traditional medicine trade (Whiting et al., 2011). Rhino horn thefts 
in Africa, Asia, and in European museums, for example, are driven by the Asian belief that 
powdered rhino horn can cure cancer, as well as act as an aphrodisiac and increase men’s sex 
drive (Agence France Presse, 2011c; BBC News, 2011, July 25; Lyall, 2011, August 26; 
Thomet, 2011). This belief is especially difficult to dispel as it has existed in Asian culture for 
more than 1,000 years (Agence France Presse, 2011b). Currently, the price of a pound of rhino 
horn powder is higher than the price of gold and cocaine. 
 
The pelt trade 
 
 A number of animal species are poached for their pelts. These include alligators, big cats, 
otters, and snakes, among others. Some are hunted for the fashion industry while others are 
hunted for traditional costumes used in religious or cultural rituals, or as signs of status. Tibetans, 
for example, use otter pelts as trim on traditional costumes and also make a warm jacket called a 
“bhatta” out of them (TRAFFIC, 2011). Crocodiles, on the other hand, are primarily poached to 
make crocodile handbags and other derivative products, but their numbers in the wild have 
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stopped declining since the creation of legal crocodile farms that raise the species solely to sell 




Trophy hunting is another reason for poaching. Many big game “status species” that 
hunters get a thrill out of shooting are now endangered (IUCN, 2012). Game farm owners must 
therefore find creative and illegal ways to continue these hunts. A recent South African scandal, 
for example, revealed that a game farm owner was buying rhinos and other wild animals from 
zoos, auctions, and private owners for poachers and tourists to shoot on his game farm (Agence 
France Presse, 2011d; Bangkok Post, 2011, September 25). Captive lion breeding is common in 
South Africa where 60% of lions live in captivity to be released into the wild for trophy hunts 
(Liou, 2012). Although this constitutes a much smaller threat to species because of stricter 
regulations for hunting permits and trophy exports, illegal trophy hunting still exists as game 
farms and hunters find loopholes to circumvent enforcement (Bangkok Post, 2011, September 
25; CITES Secretariat, n.d.; Service & Authority, 2003). 
 
Motivations for retaliatory killings 
Human-Wildlife Conflict 
 
Perhaps the most problematic motivation for illegal wildlife killings is H-WC. These 
	
 17
conflicts can result in retaliatory killings that endanger species’ survival. Population growth and 
expanding industrial activities bring humans and wildlife into increasing contact, sparking 
competition between them for limited natural resources, including land (Graham et al., 2005). 
The most common types of H-WC include human encroachment on or destruction of wildlife 
habitat and the destruction of crops or the killing of humans or livestock by wildlife. Elephants, 
for example, cause extensive damage to crops when they trample fields looking for food and 
become aggressive when approached or chased off, sometimes killing or injuring villagers 
(Bakano, 2011; Watts, 2013). 
Previous management of these conflicts has been heavily biased towards the social and 
economic needs of humans, with little regard for its impact on wildlife (Graham et al., 2005). For 
example, the logging of rainforests, which has benefited local human populations financially, is 
also causing numerous wildlife species to become extinct (Polidoro et al., 2010, April). Some 
other examples include the hunting of bears in New Jersey when they stray near human houses to 
eat garbage (Petty, 2012) or the killing of sharks after shark attacks or sightings near tourist-
laden beaches in Australia (Coots, 2012). 
In the past, H-WCs have been limited to small geographic regions and therefore have 
only had localized impacts on global biodiversity. The growing expansion of human activities 
means that these conflicts are now occurring all over the world and, if managed incorrectly, have 
the potential to wipe out a much larger number of species (Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity & United Nations Environment Programme, n.d.). The retaliatory killing of 
“problem animals” could become one of the biggest causes of species extinction given its 
geographical scope and the number of species it affects. 
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Factors that contribute to H-WC and retaliatory leopard killings 
 
 Several factors increase the likelihood that humans will enter into conflicts with wildlife. 
These include ecological factors that shape animals’ behavior so they are more likely to 
encounter humans and human factors where humans behave in ways that increase contact with 
wildlife. Human factors include habitat destruction and fragmentation, economic strain, and 
misguided expectations of predation losses. Ecological factors include the large home ranges of 
carnivores, their opportunistic hunting patterns, and fluctuations in natural prey. 
 
Habitat destruction and fragmentation 
 
The first way in which humans can exacerbate H-WC is through direct habitat 
destruction5 (Al-Johany, 2007). For example, in a study in the Annapurna Conservation Area of 
Nepal, local residents caused damage to the fauna by cutting firewood in the area, making it 
harder for the snow leopard to find cover when it hunts6 (Oli, Taylor, & Rogers, 1994). By 
cutting firewood, local Nepalese reduced the size of functional snow leopard habitat. As a result, 
more snow leopards have to successfully hunt food in a smaller geographical area with less prey, 
since a smaller habitat supports less prey. Furthermore, a reduction in habitat size makes it easier 
																																																								
5 There are multiple components to wildlife habitat integrity: these include the size of habitat, the 
degree of degradation, fragmentation, and the connectivity to other habitat blocks 
(Wikramanayake et al., 1998). Human activity and high human densities can affect every one of 
these aspects of habitat integrity. 
6 Although the focus of this research is on leopards (Panthera pardus), snow leopard (Panthera 
uncia) research is included because the two species are genetically very similar and suffer from 
the same H-WC and conservation issues (Yu & Zhang, 2005). 
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for poachers to find snow leopards because they have less ground to cover, putting an added 
strain on the species (Henschel, 2008). 
If Nepalese snow leopards are not able to find enough food in their new reduced habitat, 
they will choose one of two options. One, they will move to another more suitable habitat, if it 
exists, or two, they will start roaming human-inhabited areas in search of food. For leopards, the 
problem with moving to a more suitable habitat is that they are running out of them. Recent 
evidence from researchers with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) shows that changing weather 
patterns due to climate change are pushing forests further into the mountains and causing alpine 
habitat losses for leopards (this added to the existing losses from human destruction) (Agence 
France Presse, 2012a; Forrest et al., 2012). 
Direct destruction, though, is not the only thing reducing the leopard’s habitat. The world 
is experiencing large amounts of indirect habitat loss through human encroachment and 
disturbance (Gill, Norris, & Sutherland, 2001). Al-Johany (2007) describes how, in Saudi 
Arabia, leopards have left several areas where they once used to live because of human 
influences like roads and the continuous hunting of ibex and hyrax (their prey) by local residents. 
The effect of such indirect habitat destruction can be seen in Kenya. The “critical human 
density” for leopards is the human density at which there is a 50% probability of leopard 
extinction. For Kenyan areas with no bushmeat hunting, this number is 900 inhabitants per 
square kilometer. Having more than 900 human inhabitants per square kilometer in those areas 
will drive out leopards because there will not be enough resources to sustain both. This “critical 
human density” value is even lower in areas where residents depend on bushmeat for protein and 
thereby dip into the leopard’s prey population (Woodroffe, 2000 in (Henschel, 2008)). 
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 Moving to another habitat to avoid human disturbance also has a higher cost for species 
like leopards that feed on migratory prey because their prey species may not move with them 
(Gill et al., 2001). Different species have different “critical human density” values. Wildebeest 
for example, might be able to survive in an area with more than 900 humans per square kilometer 
when leopards cannot. If the leopard moves to avoid human disturbance, it will no longer have 
access to the wildebeest population it usually feeds on. With less food, a leopard has lower 
chances of both survival and reproductive success. Interference competition7 only aggravates 
these problems when, for example, tigers living in the same areas as leopards also depend on the 
same food source (Odden et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, a leopard that moves to a new habitat because of habitat destruction or 
encroachment (assuming such a habitat is both suitable and available) has to carve itself a new 
territory by fighting territorial battles with current leopard residents or rival species (i.e. tigers or 
lions) (du Preez, Loveridge, & Macdonald, 2014). Although rival species can live in the same 
habitat with sufficient cover to avoid each other, they can also force leopards to move to 
marginal and less suitable habitat (Hamilton, 2014). The stress of human disturbance, less 
suitable habitat, and fighting for new territory can have severe fitness costs for a leopard. These 
costs include reduced prey intake, increased vigilance levels, higher risk of falling ill, and 
reduced levels of parental care, all of which can contribute to less reproductive success and 
possibly death (Gill et al., 2001). 
Habitat fragmentation also has direct implications for population health. The more 
fragmented leopard habitat is, the higher the risk of patch distribution, where leopard populations 
																																																								
7 A form of resource competition between species where “one species imposes a cost on another 
by limiting its foraging ability” (Odden, Wegge, & Fredriksen, 2010, p. 875). 
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exist in different areas without any contact with each other because no corridors remain between 
habitats (Zeller, Nijhawan, Salom-Perez, Potosme, & Hines, 2011). This leaves a leopard 
population even more vulnerable to extinction through illness, environmental disaster, or simple 
genetics because of a lack of genetic diversity (Yiming, Zhongwei, Qisen, Yushan, & Niemela, 
2003; Zeller et al., 2011). Leopard populations in the Eastern and Western Cape Provinces of 
South Africa are already at risk of extinction because of this lack of genetic diversity (McManus, 
Dalton, et al., 2015). 
If a leopard cannot move to a less fragmented and disturbed habitat, it must turn to 
alternative prey. Unfortunately, fragmented and disturbed habitats support smaller amounts of 
wild prey because of size constraints and the out migration of prey species that can find 
alternative habitat. Since human encroachment is a common reason for habitat fragmentation, 
and humans often bring livestock and pets with them, a leopard stuck in a disturbed habitat will 
often turn to those animals for food (Athreya & Belsare, 2007). Livestock and pets make 
excellent prey because they have limited survival instincts; these were bred out of them after 
generations of human dependence (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011). By 
introducing livestock and pets into the leopard’s shrinking habitat, humans have engineered the 




 Livestock predation, although a problem, would not aggravate agro-pastoralists as much 
as it does if it was not for the economic strain under which they live (Butler, 2000; Erasmus, 
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2011, January 21). In agro-pastoralist communities, the loss of even a small number of livestock 
a year to carnivores can have serious economic consequences8 and can result in negative 
attitudes toward wildlife and conservation in general (Mishra, 1982; Upreti, 1986 in (Oli et al., 
1994)).9 Near Serengeti National Park in Tanzania the mean annual livestock loss per affected 
household was 5.3. The cash value for this amount of livestock is about two-thirds of the local 
average annual income (Holmern, Nyahongo, & Roskaft, 2007). In Zimbabwe, the average 
livestock loss for households was $13 U.S. dollars or 12% of a family’s annual income (Butler, 
2000). In Nepal, that same value for the winter months, the harshest for subsistence livelihoods, 
represented a quarter of the average Nepalese’ annual income (Oli et al., 1994). This level of 
economic impact is not limited to carnivores: elephants in Uttarakhand, India, cause crop farmers 
to lose an average of 20 to 50% of their anticipated crop yield (Ogra, 2008). 
Unfortunately, leopards tend to kill some of the most expensive livestock, like cattle and 
donkeys (Butler, 2000), meaning agro-pastoralists resent them even more than other conflict-
causing species. Hill (2004) notes that people’s perception of how much danger a species poses 
depends on the species’ visibility (i.e. size), the degree to which it is dangerous to humans, and 
the degree of control that people feel they can have over its activities. Leopards invite resentment 
from farmers on all these levels because they are larger animals, can easily kill a human, and are 
																																																								
8 Losses to wildlife, though, are not just economic. They can include loss of education for 
children who end up having to guard their parents' fields or livestock, or loss of life or health if 
one is attacked by wildlife or develops a disease like malaria from increased night work to guard 
crops or livestock (Hill, 2004; Ogra, 2008). 
9 Surprisingly, in Sweden and Norway, attitudes towards carnivores were not related to carnivore 
abundance or experience of livestock losses but rather to the country’s environmental policies 
and local resident’s trust in government authorities. The more suspicion of government 
authorities, the more anthropogenic the attitudes (Gangaas, Kaltenborn, & Andreassen, 2015). 
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hard to track and hard to control because wildlife officials are often unwilling to cull them 
because of their protected status. 
 
Belief that predation should not occur 
 
 The economic strain that livestock losses from carnivores place on farmers causes them 
to develop a “leopard or I” survival mentality that fosters their belief that retaliatory killings are 
legitimate (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011). Agro-pastoralists’ belief that 
livestock predation by carnivores should not occur fosters this mentality and increases the 
motivations for retaliatory leopard killings. Even though carnivore livestock killings represent a 
small percentage of stock losses compared to those from disease (especially tick fever in South 
Africa) (Hemson, Maclennan, Mills, Johnson, & Macdonald, 2009), livestock owners emphasize 
that they are a true bane to their livelihood and should not occur (Farmer 2, personal 
communication, August 5, 2011; Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011). 
 Part of the reason for this rancor is farmers’ belief that the government should do more to 
stop “its” animals from killing their livestock. This feeling is especially strong in communities 
with no farming subsidies (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011). When 
conservation policies stop farmers from taking direct action against crop-raiding species, they 
expect that the government will step in and prevent H-WCs (Hill, 2004). The fact that hunting 
permits are now required to hunt animals in many countries reinforces this belief that the 
government “owns” the local wildlife (Hemson et al., 2009). For example, Hill (2004) 
documented that farmers believed that “the Ugandan government behaves like an irresponsible 
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livestock owner" when it does nothing to prevent wildlife from destroying their crops and does 
not compensate them for damage, because if a domestic animal were to do the same, its owner is 
lawfully required to compensate the injured party (Hill, 2004, p. 282). 
 Expectations of how leopards should or should not behave often do not take into account 
basic ecological principles. To expect no livestock losses to carnivores is unrealistic knowing 
that livestock are easy prey and new husbandry methods require less direct supervision of 
animals, giving a leopard the opportunity to catch one (Graham et al., 2005). Similarly, agro-
pastoralists are often so enraged by livestock losses that they fail to distinguish signs of leopard 
predation from signs of other predators (Government wildlife official 1, personal 
communication, July 31, 2011) or make no distinction between the between proximate and 
ultimate cause of livestock death (i.e. leopards will often go after sick or weak animals that 
would have died anyways) (Butler, 2000; Graham et al., 2005; Oli et al., 1994). 
 
Large home ranges of carnivores 
 
 Leopard ecology is partly responsible for making their retaliatory killings more likely. 
Their large home ranges (also true for most carnivores) guarantee overlap with human activities 
(Graham et al., 2005). The leopard’s adaptable nature also increases the likelihood that it will 
come into conflict with humans. Examples of this uneasy co-habitation include leopard attacks 
on humans in India when villagers enter the jungle just outside their village to defecate or collect 




Opportunistic hunting by leopards 
 
 The leopard’s opportunistic hunting also makes it more likely to conflict with humans 
because humans have introduced livestock, an opportunistic hunters’ dream prey, into the 
ecosystem while refusing to recognize that this may result in livestock predation. Leopards will 
look to expend the least amount of energy to catch their prey when hunting for the 3 kg of daily 
meat they eat (Al-Johany, 2007). Livestock provide an easier food source than wild prey because 
they have few instincts to flee (cattle huddle in a pack to protect themselves from predators) and 
are usually corralled with no means of escape. Leopards in a location with livestock will 
therefore choose it over wild prey. This penchant only increases during the dry and/or winter 
season when lack of vegetation cover and decreased availability of seasonal prey can result in 
lower hunting success for leopards (Butler, 2000; Oli et al., 1994). 
 Furthermore, humans have accelerated this prey shift to livestock by hunting the 
leopard’s wild prey for bushmeat and legal hunting (Schaller, 2011). Kurvits et al. (2011) state 
that the loss of natural prey due to poorly managed hunting is one of the primary threats to snow 
leopards and Graham et al. (2005) & Henschel (2008) note that this same problem exists for 
leopards. Leopards require medium and large-sized ungulates to eat, types of species that are 
often poached for bushmeat in densely populated areas (Henschel, 2008). They cannot subsist on 
small-bodied prey alone, although they will shift their prey choice and size when their preferred 
prey is not available (Butler, 2000; Henschel, 2008). Part of this shift in prey choice involves 
eating non-wild species (i.e. livestock and pets) if this is the next best thing to their preferred 
prey (Graham et al., 2005). 
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Introducing livestock into the leopard’s habitat can change predator-prey activity patterns 
because the leopard will sync its behavior to mirror that of livestock instead of wild prey to 
increase its foraging efficiency (Eriksen et al., 2011). This choice of food can then be passed on 
to future generations when raising cubs. In Zimbabwe and Namibia, Stander (1990) (in Butler 
(2000)) documented the existence of such “rogue individuals” that consistently attack livestock 
rather than wild prey once they have discovered livestock as a food group10. To date, there is no 
conclusive evidence that only a small number of rogue leopards attack and kill livestock. When 
farmers introduce livestock into an area, leopards will start to eat livestock, especially if wild 
prey numbers are declining. Killing leopards in retaliation for livestock losses is ineffective 
because solving the problem would require killing the entire leopard population and all other 




 Surplus killing is, for example, when a leopard enters a sheep corral and kills 10-15 sheep 
but eats only one or two (Al-Johany, 2007). Farmers in the Western Cape Province of South 
Africa describe this phenomenon by saying leopards are thirsty for blood and go into a killing 
frenzy at the sight/smell of it (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011). Linnell et 
al. (1999), though, suggests that this behavior is adaptive and occurs in other large carnivore 
species like wolves, cougars, and grizzly bears, and among small carnivores that cache carcasses 
																																																								
10 Stander (1990) (in Butler (2000)) and Linnell, Odden, Smith, Aanes, and Swenson (1999) 
suggest that these individuals tend to be males but find no evidence that these individuals have 
less hunting skill because they are young, injured, or old. 
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for later. This behavior is not often seen in the wild for lack of opportunity because wild prey 
rarely cluster together when attacked (unlike livestock). Agro-pastoralists, though, are further 
angered by the waste and high cost such surplus killings cause (Al-Johany, 2007). Surplus 
killings foster a deep resentment of leopards among affected farmers, which can then degenerate 
into retaliatory killings. 
 
General illegal killings versus species-specific illegal killings 
 
The main problem with looking at illegal wildlife killings as a general phenomenon is 
that each species is illegally killed for very specific reasons. Looking at illegal killings as a 
whole is therefore ineffective in coming up with a targeted solution to the problem. For example, 
rhinos are primarily killed for the traditional medicine trade, with the profits from this trade 
going towards all sorts of organized crime activities (Gettleman, 2012a). Although rhino 
poaching is, theoretically, a subset of general poaching, looking at it from this perspective is 
simply too broad, resulting in general solutions that are ill suited to rhinos. Solutions like 
preemptively dehorning rhinos or covering their horns in fluorescent dye that shows up at 
customs checkpoints (Agence France Presse, 2011a; Gerardy, 2010), are not transferable to say, 
Mangshan Pit Viper poaching, which is done primarily for the pet trade and where the whole 
snake is smuggled out of China alive (TRAFFIC & IUCN, 2008).  
Even among animals illegally killed for the same reason, like H-WC, the solutions for 
each species are different. Compare, for example, retaliatory elephant killings where farmers kill 
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elephants that trample their crops11 (Bakano, 2011; Chadwick & Winter, 2010; K. Ray, 2012; 
Watts, 2013) and retaliatory lion killings in Kenya where livestock owners shoot livestock-eating 
lions (Hunter, 2012; Lion Guardians, 2012). For the elephants, the Kenya Wildlife Service 
(KWS) chose to remove them from the Narok region, which could no longer support such a large 
pachyderm population, and transport them to a wilder location, Maasai Mara National Park 
(Bakano, 2011). For the lions, an NPO chose to train local Maasai warriors to monitor lion 
movements using radio-collars and educate their fellow villagers about how to prevent livestock 
losses using predator proof corrals and better husbandry techniques (Hunter, 2012; Lion 
Guardians, 2012). 
The choice to relocate the elephants but not the lions stems from the difference in the 
ecology of each species. Lions are territorial while elephants are not (African Elephant Specialist 
Group, Species Survival Commission, & IUCN, 2011; Funston, Mills, & Biggs, 2001). 
Relocating lions to a different habitat is fraught with risk because of the high chance of death and 
stress from fighting for a new territory with the current lion residents of that area (Dloniak, 
2012). Second, there are two different ecological phenomena driving the H-WCs here. H-WC 
can occur when a species’ population is too large to survive in a particular habitat, like with the 
elephants in Kenya (Bakano, 2011), but it can also occur because humans introduce an easier 
prey into an ecosystem, like with lions and livestock in Kenya (Al-Johany, 2007). Each scenario 
requires a different response. Although the motivation to illegally kill lions and elephants 
appears to be the same (i.e. H-WC), the complexity of the environment in which these killings 
take place requires different solutions for each species. 
																																																								
11 In Sumatra, elephants knock down palm trees to eat heart of palm, a favorite food and end up 
destroying farmers’ palm oil plantations (Watts, 2013). 
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 Even among carnivore-human conflicts, the ecology of each carnivore species makes 
cross-species comparisons difficult and questionable without studying each individual carnivore 
first. Leopards, for example, are some of the most versatile big cats in terms of habitat (Bailey, 
2005; Panthera, 2015). This makes them more likely to adapt to human encroachment on their 
territory than lions, for example. As a result, you would expect leopards to move, if possible, 
before they remain near humans and resort to eating their livestock from lack of wild prey. 
Lions, on the other hand, may have a harder time finding an alternate appropriate habitat and so 
may resort to eating local pastoralists’ livestock earlier than leopards. Female lions also tend to 
hunt in packs (Funston et al., 2001), while leopards hunt alone. An incident of lion predation can 
therefore result in more dead livestock and can have a larger impact on local livestock operations 
than a case of leopard predation. 
All these ecologically driven differences in carnivore-human conflicts are hypothetical 
because no comparison studies have yet been done. Given this lack of research, though, it seems 
unwise to group carnivore-human conflicts together. In fact, previous research suggests that 
extrapolation of solutions from one species to another is often ineffective (Chapron et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, SCP, the framework on which this study is based, emphasizes the need to look at 
specific crimes when coming up with crime prevention techniques to better target the prevention 
methods (Clarke, 1983; Cornish & Clarke, 1987). As such, a researcher using SCP would 
differentiate between burglaries of retail establishments vs. burglaries of single-family houses 
(Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2013). Given all of the above, this research will focus 




Motivations for illegal leopard killings 
 
Although illegal leopard killings occur across the leopard’s range, many motivations for 
illegal killings are locally driven either because the motivation only exists in a small 
geographical area or because offenders only kill a limited number of leopards. As such, the 
following section separates motivations into minor threats to leopard conservation versus major 
threats. A minor threat is any threat that is geographically limited or affects such a small number 
of leopards that it does not seriously threaten the species. This assessment of the scope of leopard 
poaching is based on the current literature from the fields of biology, anthropology, criminology, 
and agricultural studies. 
 
Small-scale threats to leopards by illegal killing motivation 
Bushmeat hunting (Africa and India) 
 
 Although leopards live in areas where bushmeat hunting is documented (Africa and 
India) and they would provide adequate lean meat for consumption (Bikya Masr, 2012; 
Carpaneto & Fusari, 2000; Mfunda & Roskaft, 2010), they tend not be sought after for bushmeat. 
Carpaneto and Fusari (2000) found that most hunters in central-western Tanzania ate or sold 
about 73% of their catch while the remaining 27% of their catch were from animals they hunted 
to protect their crops or livestock and was not meant for human consumption. Carnivores tended 
to fall into the latter category. They are rarely killed for bushmeat because of cultural taboos 
associated with eating them and the fact that many local residents do not like the taste of their 
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meat. The only exception is the African civet (Civettictis civetta), eaten by local residents in 
Tanzania (Carpaneto & Fusari, 2000). Thus, leopards are not directly at risk from bushmeat 
hunting, but they are indirectly hurt when hunters kill their prey species. 
  
The pet trade (Middle East) 
 
Big cat poaching for the exotic pet trade does exist but is of limited conservation impact 
for leopards because of the small numbers of animals involved. Warchol et al. (2003) found 
evidence of a “status pet” market for large cats and reptiles in the Middle East. This trade also 
seems to exist in New York City, where a Harlem man was arrested in 2003 for keeping a full-
grown tiger in his apartment that he had raised from a cub (CNN, 2003). Occasional stories like 
this crop up in the news, but no comprehensive study has been done to determine the extent and 
locations of this trade. Given how impractical it is to keep an aggressive large cat as a pet, 
though, this motivation for poaching leopards is probably limited. 
 
The traditional medicine trade (Africa and Southeast Asia: primary receiving countries) 
 
Some leopards may be illegally hunted for the traditional medicine trade. Leopard skins 
and body parts are traded for traditional medicine because users believe owning these items will 
provide them with the animal’s strength (Whiting et al., 2011). Henschel (2008) described a 
regional market in the Congo Basin for leopard skins, claws, and canine teeth for the traditional 
medicine trade, as did Al-Johany (2007) in Saudi Arabia. John (2014) also found this to be true 
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for leopard claws, skulls, canine teeth, and pelts in Southeast Asia. Reports of search and seizure 
by government authorities suggest that middlemen in Southeast Asia smuggle leopard parts for 
the traditional medicine trade to countries where demand is high. 
Several pieces of information, though, suggest that leopard poaching for the traditional 
medicine trade is limited and may not be a major threat to leopard survival. Whiting et al. 
(2011)’s study of the Faraday market in South Africa found that most of the 32 traders who 
offered leopard products sold small pieces of leopard skin or bones/claws/teeth, rather than 
whole carcasses. These traders tended to run small cash-strained businesses where their ability to 
obtain leopard products depended on proximity to leopard habitat or available disposable income 
to buy inventory or travel to hunt a leopard (Botha, 1998; Botha et al., 2004; Whiting et al., 
2011). Furthermore, not all leopard parts they sold came from illegally killed leopards, some 
came from animals that died of natural causes (Whiting et al., 2011). 
This suggests that the number of leopards being poached specifically for the traditional 
medicine trade may be relatively small, as hundreds of small pieces of leopard skin could have 
come from one carcass. In addition, most traders indicated that, although they knew of 
commercial gatherers for traditional medicine ingredients (an inevitable by-product of its 
lucrative profits), they generally did not buy from them, because they were unsure their products 
were genuine and/or purified according to traditional rituals (Botha, 1998). Since most traders do 
not have the financial resources to travel long distances to collect specimens (Botha, 1998; Botha 
et al., 2004), it appears that traditional healers are only a small-scale threat to leopards. 
Traditional healers’ belief that they are conservationists meant to “carry the medicinal plants and 
animals into the future” reinforces this (Botha, 1998, p. 631). 
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The pelt trade (Southeast Asia and South Africa) 
 
Poaching for pelts is perhaps one of the more common motivations for illegal leopard 
killings given the numbers of pelts intercepted by law enforcement authorities, primarily in 
Southeast Asia (TRAFFIC, 2011). Large numbers of leopard pelt seizures have taken place in 
India, China, Thailand, and Nepal with smaller numbers occurring in select African countries 
(see table A1 in the Appendix) (Tsabedze, 2011, November 25). Poaching for pelts is common in 
large parts of India and Myanmar for leopards (Deccan Chronicle, 2012, January 6; John, 2014; 
Platt, 2012) and in Baltistan, Pakistan, in winter for snow leopards (Hussain, 2003). Snow 
leopards are caught in leg snares and clubbed to death or starved so their pelt is not damaged. 
The pelts are then taken to a market in Peshawar for domestic buyers and in the Arab Gulf states 
and Europe for foreign buyers. A well-kept snow leopard pelt can fetch $400 U.S. dollars in 
Skardu, Pakistan, an amount equal to a year's cash income for most local families (Hussain, 
2003). Tibetans also collect snow leopard skins to use as trim or be sown into the backs of 
traditional costumes worn in Sichuan Province, China (TRAFFIC, 2011). In India, leopards are 
killed in similar ways to snow leopards but are also poisoned with over-the-counter pesticides 
like carbofuran (Hindustan Times, 2013). Their pelts can sell for $10,000 to $14,000 U.S. dollars 
(Platt, 2012). 
Members of the Shembe religious group in the KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa 
also kill leopards illegally to wear their skins during religious ceremonies as a sign of their love 
of nature (Roberts, 2010, October 10). They do not believe they are diminishing leopard 
populations because their leader, Isaiah Shembe, has the power to create more leopards. Since 
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leopard skins cost about 6,000 South African Rand (about $730 U.S. dollars), owning one is 
viewed as a sign of wealth and respect, increasing their demand (Roberts, 2010, October 10). 
Members of the Zulu tribe also wear leopard pelts as a symbol of power, as do Congolese rebel 
army military officers (Roberts, 2010, October 10; Salopek & Olson, 2005). These traditions 
present a threat to leopard populations in areas with Shembe and Zulu tribesmen, but this threat 
is decreasing as NPOs are successfully working with these communities to replace leopard pelts 





There are two ways in which trophy hunting can contribute to leopard poaching: 1) when 
a hunter wants to “bag a leopard”, 2) when a game farm owner shoots a leopard to protect his 
legal trophy hunting species. The first is less documented, but a few researchers found evidence 
that the historical practice of leopard trophy hunts continues today on a small-scale. Al-Johany 
(2007) found that local residents in Saudi Arabia organize hunting parties to kill leopards as a 
source of personal pride/honor and to gather their pelts. The CITES leopard export permit 
quotas, 150 permits for South Africa in 2012 for example, also suggest that leopards are still 
subject to trophy hunting (CITES Secretariat, n.d.; Mabuse & Ko, 2012; Quammen, 2005). 
Warchol et al. (2003) found that a small number of adult African cheetahs and leopards are 
actually caught alive and sold to game farms for trophy hunting. 
 The second is a by-product of species-focused conservation policies for the promotion of 
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trophy hunting (Hussain, 2003). Part of wildlife tourism revolves around trophy hunting on 
commercial game farms or through government-regulated hunts, where legislation conserves 
certain species to guarantee thriving game populations for hunts. These ventures attract hunters 
based on how easily they can shoot wild game, mainly large ungulates. This gives game farm 
owners and local community members, who benefit from the proceeds of a hunt, a reason to 
shoot leopards or other carnivores on their property to stop them from eating wild game that 
customers/hunters can hunt (Graham et al., 2005; Hussain, 2003). The fact that most large 
carnivores are not legal to hunt or are almost impossible to obtain hunting permits for reinforces 
this behavior because leopards have no cash value in the eyes of game farm owners. 
 
Large-scale threats to leopards by illegal killing motivation 
H-WC and retaliatory killings 
 
The biggest current threat for leopards in Africa and Southeast Asia appears to be 
retaliatory killings triggered by H-WC12. This phenomenon is recognized as one of the biggest 
threats to wildlife conservation because of the cost preserving wildlife imposes on people in rural 
areas (Hill, 2004; Holmern et al., 2007; Wikramanayake et al., 1998). For example, local 
residents living near a national park or prime leopard habitat are more likely to experience 
livestock losses from leopards or risk being killed by them. A May 2012 newspaper article in 
The Star of Kenya described how residents of Gilgil vowed to kill a leopard that killed 24 sheep 
																																																								
12 Retaliatory killings are illegal unless the shooter obtains a permit from the relevant wildlife 
authority to kill the “problem leopard.” 
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and injured 6 others during a midnight attack (Murage, 2012, May 13). Another article published 
in The Tribune of India discussed how a shopkeeper from the Chopda area of Didihat was killed 
by a leopard who was later found clutching his body by the neck not far from his shop (Khanna, 
2012, January 26). The outcome of these types of incidents can be retaliatory leopard killings. A 
March 2012 article in The Indian Express, for instance, reported on a series of leopard killings in 
the Assam area where residents, angry after a series of leopard attacks on humans, retaliated by 
killing two leopards and eating their meat (Gupta Kashyap, 2012, March 6). 
  
Livestock predation as triggers of retaliatory killings 
 
The main type of H-WC that triggers retaliatory leopard killings is leopard predation on 
livestock, which causes serious economic losses for small-scale meat farms (Athreya, Odden, 
Linnell, & Karanth, 2010; Kgathi, Mmopelwa, Mashabe, & Mosepele, 2012; King, 2006; 
Kurvits et al., 2011; Snow, 2006) (see table 2.1a below for a summary of the events and 
conditions necessary for retaliatory leopard killings motivated by leopard livestock predation). 
Butler (2000) found that leopards are responsible for 12% of livestock killings in areas bordering 
wildlife reserves in Zimbabwe, mainly by jumping into fortified kraals (enclosures) at night. In 
South Africa, “Farmers Weekly” magazine (the oldest agriculture magazine in the country) 
reported that sheep farms lose 9% of their flock to predators (compared to 6% in the U.S.), while 
90% of sheep losses are due to predation (37% for the U.S.) (Bezuidenhout, 2010, August 20). 
Agro-pastoralists’ retaliatory behavior can range from direct retaliation by killing a 
suspected “problem animal” to indirect retaliation by opposing the creation of wildlife 
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sanctuaries or the implementation of other conservation initiatives (Graham et al., 2005). Some 
illegal leopard killings fall into the former category of direct retaliatory killings (Kurvits et al., 
2011; Oli et al., 1994). Agro-pastoralists sometimes poison the carcasses of dead livestock to kill 
any returning predators. This method is particularly effective for most carnivores because almost 
all species return to their kill within 24 hours, and if not, there is always another 
predator/scavenger willing to eat the remains (Al-Johany, 2007). 
Agro-pastoralists, though, will often not care what animal killed their livestock and will 
retaliate against whatever species or individual animal they believe, rather than know, is at fault 
(Government wildlife official 1, personal communication, July 31, 2011). In the Western Cape 
Province of South Africa, some farmers that have experienced stock losses to predators shoot 
any leopard that comes onto their property. Since leopards are stealthy and hard to catch, these 
farmers will call upon a local community member with specially trained hunting dogs to 
organize a leopard hunt (Government wildlife official 1, personal communication, July 31, 
2011). In Gabon, local residents resort to snaring leopards on the edges of national parks, where 
leopard livestock predation is common. (Henschel, 2008). Both arbitrarily shooting and snaring 
leopards are ineffective responses to livestock predation because they indiscriminately target all 
leopards. They do not guarantee that the problem leopard has been dealt with and can have 







Table 2.1a. Summary of events and conditions necessary for an illegal leopard killing driven by 
leopard predation on livestock 
 
 Leopard Cattle Farmer Environment 
Pre-leopard 
shooting 
Roaming far distances 
for food 
 
Struggling to make a 
living 
 





Trying to avoid human 
activity 






Leaving cattle to graze 
unsupervised in fields 
 





Struggling to find food 








Believes should have 0 
losses from predators 
 
Small corridors with no 
buffer near human 
activities 
 
Creation of national 
parks sparking H-WC at 
park boundary 
 
Wants to expend the 
least energy to eat 
Presence of cattle with 








struggling to stay/get 
pregnant because of 
malnutrition 
 
Feeding frenzy and kills 
more than eats 
 
The shooting Leopard returns to kill 
within 24 hours 
 
Wildlife service too 
slow or has no 





guarantees return to kill 
Cornered by farmer 
 
No trust in methods of 
wildlife service 
 
Reacts defensively and 
attacks 
Knows of other farmer 
who shot a leopard 
without consequence 
Leopard’s mountainous 
habitat makes it harder to 
kill after it discards cattle 
carcass permanently Knows farmer with 






N/A Dumps carcass in bush 
to destroy evidence 
 
Loss of breeding female 
affects breeding for that 
season and/or results in 
death of her current cubs 
N/A Sells carcass to middle 
man (Shembe 
tribesman, traditional 
medicine user, or 
smuggler) 
 
Loss of alpha male 
means new male comes 
in and kills previous 
offspring 
N/A Profits off leopard kill 
if carcass sold 
Increase in “pest 
species” until food chain 
balance is restored 
No prosecution / 
occasional small fine 
 
New leopard moves into 
open territory 
 
Leopard attacks on humans as triggers of retaliatory killings 
 
A different retaliatory killing problem exists in India where leopards attack humans in or 
near rural villages (see table 2.1b below for a summary of events and conditions necessary for 
retaliatory killings of leopards motivated by leopard attacks on humans). In March 2012, in the 
town of Kamrup, villagers killed a leopard that attacked 8 people in a local field (Gupta 
Kashyap, 2012, March 6). Not all these cases of human attacks, though, have resulted in the 
death of the leopard. A surprising number ended with local residents calling the Indian wildlife 
service for help removing the leopard to more remote wilderness (Khanna, 2012, January 26). 
The reality of a growing world population and industrialization is that untouched wilderness is 
growing scarce, making it more common for humans and animals to co-exist in semi-wild 
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terrain. Learning to manage these interactions in non-lethal ways for both humans and leopards 
will ensure that H-WC does not result in widespread species extinction. 
 
Table 2.1b. Summary of events and conditions necessary for an illegal leopard killing driven by 
a leopard attack on a human 
 
 Leopard Villagers Environment 
Pre-leopard 
shooting 
Roaming far distances 
for food 
 
Living without running 
water or indoor 
plumbing 
 







Trying to avoid human 
activity 
Travel into forest for 
water and 
urination/defecation 
Overlap of foraging area 




Travel into forest to 
shoot small prey for 





Small corridors with no 
buffer near human 
activities 
 
Struggling to find food 








Feel abandoned by 
government resources 
 
Nearby national park 
with higher 
concentration of leopards 
 
Wants to expend the 
least energy to eat 
 
 
Presence of easy prey 
like cattle (no wild 
instincts) and feral dogs 
(no guardianship) near 
villages 
 
Roams near villages 
















attacks and/or kills 
human 
Wildlife service too 
slow or has no 
resources to respond 
Territorial nature of 
leopards guarantees 
human perceived as 
threat 
No trust in methods of 
wildlife service 
 
Know of others who 




towards crowd and 
human presence fuels 
villagers’ anger 
Crowd’s anger at 
leopard fuels urge to 
kill 
Crowd beats or shoots 
leopard to death 
Post-leopard 
shooting 
N/A Crowd feasts on 
leopard meat, celebrates 
 
Loss of breeding female 
affects breeding for that 
season and/or results in 
death of her current cubs 
N/A Dump carcass in bush 
to destroy evidence 
 
 
Loss of alpha male 
means new male comes 
in and kills previous 
offspring 
N/A Profit off leopard kill if 
carcass sold 
Increase in “pest 
species” until food chain 
balance is restored 
No prosecution / 
occasional small fine 
 









Studying illegal wildlife killing as a broad phenomenon is misguided because the reasons 
for illegally killing each species are so specific. Illegal killings require targeted solutions that are 
non-transferable between species. Some motivations for illegally killing leopards are locally 
driven and affect only a small geographical area or number of leopards. These minor threats to 
leopard survival include bushmeat hunting, the pet trade, traditional medicine, the pelt trade, and 
trophy hunting. 
Major threats to leopard survival include retaliatory killings for livestock predation and 
human attacks. These H-LCs are exacerbated by leopard ecology, such as large home ranges and 
opportunistic hunting patterns, and human behaviors, like habitat destruction and misguided 














Chapter 3: Attempts to reduce illegal leopard killings 
 
Prevention methods for illegal leopard killings take many forms and can be tailored to 
specific killing motivations. For example, international treaties forbidding the trade in certain 
species are primarily meant to control poaching and illegal wildlife trafficking by stopping the 
import and export of wildlife. National laws, though, outlaw the catching or killing of wildlife 
irrespective of the perpetrator’s motivation, targeting both poaching and retaliatory killings. 
Tourism initiatives fulfill the same purpose by giving wildlife value in the eyes of local residents 
and dis-incentivizing both poaching and retaliatory killings. Only predation prevention methods 
focus solely on limiting H-WC, the immediate precursor event to retaliatory killings. 
 Few evaluations exist of these prevention methods for illegal killings (Pires & Moreto, 
2011). Nevertheless, it is possible to describe some of the successes and failures of wildlife 
crime legislation, law enforcement responses, and grass-roots prevention internationally. The 
following section begins by describing the prevention efforts that currently exist, then goes on to 
explain their pros and cons. Special emphasis is placed on measures that prevent H-WC induced 
retaliatory leopard killings because, as discussed in chapter 2, this is deemed to be the biggest 
threat to leopard survival. 
  
Legal protection of wildlife 
 
Several basic laws regulate the trade in leopards and their parts and prohibit hunters from 
killing leopards without a permit. These laws exist both on the international and the 
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national/provincial level. Below is a brief description of the main international agreement, 
CITES, and the country-specific laws relevant to this work: 
 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 
 
CITES is an international treaty between willing countries that regulates the movement of 
wild flora and fauna to prevent the extinction of these species from international trade (CITES 
Secretariat, n.d.). All species that are part of CITES (over 30,000) are subject to certain controls 
and require specific licenses when they are imported, exported, re-exported, and introduced from 
member nations either alive, dead, or as derivative products. 
These species are listed in three appendices based on the amount of protection needed. 
Appendix I species are at high risk of extinction and cannot be traded barring exceptional 
circumstances. In such cases, an export and an import permit are required and the importer must 
prove the import will not be detrimental to the survival of the species. Appendix II species are 
not necessarily threatened by extinction but their trade needs to be monitored to avoid 
unsustainable use. Appendix III species are protected in at least one member country that has 
requested the help of other nations in controlling the species’ trade (CITES Secretariat, n.d.). 
Each member country is responsible for creating the management structure needed within their 
borders to provide these licenses and monitor what effects the trade has on species population 
levels.13 This is perhaps one of the major weaknesses of CITES: its enforcement is only as good 
as the amount of effort a country puts into creating and monitoring this infrastructure. The 
																																																								
13 South Africa joined CITES in July 1975, India in July 1976, and Kenya in December 1978. 
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leopard is part of Appendix I and has been since January 7th, 1975.14 The following countries 
have obtained permission to export a select number of leopards in 2012 and 2015 (UNEP-
WCMC & CITES Secretariat, 2015): 
 
Table 3.1. Number of leopard export permits by country for 2012 and 2015 (no CITES exports 
permits given for leopards in 2014) 
 




What products can be exported 
Botswana 130 0 Trophies & skins 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
5 0 Skins 
Central African Republic 40 0 Trophies & skins 
Ethiopia 10 50 Trophies 
Kenya 80 0 Trophies & skins 
Malawi 50 0 Trophies & skins 
Mozambique 120 0 Trophies & skins 
Namibia 250 250 Trophies (2012, 2015) & skins as 
personal effects (2012) 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
500 500 Trophies (2012, 2015) & skins (2012) 
Uganda 28 0 Trophies & skins 
South Africa 150 0 Trophies & skins 
Zambia 300 0 Trophies & skins 
Zimbabwe 500 0 Trophies & skins 
* # of specimens. 
 
The National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act of 2004: Threatened or 
Protected Species Regulations (South Africa) 
 
 The National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act of 2004 consolidated existing 
																																																								
14 This does not mean poaching prevention measures have been successful overall. The IUCN 
Red List of Threatened Species explains that, although the leopard is highly adaptable compared 
to other big cats and remains widespread in certain parts of its habitat (sub-Saharan Africa), in 
other areas (North Africa), leopard subpopulations are on the verge of extinction. There is a 




South African biodiversity legislation and created national standards for how the country’s 
different wildlife management authorities should deal with wildlife (Endangered Wildlife Trust 
& South African National Biodiversity Institute, 2008). Its provisions for damage causing 
animals (including leopards) require the provincial conservation department to decide between 
capturing and relocating the animal or culling it. Either option can be carried out by the 
department or by an individual to whom they issue a permit for the procedure15. The holder of 
this permit can then choose to hunt the damage causing animal using the following methods: 
poison, bait and traps (including gin traps), dogs, darting, or shooting (Southern African Legal 
Information Institute, 2007). The skins of leopards killed using a damage causing animal permit 
cannot be exported outside South Africa (Balme et al., 2009). 
Under this legislation, leopards can also be legally hunted for trophies if a hunter 
possesses a CITES permit issued by the Province’s conservation department. Only a limited 
number of these permits are issued based on how vulnerable the local leopard population is to 
extinction (Balme et al., 2009; UNEP-WCMC & CITES Secretariat, 2015). In South Africa, 
leopards may not be killed without a permit unless killed in self-defense (where there is an 
immediate threat of death) (Southern African Legal Information Institute, 2007). 
 
The Wildlife Conservation and Management Act of 2013 (Kenya) 
 
 The Wildlife Conservation and Management Act of 2013 is the long awaited major 
																																																								
15 “In principle, destruction permits are issued only to landowners who demonstrate that a 
leopard represents a threat to life or property, and that no alternative non-lethal solutions is 
available” (Balme et al., 2009, p. 2683). 
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overhaul of the original act of 1976 (Kahumbu, 2013; National Council for Law Reporting, 
2013). The act came into effect on January 10th, 2014 (Republic of Kenya, 2013). Its major 
revisions include stringent penalties for poaching and restructured governance of wildlife 
resources where the regulation and management functions are separate from research (World 
Wildlife Fund, 2014). 
 Under this law, no wildlife can be killed in Kenya without a valid permit, unless in self-
defense. A problem animal, one causing harm to human life or property, can only be killed by a 
KWS official with permission from the land owner on which the animal resides (Republic of 
Kenya, 2013). If a family experiences a death, an injury, or loss of property as a result of H-WC 
and they have taken reasonable measures to protect themselves, they can submit a compensation 
claim to the county wildlife conservation authority. The authority will then award fair market 
value for damaged property or anywhere from 2 to 5 million Kenyan shillings in death or injury 
cases (about $22,000 to $55,000 U.S. dollars) (Republic of Kenya, 2013).  
Penalties for illegal hunting, possession of illegal wildlife products, or wildlife trafficking 
range from 2 years to life in prison or fines of 1 million to 20 million Kenyan shillings (about 
$11,000 to $220,000 U.S. dollars) depending on the conservation status of the animal killed 
(Republic of Kenya, 2013). Killing black and white rhinoceros, African elephants, and critically 
endangered species results in the harshest penalties. Leopards are a category below this group as 
“endangered mammals” (category B). Penalties for killing a leopard without a permit are a fine 
of 5 million Kenyan shillings (about $55,000 U.S. dollars) or imprisonment of five years or both 
(Republic of Kenya, 2013). The law establishes an inter-agency security team with members of 
KWS and the Police Service to apprehend poachers in protected areas. It requires that any KWS 
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official conniving with poachers be sacked and property obtained through poaching proceeds be 
seized (Kahumbu, 2013). 
 This act also outlaws livestock grazing in protected areas and bushmeat/subsistence 
hunting without a permit, although the penalties for both these offenses are much lighter than for 
poaching, usually a fine of up to 100,000 Kenyan shillings (about $1000 U.S. dollars) or 
imprisonment for up to 6 months (Republic of Kenya, 2013). 
 
The Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 (India) 
 
 The Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 (WPA) was the first piece of wildlife and 
environmental conservation legislation passed in India after its independence from British 
colonial rule (Misra, 2005). It prohibits the hunting and trafficking of wild animals and their 
parts (including trophies), except in cases where the Chief Wildlife Warden believes a wild 
animal is dangerous to human life or disabled or diseased beyond recovery (Indian Ministry of 
Environment, 1972). The WPA also appoints authorities to manage national parks and wildlife 
sanctuaries and prevent illegal killings. Protected species are separated into “schedules,” with 
schedules I and II focusing on endangered species (Misra, 2005). 
 The WPA has been revised multiple times since 1972 to keep pace with changing times 
(1982, 1986, 1991, 1993, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013). Revisions included adding more species to 
protected lists as they become endangered. India banned all exports of wildlife from the country 
in 2000, making its regulations even stricter than that of CITES (Misra, 2005). In 2002, India 
upped the penalties for wildlife crimes from 1 to 7 years in prison and a 5000 rupee minimum 
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fine (about $80 U.S. dollars) to 3 to 7 years with increased fines based on the severity of the 
offense (Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2015). The majority of wildlife trafficking 
offenses now require a 5 to 7 year prison sentence (Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests, 
2013). 
 Although public awareness of the legislation has increased, the specifics of what is legal or 
illegal under the WPA are poorly understood among the general public (Misra, 2005). 
Enforcement is still sporadic with little inter-agency communication, consultation, or joint action 
against offenders between the forestry, police, customs, and judiciary departments (Misra, 2005). 
Training of enforcement personnel is also limited, especially when it comes to species 
identification.16 
 
The effectiveness of laws 
 
 Although these laws exist, their effectiveness is highly dependent on how well they are 
applied by local law enforcement. Many countries have lacked the political will and public 
pressure for enforcing them (Schaller, 2011). For example, a study of ivory trading by Martin 
(2010, July-December) found that even though laws prohibit the sale of all ivory in Ghana (even 
antique pieces), you still frequently find ivory carvings for sale at markets. Only when law 
enforcement actively raided markets for illegal ivory, did sellers stop selling it (Martin, 2010, 
																																																								
16 Another challenge posed by this legislation is how to manage animal species whose 
populations have recovered and are now beginning to cause H-WCs where they have surpassed 
their habitat’s carrying capacity. This is complicated because some of these animals, like 
leopards, are problem animals in certain locations but are also victims of widespread poaching in 





 Previous studies have identified several factors hampering the proper implementation of 
wildlife protection laws. Firstly, law enforcement agents must be knowledgeable enough about 
these laws and have the proper skills to determine when they have been broken. For example, 
customs officials must be able to identify if a species is protected under CITES or local 
legislation (Warchol et al., 2003). It can sometimes be very difficult to differentiate between 
protected versus non-protected species, especially when few customs officials have the 
biological knowledge to do so. The ASEAN-WEN Wildlife Enforcement Network and the 
Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network TRAFFIC have created “Identification sheets for wildlife 
species traded in Southeast Asia” (see figure 3.1 for an example). These give detailed illustrated 
instructions on how to identify each protected species (or their byproducts) and differentiate 






Figure 3.1. Example of an identification sheet for the oriental rat snake produced by ASEAN-
WEN and TRAFFIC 
 
Second, many wildlife laws lack legitimacy or importance in the eyes of both the public 
and the courts. As a result, the public feels no moral obligation to obey the laws and courts 
impose light if any punishment, reinforcing the public’s behavior. For example, in rural Pakistan, 
illegal leopard killings occur with the consent of the whole village, despite its illegality. This 
collusion makes it all the more difficult to eradicate the custom (Hussain, 2003). In Nepal, the 
village elder in a small Gurung village has overruled the countries’ ban on killing leopards and 
bears after a leopard killed 21 goats in a day (Adhikari, 2012). Since the government has no 
presence in this part of Nepal, retaliatory leopard killings are likely to continue among villagers. 
Law enforcement and NPO efforts at the local level should focus on changing mentalities in such 
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areas, so local residents understand the importance of abiding by environmental laws for their 
region’s economic and biological survival (Pires & Moreto, 2011; K. Ray, 2012). 
Even if an offender is reported and caught, most courts do not impose harsh sentences for 
wildlife crimes because judges are often unfamiliar with environmental law or are unwilling to 
prosecute neighbors in rural areas (Martin, 2010, July-December; Warchol & Johnson, 2009). 
For example, an elephant poacher in Ghana received only a small fine and had his rifle 
confiscated for killing two elephants in Kakum National Park in 2003 (Martin, 2010, July-
December). A farmer who illegally killed two brown hyenas in the Barrydale region of South 
Africa (a very rare species) received only a $115 U.S. dollar fine for the killing because the 
presiding judge empathized with his stock losses (Government wildlife official 2, personal 
communication, August 19, 2011). This sort of behavior from the courts only bolsters local 
belief that obeying wildlife laws is unnecessary and opens the door for organized poaching 
operations. These operations are more than willing to accept such mild penalties as “the cost of 
doing business” because the profits from their hunts generally far outweigh their potential costs 
if caught (Leader-Williams & Milner-Gulland, 1993). 
 Thirdly, there is a lack of coordinated effort between actors in law enforcement at the 
local, national, and international level that hampers proper implementation and enforcement of 
wildlife laws (Kurvits et al., 2011; Lin, 2005). Since illegally poached species often travel across 
state lines to their buyers, international cooperation is essential to stop the wildlife trade 
(Schaller, 2011). Many countries are already collaborating to stop the illegal trade in endangered 
species. Vietnam and South Africa, for example, recently signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding pledging to work closely on biodiversity management, conservation, law 
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enforcement, and compliance with CITES and other relevant legislation and conventions 
(TRAFFIC, 2012a). This agreement primarily came about because of the voluminous illegal 
trade in rhino horn from South Africa to Vietnam (TRAFFIC, 2012a). 
Yet, regardless of how well countries are able to block the import or export of illegally 
poached species, it is important to remember that a domestic market can still exist (Lemieux & 
Clarke, 2009). To tackle the illegal trade in wildlife effectively, countries must strengthen their 
local and national enforcement of laws while also increasing international law enforcement 
cooperation. Preventing poaching is in large part about safeguarding the world’s biodiversity, 
which is essential to all species’ survival, including humans’. The best way to meet this goal is to 
prevent species from being killed in the first place. Species that are not traded live are dead by 
the time they reach international borders (Hussain, 2003; TRAFFIC, 2011). Even for live trade 
specimens, a large percentage of them will have died in transit by the time they reach the border 
(Pires, 2011). Preventing wildlife killings is therefore best done on the local level at the point of 
capture. Working at the local level also has the added advantage of targeting retaliatory killings 
because efforts focus on preventing the taking or killing of wildlife regardless of motive, not on 
preventing their transport. 
Some local enforcement efforts have proven to be effective at reducing wildlife crime. 
Several studies have shown that higher game warden to land mass ratios have reduced illegal 
killings as have better monitoring of patrol efforts that promote increased ranger time in the field 
(Ghoddousi et al., 2010; Martin, 2010, July-December). Better international cooperation will 
make it easier for countries to share these local successes with other nations so that they may 
improve their own law enforcement efforts. 
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Reactive versus preventive responses to illegal leopard killings 
  
 Based on the previous section, current laws often seem to fall short of preventing wildlife 
crime. Local prevention efforts may be more effective because they have the potential to prevent 
wildlife deaths and tackle the root beliefs and habits that facilitate illegal killings in rural 
communities. In fact, some researchers are suggesting that the reactive-policing model is not 
effective for wildlife crime and that law enforcement responses should focus on prevention 
rather than response (Pires & Moreto, 2011). 
Prevention methods have obvious advantages when trying to stop wildlife deaths, but it is 
important to note that market raids (a reactive rather than preventive method) have shown some 
promise in reducing ivory trading in Ghana and that similar methods may prove useful in 
reducing wildlife killings for profit (Martin, 2010, July-December). The key to successfully 
implementing such reactive methods is knowing when and where to use them instead of 
preventive action. 
This research focuses on H-WC driven leopard killings, which, unlike poaching, do not 
result in a wildlife byproduct (like pelts or bones) being sold. A reactive method is ill suited to 
this type of illegal killing since there is no market to shut down or raid. For retaliatory killings, 
prevention methods are far more useful than reactive ones for two reasons: 1) the ultimate goal is 
finding a non-lethal outcome to the conflict to prevent the killing of the problem animal and 2) 
the perpetrators are too focused on the immediate survival of their flock (and livelihood) to 
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consider the long-term outcomes of their actions17. 
The sections below describe two types of preventive response to retaliatory leopard 
killings that are currently used internationally. The first is predation reduction methods that 
attack the root cause of retaliatory leopard killings: leopard livestock predation. The second is 
green tourism whose goal is to convince local residents that live leopards have a monetary value 
because they bring in tourist dollars that benefit the community. 
 
Predation reduction methods 
Selective removal and relocation 
  
 One of the main approaches to preventing retaliatory leopard killings has been to reduce 
leopard predation on livestock thereby eliminating agro-pastoralists’ reason to kill leopards. 
Predation reduction methods tend to focus on controlling predator abundance18, but Graham et 
al. (2005) suggest that this approach is misguided because losses appear unrelated to predator 
density but related to prey availability. 
 Selective removal and relocation is one of the methods used to reduce predator 
abundance in an area and spread predator numbers out more evenly over the landscape. One of 
																																																								
17 Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland (1993)’s research explains that in developing countries, 
where the future is uncertain and so valued less than the present, concentrating on 
detection/prevention is better than increasing penalties since most citizens are not thinking about 
hypothetical future penalties. 
18 An exception to this is diversionary feeding, but this option has many downsides. It can only 
be used short-term because of the cost and effort involved. It also encourages leopards not to 





the only evaluations of this method by Athreya et al. (2010) in India, though, seems to support 
Graham et al. (2005)’s claims that controlling predator abundance is ineffective at reducing 
leopard predation on livestock. Athreya et al. (2010) found that translocating leopards led to a 
sharp increase in the number of leopard attacks on humans and a 56% increase in livestock 
predation events. Their findings indicated that leopards did not remain where they were 
translocated. These researchers suggested that the leopards’ increased aggression towards both 
humans and livestock was due to the stress of the translocations and return through unfamiliar 
landscapes back to their home territory, as well as a loss of fear of humans from their constant 
proximity during the translocation. These findings support those of Dr. Craig Packer, director of 
the Serengeti Lion Project, who found that, in Kenya, moving livestock-killing lions only shifted 
the problem to another area, because translocated lions were forced to the human-dominated 




 Selective culling of “problem leopards” is another popular solution in many areas, but it 
assumes that only certain leopards are prone to eating livestock and that these individuals can be 
successfully removed without other leopards taking their place as livestock eaters19 (Linnell et 
al., 1999). As this has yet to be proven (Linnell et al., 1999) and as there have been cases of 
farmers and even governments abusing laws that sanction the removal of problem animals 
(Coniff, 1999 in (Hussain, 2003)) (Geldenhuys, 2011, December 4; Hussain, 2003), this method 
																																																								
19 A process akin to “offender replacement” in the criminological literature. 
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remains suspect. Furthermore, the reduction in leopard numbers from poaching makes wildlife 
officials wary of issuing cull permits, causing tensions with local people suffering from livestock 
predation (Erasmus, 2011, January 21; Liberg et al., 2011). 
 Another risk with selective culling is the consequences it has for other ecologically 
dependent or related species in the food chain. Previous efforts to cull predators through 
strychnine poisoning for wolves (Bjorge & Gunson, 1985) and poisoned livestock carcasses for 
hyenas (Al-Johany, 2007) ended up killing non-target species and did not stop wolves and 
hyenas from attacking livestock. Hunting the jackal to extinction because it preyed on farmers’ 
livestock also failed because it caused spikes in pest species populations lower in the food chain, 
like rabbits (Government wildlife official 1, personal communication, July 31, 2011). All three 
of these examples show how policies like selective culling can have unforeseen negative effects 
on other species because they are poorly thought through. Even now, researchers do not fully 
understand all the links between species in an ecosystem (U.S. Geological Survey, 2007). 
Selective culling should therefore be used only as a last resort, if used at all, until all of its 
consequences are fully understood. 
Selective culling also does not encourage community tolerance for predators, which is a 
key component to the future conservation of leopards (Packer et al., 2009; K. Ray, 2012). 
Culling indirectly reinforces the idea that killing leopards is an acceptable method to reduce 
livestock predation. Reinforcing this idea can then lead individuals, like Oli et al. (1994)’s 
Nepalese subjects, to try and completely eradicate predators in their area and refuse to consider 




Innovative husbandry techniques 
 
 Some of the more promising (although not widely implemented or researched) methods 
to combat H-WC induced poaching are innovative husbandry techniques like predator-proof 
corrals and Anatolian sheep dogs or donkeys for more effective guardianship (Aryal, Brunton, Ji, 
Barraclough, & Raubenheimer, 2014; Gusain, 2014; Linnell et al., 1999; McManus, Dickman, 
Gaynor, Smuts, & Macdonald, 2015; Romans, 2014; Snow, 2006; World Wildlife Fund & 
Global Species Program, N.d.). 
 Predator-proof corrals (see figure 3.2) are specially made enclosures that prevent 
predators from reaching livestock. Maasais in the Maasai Mara area fortify their livestock 
enclosures with two feet of underground wire fencing and six to ten feet high wire walls to 
prevent lions from pushing through the fence, leopards from jumping over, and badgers and 
hyenas from digging under (Westberg & Westberg, 2012). These types of fortified corrals are a 
commonly used husbandry technique to prevent predation. In Botswana, for example, the 
government will only compensate livestock farmers for their predation losses if they can prove 






Figure 3.2. Example of a predator proof corral in Ulley Village, India (Panthera, 2014) 
 
Bell collars are placed on livestock to scare away predators. They ring when predators 
startle livestock, scaring the predator away. Anatolian sheep dogs or donkeys also ward off 
leopards from grazing livestock. Once they live with a herd, the dogs bond with it and attack any 
predator that tries to eat a member of their flock (Landmark Foundation, n.d.; Stannard, 2006). 
Anatolian sheep dogs work well in conjunction with bell collars because the sound from the bell 
collars alerts the dog to a problem in the herd.20 In South Africa, donkeys can provide a good 
alternative to Anatolians because of their low cost. An adult donkey, if sufficiently angered, can 
kill a leopard by kicking it with its hooves (Gusain, 2014; Romans, 2014) (Farmer 1, personal 
communication, August 17, 2011). 
 
																																																								
20 Note that The Landmark Foundation states that innovative husbandry techniques should be 
used “holistically as part of an adaptive and dynamic management plan. No single method is 
100% effective on its own. They work best when applied in combination” (Landmark 





Figure 3.3. Example of a bell collar (Landmark Foundation, n.d.) 
 
The main problem with these measures has been convincing farmers to try them and 
apply them properly. This is even before the hurdle of finding funding to subsidize their 
implementation (Kurvits et al, 2011) (NPO worker 1, personal communication, July 31, 2011; 
Government wildlife official 3, personal communication, August 23, 2011). Hemson et al. 
(2009), for example, found that Botswana cattle post owners were not willing to improve 
husbandry techniques to protect their livestock, but were willing to kill lions. Few had attempted 
it, but the ones who had killed 20% of the lion population during the study. 
Convincing farmers to use innovative husbandry techniques is difficult in South Africa as 
well because farmers believe proponents of these new techniques have insufficient animal 
farming experience and are basing their recommendations on limited research and isolated 
success stories (Bezuidenhout, 2010, August 20). Part of this belief may stem from unrealistic 
expectations of what these methods should do. Farmers sometimes believe that innovative 
husbandry techniques should eradicate livestock predation completely, which is unrealistic. They 




Bell collars, for instance, have had mixed success based on how well they are used (King, 
2006; Landmark Foundation, n.d.) (NPO worker 1, personal communication, July 31, 2011). To 
use them effectively, farmers must commit to putting them on their flock one day, then returning 
to the grazing site the next day and removing them, and continue this pattern for several weeks at 
a time during periods of livestock vulnerability, like lambing season. Unfortunately, this process 
is time consuming and puts added pressure on the farmer (NPO worker 4, personal 
communication, August 21, 2011) (King, 2006). 
Donkeys require less careful monitoring, but farmers must still check on their flock 
regularly because some donkeys never bond with the herd. Donkeys also do not protect animals 
that stray from the pack, like pregnant cows that wander away to give birth. One interviewed 
farmer reported that that 2 out of 4 of his donkeys never bonded with his livestock, leaving them 
unprotected (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011). Those that did bond with the 
herd were effective guardians, but farmer supervision is still required to determine if a donkey 
has bonded with its herd. A guardian animal does not replace the vigilant eye of a shepherd. 
As for Anatolian sheep dogs, they must be properly bred and stopped from bonding with 
humans. Ideally, a farmer should check on his dog once a day and feed him then to insure 
baboons or other opportunistic wild animals do not eat his food. Stolen food can cause dogs to 
hunt wild game instead of protecting the herd (Farmer's Weekly, 2009, May 22). Poor breeding 
can also result in dogs having a “game hunting drive” that makes them ill suited to guard 
livestock (Government wildlife official 3, personal communication, August 23, 2011). Finally, 
Anatolian sheep dogs can suffer from tick-borne illnesses that reduce their effectiveness as 
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guardians if their owners do not properly groom them (Government wildlife official 3, personal 
communication, August 23, 2011). 
Despite their defensive attitudes towards innovative husbandry techniques, farmers have 
valid reasons for their complaints. The head of the African Large Predator Research Unit at the 
University of the Free State (South Africa), H.O. de Waal, argues that little scientific research 
has been done on the efficiency of predator management (de Waal, 2009, July 3). Many non-
lethal methods of deterring predators, like donkeys and bell collars, have proven to be only 
temporarily effective until predators learn to outwit them (de Waal, 2009, July 3). He cites the 
example of livestock protection collars21 (also known as “dead stop” or “King collars”, see 
figures 3.4a and 3.4b) that have shown some success against carnivore livestock attacks, but 
have failed to prevent jackal predation because jackals adapted to the collars and learned to 
attack animals from behind instead of at the throat. Instead of automatic death, this resulted in 
farmers finding sheep and goats with their abdominal cavities gaping and entrails trailing, left to 













21 This can either be a hard plastic collar placed around a sheep’s throat or a wire one that looks 
like a cage around the throat. The hard plastic version generally contains poison to kill the 


















Figures 3.4a & 3.4b. a) Example of a livestock protection collar with poison inside it (Retrieved 
from http://www.livestockprotection.net/collar01.htm); b) example of a dead-stop collar that 
protects an animal’s throat from injury (Landmark Foundation, n.d.) 
 
Existing efforts to study the problem of predator management tend to be too fragmented 
with resources inefficiently managed, in part because too many actors are involved in the process 
(the agricultural department, the environmental affairs department, and numerous provincial 
departments) (Bezuidenhout, 2010, August 20; Farmer's Weekly, 2010, October 29). These 
departments often have limited research funds (insufficient to sustain large research projects) and 
lack experts in predation and livestock management to help research and evaluate effective 
solutions to livestock predation. 
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In addition, the absence of national norms for dealing with predation issues means that 
each province or department implements its own policies without regard for what others have 
done and what has worked elsewhere (Farmer's Weekly, 2010, October 29). Coordinating the 
efforts of all these parties more efficiently would produce better results. It would also lower the 
frustration of livestock farmers trying to work with this bureaucracy and increase their trust in 
suggested predation prevention methods (Farmer 2, personal communication, August 5, 2011; 
Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011) (Bezuidenhout, 2010, August 20; K. Ray, 
2012). 
NPOs seem more motivated to research innovative husbandry techniques to prevent 
livestock predation by leopards (Landmark Foundation, n.d.). The Landmark Foundation is 
currently working on an evaluation of husbandry techniques in the Western and Eastern Cape 
Provinces of South Africa (Landmark Foundation, n.d.). Their results, just published in the 
journal Oryx, show that non-lethal predator management methods (like Anatolian sheep dogs, 
donkeys, and livestock collars) proved cheaper for start-up and running costs per year and more 
effective than past lethal methods (McManus, Dickman, et al., 2015).22 
One problem with these findings is that NPOs are advocates for leopard conservation 
and, as such, are not unbiased evaluators of innovative husbandry techniques. Their research 
therefore remains suspect until the academic community does its own assessment. At this point, 
the mixed reviews of innovative husbandry techniques, with their intermittent successes, suggest 
they have potential but need further assessment before they can be touted as effective for 
																																																								
22	These methods are probably best applied on an individual basis as their effectiveness varies 
from farm to farm based on flock size and the location of farm land, hence the preliminary 
results’ widespread range of 56 to 97% percent reductions in livestock predation (Moberly, 
White, Webbon, Baker, & Harris, 2004). 
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predation prevention. Ideally, future evaluation efforts will include government departments and 
researchers not affiliated with NPOs. This will bolster the methods’ credibility with farmers and 
the research community. 
 
Tourism and “diffusion of benefits” measures 
 
 Green tourism and community-based conservation (CBC) programs continue to be 
championed for promoting conservation by giving the profits from wildlife viewing back to local 
populations (C. Mishra et al., 2003; Pires & Moreto, 2011). The theory behind green tourism is 
that this diffusion of benefits helps local people view wildlife as valuable when alive, with a cash 
value versus an ecological value, and gives them an incentive to protect local species. 
 Reviews are mixed as to whether or not CBC programs are effective (Schaller, 2011). A 
study by Hemson et al. (2009) of tourist facilities around Botswana’s Makgadikgadi Pans 
National Park found that, despite these facilities paying large sums of money to Botswana, few 
local residents felt that tourism was valuable and benefited them. The majority of those 
interviewed believed that the government, not their communities, saw most of the profits 
(Hemson et al., 2009). 
 Hemson et al. (2009)’s research suggests that tourism brings in large amounts of money 
but that its distribution to local communities is flawed or, according to Schaller (2011), 
inexistent. One of the ideas behind CBC is that those who suffer the costs of cohabitating with 
wildlife should receive the benefits from wildlife tourism, even a non-homogenous sharing of 
benefits that is proportional to each family’s loss. Yet, local residents near Makgadikgadi 
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exclusively benefited from local tourist ventures through employment, with only 17% of families 
benefiting, while 65% of families experienced livestock predation losses (Hemson et al., 2009). 
Examples like these confirm the following quote from Botha et al. (2004) that: 
"Although there has been limited success in achieving the twin goals of biodiversity 
conservation and improving local livelihoods in CBC programs worldwide, most reviews 
concur that this is due to the complex local and global environments in which they 




One widely accepted and implemented measure to reduce retaliatory killings is 
compensation programs where victims of carnivore predation can file a complaint and receive 
money for their dead livestock (Hemson et al., 2009; Hill, 2004; Oli et al., 1994; Schaller, 2011). 
Some conservation organizations, like the Corbett Foundation, have even created programs that 
disburse funds immediately to local residents while they wait for their compensation claims to 
filter through the government bureaucracy. In India, this can take between 16 and 18 months 
(World Wildlife Fund, 2010, December). For the Corbett program, the owner must report the kill 
within 72 hours and inspect the carcass with a Foundation employee. Cash payment is made 
upon inspection and owners keep this cash in addition to the government’s compensation. 
Informers who report a kill before an owner are also compensated, incentivizing aggrieved 
livestock owners not to poison carcasses in retaliation and to call the Corbett Foundation 
themselves (World Wildlife Fund, 2010, December). 
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An alternative to this type of compensation is monetary incentive programs where a 
conservation organization enters into a contract to buy local handicraft or crops and provide a 
cash bonus if no illegal killings occur on community land. Any violation of the no illegal killing 
clause, regardless of whether the violator is a community member or an outsider, results in the 
loss of the bonus for all participants and the expulsion of community member violators from the 
program (C. Mishra et al., 2003). The added benefit of this program is that it encourages local 
people to protect wildlife from poachers outside their community. 
Although these types of programs are popular with local residents, they have high costs 
and generally do not sustain themselves (Schaller, 2011). They are also expensive to expand past 
the local level (C. Mishra et al., 2003). Furthermore, unless compensation for livestock losses is 
dependent on livestock owners using predation prevention methods on their farms, compensation 
programs can lead to neglect of good husbandry practices (Hemson et al., 2009). Incentives to 
use predation prevention methods are undermined if a farmer is reimbursed for all livestock 
losses regardless of context. Given all this, these programs are probably not the most cost-
effective or long-lasting solutions for H-WC driven illegal leopard killings. 
 
The importance of community engagement 
 
 The mixed success of predation prevention and “diffusion of benefits” measures suggests 
that stopping the illegal killing of leopards is fraught with difficulties. Even when the type of 
intervention needed is clear, “good science and good laws do not necessarily result in effective 
conservation” (Schaller, 2011, p. 91). The wildcard in conservation is the community. To 
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achieve continued success according to Schaller (2011, p. 91), “communities must be directly 
involved as full partners in conservation by contributing their knowledge, insights, and skills.” 
 The problem is that communities are not always willing to prevent illegal leopard 
killings. Human tolerance for carnivores and H-WC is essential to conservation efforts and must 
be developed for wild animals outside of protected areas (K. Ray, 2012). The focus should now 
be on creating a “conservation landscape” where you merge protected areas and human-
dominated land. The reality is that most countries no longer have the space to set up large 
conservation areas. Protected areas are small and the isolated populations of big cats in them are 
at higher risk of extinction from inbreeding, disease, and natural disasters (Schaller, 2011). 
Creating a core set of protected areas within human-dominated land, with wildlife corridors of 
viable habitat where animals can travel is essential, but requires human cooperation. Humans 
must agree to keep habitat between protected areas viable and shoulder the costs of increased 
human-wildlife contact. 
 Creating these conservation landscapes requires using predation prevention methods 
skillfully to reduce H-WC to its absolute minimum, while teaching humans to accept that no 
method will be 100% effective and that poaching and retaliatory killings will not produce a 
better outcome (Hunter, 2012). To teach this, though, one must understand the cultural context in 
the region. A community’s previous experience with wildlife and natural resources informs how 
willing they are to conserve them. So do their previous interactions with wildlife conservation 
officials and NPOs (Kideghesho, Roskaft, & Kaltenborn, 2007). Building a “conservation 
landscape” requires integrating the ecological, economic, and cultural realities of the area 
(Hemson et al., 2009; Schaller, 2011). 
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 South Africa, for example, has a history of not subsidizing local agriculture. Small 
farmers, primarily white farmers, have felt slighted by this lack of support in difficult economic 
times (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 17, 2011) (Wilson, 2009). Building a 
“conservation landscape” in parts of South Africa would require taking their anti-government 
feelings into account and recognizing that farmer-generated conservation efforts rather than 
government-dictated conservation requirements will be most effective. Positive incentives will 
also be more effective in an area filled with resentment of wildlife and where wildlife generates 
little revenue (Farmer 3, personal communication, August 18, 2011). Failure to consider this 
cultural subtext can alienate the community when their support is vital to the success of any 
long-term conservation effort. 
NPOs can help implement a strategy to stop illegal killings, but, ideally, they will then 
hand over the running of the operation to the local community for long-term development. For 
this to happen seamlessly, the different actors in the process must not act as separate entities but 
must believe they are part of a whole (Zahler & Schaller, 2014). Too often, factions develop 
within a community because black and white labels are applied: he is a “conservationist”, she is 
a “farmer”, he is a “government official.” For example, the passion that drives conservation NPO 
workers can sometimes lead them to exclude the value of local farmers’ opinions (NPO worker 
4, personal communication, August 21, 2011). Local farmers may distrust conservationists 
because, in their minds, they are only there to save the leopards without concern for their 
livelihood. Every effort must be made to avoid such splintering. Community empowerment is, in 
the long run, the most cost-effective method for conserving local wildlife (Gettleman, 2012b; 





The current trend when dealing with retaliatory killings of leopards and other carnivores 
seems to be creating innovative predation reduction methods to reduce the motivation for 
killings. Several articles have recently been published in the press about livestock owners who 
have created or are using new gadgets to protect their livestock. The French newswire Agence 
France Presse, for example, published an article about a South African sheep farmer who 
equipped one sheep in each of his herds with a cell phone tracking device that calls him when the 
herd runs away from something, usually a sheep stealer or a predator (Agence France Presse, 
2012b). CNN also published an article about a 13-year-old boy in Kenya who noticed lions in the 
area feared flashing lights like the flashlights shepherds carry to check on their flock. He created 
a flashing light display, called a “Lion Light” system, around his livestock corral to prevent lion 
predation (Kermeliotis, 2013). 
Anecdotal stories like these, in combination with successful efforts by NPOs with bell 
collars and livestock protection animals, suggest that future research should focus on bettering 
these predation reduction methods. This focus seems particularly appropriate since top-down 
initiatives from government entities often fail to gain traction with local residents, while local 
inventions like the “Lion Light” system catch on quickly in these areas (Kermeliotis, 2013). 
This research will help improve these grass-roots methods for leopard livestock predation 
by understanding where retaliatory leopard killings occur and why. Livestock owners can then 






The effectiveness of poaching and retaliatory killing prevention methods remains for the 
most part in doubt. Laws are only as effective as the efforts to enforce them, which often fall 
short. Some researchers suggest that law enforcement should focus on prevention rather than 
response. Table 3.2 below summarizes the pros and cons of each method discussed in the 
chapter. Further research is needed to determine when and where each method is most effective, 
but grassroots predation reduction methods currently seem the best approach to preventing 









Table 3.2. Methods to reduce retaliatory leopard killings and their pros and cons 
 
Method to Reduce Retaliatory Leopard 
Killings 
Impact Problems with Method 
Predation reduction methods   
Translocation of problem leopards Displaces predation problem to another 
location (at least temporarily) 
1) Livestock losses unrelated to predator density23 
2) Leopards did not remain where translocated24 
Selective culling Quick fix until a new predator takes the 
place of culled individual 
1) Unknown consequences for other ecologically dependent 
species25 
2) No proof that new livestock eating leopard does not replace 
culled individual26 
3) Does not encourage tolerance for predators27 
Innovative husbandry techniques   
Bell collars for livestock (to scare leopards) 
 
Livestock protection animals (donkeys, 
Anatolian sheep dogs) 
Show more ecologically sound and 
promising results than other methods28 
1) Convincing local farmers to try these methods difficult29 
2) Little research to prove their effectiveness30 
3) Some predators learn to outwit bell collars31 
4) Requires monitoring to ensure that protection animals bond with 
the flock32 
"Diffusion of benefits" measures   
																																																								
23 Graham et al. (2005). 
24 Athreya et al. (2010); Dloniak (2012). 
25 U.S. Geological Survey (2007); Bjorge and Gunson (1985); Al-Johany (2007); Government wildlife official 1 (personal communication, July 31, 2011). 
26 Linnell et al. (1999); Coniff, 1999 in Hussain (2003); Geldenhuys (2011, December 4); Hussain (2003); Erasmus (2011, January 21);Liberg et al. (2011). 
27 Packer et al. (2009); K. Ray (2012); Oli et al. (1994). 
28 King (2006); The Landmark Foundation (n.d.); Landmark Foundation (n.d.); Linnell et al. (1999); Cheetah Outreach (2011); Moberly et al. (2004); Farmer 1 
(personal communication, August 17, 2011). 
29 Kurvits et al. (2011); Hemson et al. (2009); Bezuidenhout (2010, August 20); NPO worker 1 (personal communication, July 31, 2011); Government wildlife 
official 3 (personal communication, August 23, 2011). 
30 de Waal (2009, July 3); Bezuidenhout (2010, August 20); (Farmer's Weekly, 2009, May 22). 
31 de Waal (2009, July 3); Landmark Foundation (n.d.); King (2006); NPO worker 4 (personal communication, August 21, 2011). 
32 King (2006); The Landmark Foundation (n.d.); Farmer's Weekly (2009, May 22); NPO worker 1 (personal communication, July 31, 2011), NPO worker 3, 
NPO worker 4 (personal communication, August 21, 2011), Farmer 1 (personal communication, August 17, 2011). 
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Green tourism 1) Gives monetary value to live wildlife 
in the eyes of local residents that benefit33 
2) Invests money in local communities34 
1) Distribution of tourism revenue to local residents often flawed 
and unequal35 
2) Proper implementation of schemes highly dependent on local 
dynamics36 
Compensation programs for livestock losses Reduces livestock owners’ resentment of 
carnivores37 
1) High costs to implement38 
2) Rarely sustain themselves39 
3) Only effective if require use of predation prevention methods for 
compensation40 
Laws   
CITES and others Provide a structure from which to combat 
illegal killings once they have already 
occurred  
1) Law enforcement not always knowledgeable enough to enforce 
properly 
2) Laws lack legitimacy or importance in the eyes of the public and 
courts 
3) Lack of coordination between law enforcement actors prevents 
effective implementation 




33 C. Mishra et al. (2003); Pires and Moreto (2011). 
34 C. Mishra et al. (2003); Pires and Moreto (2011). 
35 Hemson et al. (2009); Schaller (2011).	
36 Botha et al. (2004); Alpert (1996) in Botha et al. (2004); Newmark and Hough (2000) in Botha et al. (2004). 
37 Hill (2004); Oli et al. (1994); World Wildlife Fund (2010, December); C. Mishra et al. (2003); Schaller (2011); Hemson et al. (2009). 
38 C. Mishra et al. (2003); Schaller (2011). 
39 Schaller (2011). 
40 Hemson et al. (2009). 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical framework 
 
The previous chapters described the main motivations for illegal leopard killings, 
concluding that H-WC is the most pressing threat. More importantly, they have identified factors 
that contribute to retaliatory leopard killings and methods tried to mitigate these factors, 
including predation prevention methods. These factors include ecological characteristics that 
shape leopard behavior and bring them in contact with humans and human behaviors that 
generate conflict with wildlife. 
 The purpose of this research is to understand where retaliatory leopard killings are most 
likely to take place and why. Identifying the situational factors that contribute to retaliatory 
leopard killings will help determine where to best target solutions. The following sections will 
discuss rational choice theory, choice-structuring properties, SCP, and informal guardians as they 
apply to this analysis. Rational choice theory and choice-structuring properties give the context 
for understanding where and how retaliatory leopard killings occur. SCP provides a framework 
for solving the problem. 
 
Rational Choice Theory 
 
 Traditional criminological theories have long focused on what Cornish and Clarke (1986) 
call the “initial involvement model” of crime: what personal traits make individuals more likely 
to choose to engage in crime. Rational Choice Theory, rather, focuses on an individual’s decision 
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to commit a specific criminal act (Felson & Clarke, 1998), what Cornish and Clarke (1986) call 
“the criminal event model.” It argues that, although offenders may commit crimes because of 
long-seated motivations and predispositions (i.e. low self-control, weak social bonds etc.), their 
decision to engage in a particular crime is based on “the opportunities presented to them during 
their normal patterns of social and economic life” (Felson & Clarke, 1998; Lilly, Cullen, & Ball, 
2007; Petrossian, 2012, p. 24). 
According to Rational Choice Theory, when offenders plan a crime, they weigh the costs 
and rewards of the crime in a rational manner so as to maximize its rewards and minimize its 
costs (Felson & Clarke, 1998). As a result, offenders are more likely to choose crimes that have a 
low risk of detection, are easy to commit, and provide what they consider a worthwhile reward. 
As stated by Cornish and Clarke (1987, p. 935), “decisions to offend [...] are influenced by the 
characteristics of both offenses and offenders, and are the product of interactions between the 
two.” 
 
Choice-structuring properties and “bounded” rationality 
 
In their 1987 paper, Cornish and Clarke (1987, p. 935), identify what they call “choice-
structuring properties” of offenses that “provide a basis for selecting among alternative courses 
of action and […] effectively structure the offender’s choice.” They are the characteristics of a 
crime that make it attractive to one offender but not another at different times and based on his or 
her goals, character traits, background, and/or expertise. Examples of choice-structuring 
properties include the type and amount of payoff, the perceived risks, the skills and resources 
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needed, and the availability of targets (see table 4.1 for a list of choice-structuring properties for 
thefts involving cash, adapted from Cornish and Clarke (1987)). 
Choice-structuring properties are classified into two types: static or variance properties 
(Pires, 2011). Static properties explain the opportunity structure of a crime and its potential for 
displacement to similar types of crime. Variance properties are the factors that an offender who 
decides to commit a crime weighs to select a particular target, modus operandi, and/or location 
(Pires, 2011). Some static choice-structuring opportunities for retaliatory leopard killings are the 
fact that law enforcement rarely prosecutes individuals for illegal killings and that farmers do not 
consider killing a leopard in retaliation for livestock losses a crime. Variance properties include 
the availability of over-the-counter pesticides and leopards’ habit of caching their kill and 
returning to eat it within 48 hours, both of which make it easy to poison a livestock carcass and 
kill a leopard. 
Although choice-structuring properties shape the offender’s choices, he or she may not be 
fully aware of the range of choice-structuring properties involved in his or her decision or of the 
part they play (Cornish & Clarke, 1987). This ties in with Clarke and Cornish (2001)’s belief that 
offenders exhibit “bounded rationality” because their cost-benefit analysis for engaging or not 
engaging in crime is limited by their cognitive abilities and emotions, the time they have to make 
the decision, and the availability of relevant information. The concept of “bounded rationality” 
acknowledges that “real world action often has to be taken on the basis of decisions made under 
less than perfect circumstances” and that individuals are more or less skillful at interpreting what 




Table 4.1. Choice-structuring properties for thefts involving cash (Adapted from Cornish and 
Clarke (1987)) 
 
Choice-structuring properties for thefts involving cash 
Availability (numbers of targets; accessibility) 
Awareness of method (i.e. pickpocketing vs. insurance fraud) 
Likely cash yield per crime 
Expertise needed 
Planning necessary (pickpocketing vs. bank robbery) 
Resources required (transport; equipment) 
Solo vs. associates required 
Time required to commit 
Cool nerves required (bank robbery vs. computer fraud) 
Risks of apprehension 
Severity of punishment 
Physical danger 
Instrumental violence required 
Confrontation with victim (mugging vs. burglary) 
Identifiable victim 




Several criminological studies have used rational choice theory and choice-structuring 
properties to understand both the location and target of poaching. Pires (2011) used choice-
structuring properties to explain how nearby illegal wildlife trafficking markets and the physical 
traits of certain parrot species influenced the likelihood they would be poached for the pet trade. 
Marteache, Viollaz, and Petrossian (2015) studied how factors like the concealability of vessels 
and illegally caught fish, convenience of ports, strength of fisheries monitoring, control, and 
surveillance measures, effectiveness of country governance, and commitment to wildlife 
protection regulations influenced illegal fishing vessels’ decision to offload their catch in certain 
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countries. Both studies then offered solutions to tackle illegal parrot poaching and fishing using 
the SCP framework. 
 
Situational Crime Prevention 
 
Clarke has identified 25 techniques of SCP based on rational choice theory and choice-
structuring properties’ assumptions about the offender decision-making process (Clarke, 2008b). 
The premise of SCP is to block the opportunities that make the commission of a crime possible. 
This framework therefore helps develop targeted solutions that reduce the opportunities to 
commit a crime by increasing its risks and difficulties (Clarke, 1995). Understanding the choice-
structuring properties involved in an offender’s decision to commit a crime helps devise effective 
solutions to dissuade offenders. Since, according to rational choice theory, people choose to 
commit crime when and where they are more likely to succeed, they will avoid committing a 
crime if the environment is not favorable and they are likely to be caught. 
SCP gives equal importance to opportunity and motivation for a crime to occur. 
Opportunity is an important cause of crime (Clarke, 2008b). An abundance of opportunities can 
lead both criminally predisposed and non-predisposed individuals to commit crime and continue 
doing so. The more opportunities for crime, the more it will occur and the more criminally 
disposed individuals will seek out other opportunities to commit crime (Clarke, 2005). Clarke 
(1983) argues that reducing these opportunities will reduce specific forms of crime. SCP 
techniques are meant to achieve this. 
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SCP also emphasizes the “situational determinants” of crime, those situational factors 
that determine whether or not an offender will commit a crime at a particular location and time 
(Clarke, 1983). These situational factors can be part of the physical environment, like the number 
of lights in a parking lot when stealing cars, or the way the environment functions, such as 
whether or not security guards check bags for stolen items when exiting a museum. Knowing 
these factors allows policy makers to predict where crime will occur and prevent it by making 
the environment in which it takes place less attractive and rewarding for offenders (Clarke, 
2008a). SCP solutions to prevent crime fall under 25 techniques divided into 5 categories: 1) 
increasing the effort and 2) the risks to committing the crime, 3) reducing its rewards, 4) 
reducing the provocations that motivate someone to commit a crime, and 5) removing the 
excuses for carrying it out (Clarke, 2008a) (see figure 7.1 in chapter 7 for a more detailed 
description of these techniques). 
 
At the intersection of human-wildlife conflict, retaliatory killings, and poaching: Tolerance for 
leopard killing 
 
Although widespread, retaliatory leopard killings are not random; they occur where there 
is an opportunity to do so, at specific locations for specific reasons. Rational choice theory 
suggests that farmer’s decision to kill a leopard in retaliation for livestock losses will be 
influenced by several factors. These factors are the “situational determinants” of the retaliatory 
leopard killing. In this case, they can be both human (i.e. cultural) and environmental (see table 
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4.2 for examples of each). These situational factors help understand where and why leopard 
killings are most likely to occur. 
 
Table 4.2. List of the major situational factors linked to retaliatory leopard killings 
 
Human determinants Environmental determinants 
Expectations from wildlife Land-use overlap 
Sensitivity to environmental issues Leopard abundance 
Local history (colonialism, pastoralism) Poor leopard habitat 
Relationship between local actors  
 
Human-leopard interactions are part of a process that involves H-WC and outcomes like 
retaliatory leopard killings and leopard poaching. At each end of this process is the concept of 
guardianship (see figure 4.1 below). H-WC is the result of a number of situational factors 
discussed in the previous chapters, with habitat loss/fragmentation and increased competition for 
resources because of population growth at the forefront. Other ecological characteristics of 
leopards and human behaviors contribute to H-WC as well (see section titled “Factors that 
contribute to H-WC and retaliatory leopard killings” in chapter 2). A lack of guardianship, 
mainly in the form of maladapted husbandry practices and a lack of predation prevention 
methods, often results in H-WC like leopard predation on livestock or attacks on humans. 
The possible responses to H-WC are three-fold: 1) retaliatory leopard killings, 2) leopard 
poaching, and 3) a concerted effort to use and improve husbandry and predation prevention 
methods. The latter is about increasing guardianship of livestock and/or humans through target 
hardening. The choice of response is based on local residents’ tolerance for leopard killing. In 
locations where H-WC has incited anti-conservation feelings, leopard poaching may be common 
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because there is no willpower or collective efficacy to prevent illegal leopard killings (lack of 
guardianship) (Hill, 2004; St. John et al., 2012). Local residents may not actively hunt leopards, 
but they also have no interest in protecting wildlife that attacks their livestock and neighbors. In 
places where H-WC has resulted in an active hunting culture, retaliatory leopard killings are 
more likely because local residents will take matters into their own hands and kill leopards in 
retaliation for livestock losses and/or human attacks (Hill, 2004; St. John et al., 2012). In some 
locations, though, H-WC will not result in illegal leopard killings of any kind. Rather, local 
residents will strive to increase guardianship of livestock and humans. This is the case, for 
example, in Java, Indonesia, where rural communities often suffer from H-WC but rarely resort 
to or allow illegal leopard killings (Government wildlife official 4, personal communication, 
November 26, 2013). 
 






The link between places where leopard poaching and retaliatory leopard killings occur is 
a tolerance for leopard killing (see figure 4.1). This research uses opportunity theories, like 
rational choice theory, to explain what situational factors create this tolerance. It is about 
determining why H-WC does not always result in a tolerance for leopard killing and, ultimately, 
in illegal leopard killings. The situational factors can be the local human context or 
environmental characteristics (including a lack of guardianship). They occur at multiple parts of 
the human-leopard interaction process, either by increasing the likelihood of H-WC (H-LC 
situational factors) or by encouraging tolerance for leopard killing after a H-WC conflict occurs 
and the victims have a choice of responses (retaliatory killing situational factors). 
The 25 techniques of SCP are helpful in designing interventions to mitigate the H-LC and 
retaliatory killing situational factors and come up with additional guardianship solutions in 
places where there is tolerance for leopard killing. This research will use SCP for both these 
purposes and to ultimately disrupt tolerance for leopard killing. Most governments and 
conservation organizations currently focus on preventing poaching (TRAFFIC, 2013), yet H-
WC, with its possible consequence of tolerance for leopard killing, is one of the main obstacles 
to getting local populations to support anti-poaching and conservation efforts (Graham et al., 
2005; Gupta Kashyap, 2012, March 6). This research’s use of SCP to address tolerance for 
leopard killing is more valuable for conservation than simply devising poaching or retaliatory 
killing interventions, because it targets the root cause of several types of illegal leopard killing. 
 Reducing tolerance for leopard killing creates opportunities to build informal 
guardianship to combat both poaching and retaliatory killings. Informal guardians are non-law 
enforcement personnel who can deter crime. According to routine activity theory, crime can only 
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occur if a capable guardian is absent and a suitable target and a likely offender meet (Cohen & 
Felson, 1979). The more guardianship is available the less crime takes place (Reynald, 2009). 
The concept of informal guardianship suggests that, where law enforcement resources are limited 
and cannot be applied everywhere, it is possible to harness the goodwill of the local population 
to fight illegal leopard killings. Local residents’ presence as informal guardians increases the 
effort and risks required for illegal killings, deterring offenders (Gettleman, 2012b). 
 
Informal guardians according to Reynald (2010) 
 
 Reynald (2010) established three conditions for someone to be a strong informal 
guardian: 1) availability, 2) knowledge of context, and 3) willingness to intervene. Availability 
means guardians must be present in a location to guard it (Cohen & Felson, 1979). The presence 
of a guardian is sometimes sufficient to deter an offender. Furthermore, they must be willing to 
monitor local activity for illegal behavior (Reynald, 2009, 2010). By doing so, they enhance their 
capability as guardians by building their knowledge of context. Knowledge of context is 
important because a person’s ability to act as a guardian depends on whether they can identify 
who is and is not a threat (Reynald, 2010). This requires knowing a neighborhood well enough to 
see who or what is out of place. A person’s ability to recognize this is enhanced if they have a 
strong community network because community members tell each other what suspicious activity 
to look for (Reynald, 2010). 
A key characteristic for a strong informal guardian is the willingness to act if they see a 
crime occur. The action can be direct, i.e. physically confronting the offender, or indirect, i.e. 
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calling the police (Reynald, 2010). The average guardian is willing to intervene as long as their 
personal safety is insured, but most prefer taking indirect action. 
A guardian’s willingness to intervene and choice of intervention hinges on four factors 
(Reynald, 2010). The first is the guardian’s sense of responsibility toward the target. Guardians 
are more willing to protect targets that are theirs or with which they are intimately connected. 
The second is the guardian’s physical competence to intervene. The more physically competent a 
guardian feels the more likely he or she is to intervene and do so directly. The same applies to 
the third factor, the availability of tools for the guardian’s protection. Finally, the more severe the 
incident observed, the less likely the guardian is to intervene and the less direct the intervention. 
 
 Informal guardians are physically present and have knowledge of the context at most 
locations where H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings occur, but the willingness to intervene is 
generally missing. That willingness is often missing because of ill feelings toward wildlife or 
conservation efforts. Most local residents do not feel any sense of ownership towards wildlife in 
their community; they believe it belongs to the government. Laws that tell them they cannot kill 
these animals without a license reinforce this belief. Furthermore, H-WCs, especially with 
carnivores, create an environment were local people are angry at the cost wildlife imposes on 
them. They would rather see these animals killed than conserved so they cannot attack their 
livestock. They therefore have no incentive to stop anyone from killing wildlife in their 
communities: they tolerate leopard killing. Understanding the situational factors of H-LC and 
retaliatory leopard killings helps define this tolerance for leopard killing whereby informal 
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guardians are unwilling to intervene and protect leopards. SCP then offers a framework to 




Criminologists have used rational choice theory, choice-structuring properties, and SCP 
to understand why poachers target particular parrot species and fish illegally in certain locations. 
Few studies, though, have focused on H-WC as a facilitator of retaliatory killings and poaching. 
What links both retaliatory leopard killings and leopard poaching is a tolerance for illegal 
leopard killing. This tolerance for illegal leopard killing creates an absence of informal guardians 
to protect leopards. To reverse this tolerance, one first needs to identify its situational factors, 
both human and environmental. These factors occur at multiple parts of the human-leopard 
interaction process either by increasing the likelihood of H-LC (H-LC situational factors) or by 
encouraging tolerance for leopard killing after a H-LC conflict occurs and the victims have a 
choice of responses (retaliatory killing situational factors). This research focuses on 
understanding these factors and their relative importance in an individual’s decision to kill a 
leopard in retaliation for livestock or human attacks. It then uses the SCP framework to design 





Chapter 5: Research design and methodology 
 
This research identifies the situational factors that contribute to H-LC and retaliatory 
leopard killings and where they occur. It also defines what fosters tolerance for leopard killing by 
exploring the relative importance of these situational factors in an individual’s decision to kill a 
leopard. The study begins with a broad analysis of illegal leopard killings in three study areas: 
the Amboseli and Tsavo West National Parks area in Kenya, the Heidelberg region in the 
Western Cape Province of South Africa, and India. This analysis focuses on identifying what the 
scope and nature of illegal leopard killings within the study areas is. It also explores what forms 
H-WC driven retaliatory leopard killings take in those locations. 
Interview data from Kenya and South Africa and media articles from India are used to 
learn about the human situational factors of H-LC and retaliatory killings. The next step of the 
analysis maps the locations of retaliatory leopard killings in the Heidelberg, Baviaanskloof, and 
Greater Addo Elephant National Park regions of South Africa to better understand their 
environmental situational factors. The focus here is on what geospatial factors contribute to 
retaliatory leopard killings. 
 
Overview of the analyses 
 
 This research is divided into 4 separate analyses based on country and whether the 
analysis focuses on the human versus environmental situational factors of retaliatory leopard 
killings. Table 5.1 gives a brief description of each analysis and the data it uses. 
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Table 5.1. Characteristics of the 4 different analyses in this study 
 
Analysis 1 2 3 4 









Content analysis Content analysis GIS mapping, non-
parametric tests 
Location Amboseli National 
Park 




Date 2006 2011 2013 2005-2011 
# of cases 234 people 16 interviews 68 articles 13 GPS points 
 
 The reason for 4 analyses is the scarcity of illegal leopard killing data. This lack of illegal 
killing data is one of the main problems facing wildlife crime researchers today (Clyne, 2014). 
Few published studies have come up with reliable counts of illegal leopard killings (see table A2 
in the Appendix for a list of existing studies) and those that have do so in two ways: law 
enforcement seizure data or GPS collar and carcass recovery data. Law enforcement seizure data 
is often publicly available (TRAFFIC, 2011), while GPS collar and carcass recovery data is 
usually not in the public domain. Publicly available data does not capture cases of retaliatory 
killings where the animal’s carcass is destroyed or left to decompose in the wild to avoid 
retribution. GPS collar and carcass recovery data can sometimes capture this information, if the 
researchers are collaring the entire leopard population in an area. In such a case, a missing 
leopard would not go unnoticed, especially if the researchers have local informants who tell them 
of rumored leopard killings. 
 This research uses 4 different approaches and data sources to study the situational factors 
of H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings. The number of cases for parts 2 and 4 of this study are 
small, making it hard to generalize from their results. However, using multiple data sources and 
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analytical methods allows for replication of these results, while using data from 3 different 
countries has the added benefit of allowing a cross-country comparison of retaliatory leopard 
killings. 
 
1. Analysis part 1: Kenyan interviews 
 
The data for part 1 of this research were gathered in April and May 2006 during a field 
research project with the School for Field Studies in Kimana, Kenya.41 The project explored how 
communities in the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem benefited from local wildlife. It also examined 
how wildlife was imposing a cost to local farmers and how it affected their attitude towards 
current wildlife conservation efforts. The study area was the Loitokitok Division of Kenya’s 
Kajiado District, in the area between Amboseli and Tsavo West National Parks, with a focus on 
the Kimana, Kuku, and Mbirikani group ranches and the Entonet area (see figure 5.1) (Viollaz, 
2006). 
The history of this area provides insight into how H-WC develops into an acute problem. 
The 6 group ranches in the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem42 are essential dispersal areas for the 
wildlife found inside the two parks and, as such, are ideal locations for ecotourism ventures and 
community conservation initiatives (Hurt, 1999). Currently, the majority of the revenue from 
ecotourism comes from the two national parks and is directly appropriated by the Kenyan 
																																																								
41 The project was titled “An assessment of local communities’ perceptions on and expectations 
of conservation initiatives in select group ranches and privately owned land in the Amboseli 
ecosystem” (Viollaz, 2006). Eight other college students were involved in this project along with 
School for Field Studies instructor Salaton Tome. 
42 The Kuku, Kimana, Mbirikani, Rombo, Olgulului, and Eseleikei group ranches. 
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government. Amboseli National Park alone generates about $3.4 million U.S. dollars each year 
from tourism, but only two percent of this money reaches local communities (Lange, 2006). The 
region faces an overall lack of government support and also suffers from inadequate health care 
and educational facilities. 
Meanwhile, human densities and settlements within the six group ranches are increasing 
because of population growth and an increase in the migration of agriculturalists to the area, 
putting pressure on existing resources and causing shortages in both food and water (Berger, 
1993; Makonjio Okello, 2005; Makonjio Okello, Buthmann, Mapinu, & Kahi, 2011). The most 
prominent land-uses in the Loitokitok division, pastoralism and small-scale agriculture, are also 
add odds with each other for resource consumption, adding to this pressure (Ministry of Planning 
and National Development & Republic of Kenya, 2001). Agriculture reduces the amount of 
habitat available for wildlife and grazing livestock. Group ranch subdivision into individual land 
plots for cultivation also prevents the open grazing necessary for pastoralism (Makonjio Okello 
et al., 2011; Poole, 2006). Since local agricultural yield is limited by seasonal changes in rainfall, 





Figure 5.1. Map of the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem showing the group ranch locations (Makonjio 
Okello, 2005) 
 
This constant competition for scarce resources pits pastoralists, agriculturalists, and 
wildlife against each other, as does the lack of government support. It creates H-WC and 
exacerbates existing conflicts. As such, the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem is a place with the 
potential for local residents to tolerate leopard killing as a release from resource competition and 
a solution to H-LC. Understanding the challenges local farmers face and why they do or do not 
support conservation efforts can help characterize what contributes to tolerance for leopard 
killing. 
Four hypotheses drive both this analysis and parts 2 and 3 of this research. 
H1: Individuals who have livestock are vulnerable to H-WC. 
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H2: Individuals who experience H-WC and its costs are less likely to support conservation. 
H3: Support for conservation is low in areas where distrust among actors is high and government 
oversight is poor. 
H4: If an individual has previous exposure to conservation initiatives, he is more likely to 
support conservation. 
The School for Field Studies data consists of 234 interviews of Tsavo-Amboseli 
ecosystem residents (Viollaz, 2006). Residents were selected based on a cluster sampling method 
to increase the representativeness of the sample. Those interviewed lived in four clusters: two 
cluster near and two clusters far from conservation initiatives. The interviewers went door-to-
door to interview participants and used semi-structured questionnaires with open-ended 
questions to allow some flexibility in questioning them. Translators were used to reduce any 
potential error in recording responses as well as to put the interviewees at ease. Translators also 
vouched for the researchers so interviewees would be honest about their problems with 
wildlife.43 
The participants were asked about themselves, including age, sex, tribe, and membership 
status in the group ranch in which they lived. They were also asked a series of questions grouped 
around three topics: 
1) H-WC; 
																																																								
43 Although the reliability of interviewee responses is always a concern in qualitative research, 
the circumstances surrounding this project suggest that most responses here are accurate. The 
School for Field Studies has a long history of fieldwork in the study area and has developed 
strong ties with the local community. They provide jobs for local people at their facilities and the 
influx of students they bring is a major source of revenue for local shop owners and farmers. 
They also work with local communities to find solutions to H-WC and discuss local farmers’ 
problems with the KWS on their behalf. 
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2) Relationship to wildlife; 
3) Beliefs about conservation. 
These questions included whether they benefited from local wildlife conservation efforts and 
what the nature of those benefits was, what impacts wildlife conservation had on them, and what 





 The responses from the 234 interviewees were formatted into an SPSS database and used 
to run descriptive statistics on the following variables: sex, age, level of education (no education, 
primary, secondary +), livelihood strategy (agriculture, pastoralism, agro-pastoralism, other), job 
satisfaction, and economic status (low, medium, high). Job satisfaction was determined by asking 
residents to rate the appropriateness of their primary livelihood strategy as not sufficient, 
sufficient or highly sufficient. 
 The first set of analyses in part 1 creates an overview of the H-WC situation in the Tsavo-
Amboseli ecosystem based on responses to the following questions: 
1) In your opinion, what has been the biggest challenge to wildlife conservation in this 
region? 
2) How do you benefit from the presence of wildlife in the area? 
3) How is wildlife beneficial to others? 
4) How is wildlife imposing a cost on you? 
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5) How is there a public/communal cost to wildlife? 
6) If not for economic benefits/incentives, would you still support wildlife conservation? 
7) Do you have any suggestions as to how the negative impacts [of H-WC] can be reduced? 
A logistic regression was then used to determine what variables influenced respondents’ 
attitude towards wildlife conservation-based income generating activities. The dependent 
variable was a respondent’s attitude towards wildlife conservation-based income generating 
activities44, coded as either “positive” or “negative” (N = 226)45. 233 out of 234 interviewees 
responded to the question. Six independent variables were included in the model (see table 5.2 





















44 Note that most, if not all, the conservation initiatives in the study area generate income.  
45 233 interviewees originally responded to this question, but 7 respondents stated they were 
ambivalent about wildlife conservation-based income generating activities. Their answers were 




Table 5.2. List of independent variables for part 1 of this analysis 
 
Variable name Question asked Coding N 
Wildlife cost Is wildlife imposing a cost to 
you? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
234 
Wildlife benefit Do you benefit in any way from 
the presence of wildlife in the 
area? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
234 
Economic status How do you rate your economic 
status? 
0 = Low 
1= Medium 
2 = High 
234 
Education What is your level of education? 1 = No education 
2 = Primary 




Generally, have you been exposed 
to issues touching on wildlife 
conservation? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
233 
Mismanagement Is KWS mismanaging Amboseli 
National Park? 
0 = Don’t know 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
233 
 
 Wildlife cost quantifies the amount of H-WC a farmer has experienced. Economic status 
indicates how much of a financial toll H-WC has taken on his/her life. Wildlife benefit is 
included because some farmers are willing to endure H-WC if they receive financial benefits 
from wildlife. These benefits include compensation for lost livestock or crops, employment, or 
bursaries for their children’s education. 
 Amboseli National Park is one of the main profit-generating conservation initiatives in 
the study area and is run by the KWS, a federal agency. Mismanagement examines local 
farmers’ beliefs about how well KWS runs this park and captures the level of trust between them 
and government personnel. 
A respondents’ level of education suggests how much formal training they have in 
biology and environmental science. This form of training can have a positive effect in cases of 
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H-WC because a farmer can, for example, understand the biological reasons why a leopard 
would attack his livestock and recognize the behavior is natural instead of believing that 
predation is a personal affront and requires retaliation. Exposure to conservation measures what 
farmers may have learned from simply living near conservation efforts, which can sometimes 
replace school learning. 
 
2. Analysis part 2: South African interviews 
 
 Part 2 of this research uses data from 16 interviews collected in 2011 in the Western Cape 
Province of South Africa. The Landmark Foundation, an NPO focused on leopard conservation, 
was managing the reserve at the time and provided the names of local farmers and 
conservationists to interview. The goal of these interviews was to understand why leopards were 
illegally killed in the area and to obtain contextual information to determine if the H-LC situation 
in the Western Cape Province was similar to that of the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem. A total of 7 
farmers, 3 conservation NPO workers, and 6 government officials were interviewed. 
15 out of the 16 interviews were conducted in proximity to Wildcliff Nature Reserve 
(GPS coordinates: -33.96010, 21.03500). The 16th interview was conducted at a private nature 
reserve near Hermanus in the Western Cape Province, located about two and a half hours east of 
the reserve, but with a similar fynbos habitat. 
Wildcliff Nature Reserve is 955 hectares of preserved land adjacent to the Boosmanbos 
Wilderness Area in the Langeberg Mountains and is located about 20 minutes from Heidelberg 
town center. Most of the land surrounding it is divided into meat and dairy livestock farms with 
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some crop farming, while the remainder of the land is devoted to game farms. Most landowners 
are white and speak English, while farm hands tend to be black and speak Afrikaans, despite a 
recent government initiative to give farmland to black South Africans for cultivation. The roads 
outside of Heidelberg town center are dirt with slabs of concrete acting as river bridges, so 
flooding is a significant problem during the rainy season. 
The area surrounding the reserve is rife with H-LC and lacks government oversight, but 
unlike in Kenya, tourism is not a major source of revenue. Local farmers feel that the 
government provides little financial support. Reports of retaliatory leopard killings are plentiful 































 Individuals recommended by The Landmark Foundation were contacted by phone and 
asked if they would be willing to talk about “leopard poaching” in the region; all agreed. The 
semi-structured interviews lasted 1-2 hours46. Although a list of interview questions was drawn 
up prior to the interviews, the flow of conversation determined the topics covered with 
occasional prompts based on the questions (see figure A2 in the Appendix for the list of pre-
prepared interview questions). 
																																																								
46 No notes were taken during interviews to put respondents at ease. Conversations were typed 
up from memory immediately following the interview. 
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 The Landmark Foundation recommended a combination of farmers applying leopard-
friendly livestock farming techniques and farmers opposed to their conservation work. Even 
those farmers angry with The Landmark Foundation were eager to share their point of view and 
many went to great length to describe the challenges they faced from leopards47. 
Conservationists came from The Landmark Foundation, a local private wildlife reserve, and the 
Western Cape Province government wildlife service, Cape Nature. Emphasis was placed on the 
fact that the research was not affiliated with any local actor, that respondents’ identities would be 
kept confidential, and that it was meant to be a fact-finding mission to benefit from respondents’ 
insider knowledge of the situation. 
 At the end of each interview, participants were asked if they could recommend other 
people to talk to. This method of snowball sampling was essential in this tight-knit rural 
community. Being vouched for by a community member allowed local farmers to open up about 
leopard problems in the area. Ongoing tensions between farmers and The Landmark Foundation 
over efforts to conserve leopards and prevent retaliatory killings may have biased the responses 
given during the interviews, but the varying opinions and sensitive information shared by the 
participants suggest otherwise. Farmers were not shy in admitting they knew who had killed 
leopards in the community and sharing names. They also openly criticized The Landmark 
Foundation and their methods while, at the same time, working with them. 
 Government workers were also contacted via email and, when possible, in person, asking 
if they knew of leopard poaching cases in their area and had data on them. These email 
																																																								




exchanges, from April to September 2011, were also added to the interview data to represent the 
government’s perspective (see table 5.3 for government interviewees). 
 
Table 5.3. South African government employees interviewed either in person or via email 
 
Title Organization 
Conservation Services Manager Cape Nature, Riversdale, Western Cape 
Province 
Ecological Coordinator for the Langeberg area Cape Nature, Western Cape Province 
Program Manager, Biodiversity Crime Unit Cape Nature, Stellenbosch, Western Cape 
Province 
Official for H-WC Cape Nature, Western Cape Province 
Environmental management inspector & acting 
deputy director  
Department of Economic Development, 
Tourism, and Environmental Affairs, Free 
State Province 
Head, Professional Hunting Division, Wildlife 
Protection Services 





 A content analysis was conducted of the interview data. A series of codes were generated 
inductively to determine what major themes respondents discussed and what attitudes they held. 
An inductive method made it possible to look at the data without any preconceptions and allow 
novel concepts to emerge (Lewins & Silver, 2007). Open coding generated both descriptive and 
conceptual codes by reviewing small segments of the interviews and comparing them to each 
other (Lewins & Silver, 2007). These codes were then refined using axial coding where “code 
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labels and the data linked to them are rethought in terms of similarity and difference” and only 
the codes that best illustrated concepts and relationships found in the data were kept (Lewins & 
Silver, 2007, p. 84). 
Table 5.4 describes the different codes and how they were conceptualized and 
operationalized. The codes are separated into 5 broad categories based on the information they 
provide (distrust, ecological beliefs, H-LCs, illegal killings, and solutions).
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Table 5.4. List of codes for content analysis of South African interviews 
 
Code Name Applied when… Reason for code 
Distrust   
Anger Respondents express anger at leopards, the current state of predation, 
the current conservation situation, or actors involved in the area. 
Shows the general state of mind and tension 
existing among local actors. 
Fear Quotations suggesting that local actors live in fear as a result of H-WC. Shows how H-LC is affecting local actors’ 
mindset and way of life. 
Distrust Quotations suggesting that third parties or even farmers themselves do 
not trust other farmers when it comes to leopard conservation/illegal 
killings. 
 
Quotes suggesting that members of the public do not trust the 
government and its personnel when it comes to leopard 
conservation/illegal killings. 
 
Quotes suggesting that third parties do not trust NPO personnel when it 
comes to leopard conservation/illegal killings. 
Lack of trust is a major obstacle to the 
implementation of solutions. If it exists, it 
must be addressed first. 
Corruption Any reference to corruption as a factor in how leopard livestock 
predation and illegal leopard killings are investigated or dealt with in 
the area. Quote must include the word “corruption.” 
Perceived corruption can affect whether or 
not suggested H-WC solutions are 
embraced and gain legitimacy. 
Failure of government 
response 
Comments suggesting the government’s current handling of H-LCs and 
illegal leopard killings is not working. 
A belief that government actions are not 
working can breed distrust, which can then 
stop actors from implementing solutions.  
Ecological beliefs   
Rational for predator 
intolerance 
Quotes that give reasons why a person dislikes leopards. These include 
things such as “leopards have criminal intent” or “leopards kill more 
than they can eat; that is unnecessary and wasteful.”  
For solutions to H-WC to garner 
widespread support, people must accept that 
they are not 100% effective. This requires 
mitigating predator intolerance so people 
are willing to accept some level of conflict 
with them. Mitigating intolerance requires 
understanding why it occurs. 
Livestock loss expectation Quotes describing farmers’ beliefs about acceptable losses of livestock. 
Quote must include the words “livestock loss” or any of its derivatives 
(i.e. “lost livestock”). 
If farmers believe any livestock loss to 
leopards is unacceptable, part of the 
solution must be to change that belief. 
Livestock losses are inevitable and any 
solutions offered can only limit losses. 
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Natural prey availability Quotes describing farmers’ beliefs about how much natural prey is 
available in the area for leopards to eat. Quote must include the words 
“prey” and “available” or any of their derivatives. 
Farmers often argue that leopards should 
not be attacking livestock because there is 
enough wild prey to eat. If this mindset is 
prevalent, it can stop farmers from 
accepting losses. This would need to be 
addressed before offering solutions.  
Unsustainable land use Quotes describing unsustainable land uses or practices in the area. Damaging the environment through 
unsustainable use is a major contributing 
factor for H-WC. If such practices exist, 
they must be rooted out for H-WC solutions 
to be effective. 
H-LC   
Human-wildlife conflict: 
Cost 
Examples of how H-WC imposes a cost on humans. Apply if quote 
discusses any interaction between humans and wildlife that is unwanted 
and imposes costs on either. 
Knowing how wildlife imposes a cost is 
necessary to come up with ways of stopping 
or reversing these costs. 
Predation prevention 
beliefs 
Quotes explaining what methods biologists, NPOs, government 
officials, farmers, and the general public believe should be used to 
prevent leopard livestock predation. 
Compare if different actors have the same 
beliefs about what predation prevention 
methods work. 
Why & when predation Quotes describing why and when biologists, NPOs, government 
officials, farmers, and the general public believe leopards eat livestock. 
Compare if different actors have the same 
beliefs about why and when predation 
occurs. 
Illegal killings   
Rational for leopard killing Justifications individuals provide for why they believe it is acceptable 
to shoot a leopard. 
Understanding their rational for killings can 
help determine how to remove excuses for 
their behavior. 
Poaching network Quotes suggesting that offenders had help or belonged to an organized 
group. 
Understand if the threat to leopards is 
organized or opportunistic. 
Leopard killing method48 Quotations describing how leopards are killed in the area. Help identify the major threats to leopards 
(gin traps, poison, hunting dogs, etc.). 
Why & when killed Quotes describing why and when biologists, NPOs, government 
officials, farmers, and the general public believe leopard poaching and 
retaliatory killings take place. 
Compare if different actors have the same 
beliefs about why and when it takes place.  
Solutions   
Judicial outcome Description of judicial outcomes for prosecutions of leopard 
killings/poaching. 
Determine if illegal killing cases are being 
prosecuted successfully. 
																																																								
48 All interviews were also coded on whether or not respondents believed leopards were being illegally killed in the region. 
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Solutions: Suggested & 
attempted 
Description of any suggested or attempted solutions to prevent leopard 
livestock predation and illegal leopard killings. 
Compile a list of all solutions to determine 
what exists. 
Solutions: Why working Quotes that explain or suggest why certain solutions to poaching and 
retaliatory killings are working. These quotes come from the 
organizations deploying these solutions or the people they are intended 
for. 
Knowing why certain solutions are working 




3. Analysis part 3: Indian media articles 
 
 The data for part 3 of this research comes from a non-traditional data source, Google 
Alerts. Google Alerts is a notification system that sends users an email anytime the Google 
search engine finds new results for a set of keywords (Google, 2014). The search engine includes 
results from Google Web Search, Google Blog Search, and Google News. This analysis used 
Google Alerts results to create a database of articles on illegal leopard killings in India to better 
understand the human situational factors that motivated these killings. 
 India has a history of H-LC and tolerance for illegal leopard killings, but its retaliatory 
leopard killings have a slightly different modus operandi. Most Indian retaliatory killings are in 
response to leopard predation on humans instead of livestock. Leopard attacks on humans and 
cattle date back to India’s days as a British colony. Statistics from the British government from 
1875-1912 suggest a fluctuating pattern of H-LC conflict as population size grew and 
industrialization took hold (see figures 5.3 and 5.4), a pattern that continues today and on which 






Figure 5.3. Number of people killed by leopards in India from 1875 to 1912 based on year and 





Figure 5.4. Number of cattle killed by leopards in India from 1875 to 1912 based on year and 



















Table 5.5. Number of people attacked by leopards from 1990 to 2005 in some Indian states 
(Adapted from Athreya and Belsare (2007)) 
 
Indian state Conflict location Type of habitat # of people 
attacked 
Date 
Maharashtra Junnar Forest 
Division 
Sugarcane fields 5149 2001-2003 
Sanjay Gandhi 
National Park 







Sugarcane fields 10651 1997-2005 
West Bengal West & East Duars Tea gardens 12152 1990-1997 








Tall crops 85054 1992-2002 




The database articles were collected using two Google Alerts for the keywords “leopard 
killing” and “leopard poaching”. No quotation marks were included so that any web content with 
the words either separately or together would be included in the results. All results had to be in 
English, but were not limited by region56. A trademarked Google algorithm called PageRank 
filtered the results by assigning a score to the web page based on the following factors 
(Strickland, 2014): 
																																																								
49 Athreya, Thakur, Chaudhuri, and Belsare (2004) 
50 Maharashtra Forest Department records. 
51 Maharashtra Forest Department records. 
52 WWF-India (1997) and Field Director, Buxa Tiger Reserve, personal communication. 
53 Vijayan and Pati (2002); Pati, Hirapara, Solanki, and Vijayan (2004). 
54 Chaudhuri (2004). 
55 Uttarakhand Forest Department records. 
56 Google Alerts in French were created on 04/03/14 for similar key words but produced no 
results between 04/03/14 and 07/10/14. 
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1) the frequency and location of key words within the page; 
2) how long the web page has existed; 
3) the number of other web pages linked to this one. 
Older pages with higher frequencies of key words and more links to the page therefore obtain 
higher scores. This filtering and the Google Alerts default setting “only the best results” 
produced only high quality results most relevant to the keywords (Google, 2014). 
The alerts found 267 pertinent articles from May 28th, 2012 to July 10th, 2014. These 
articles met two inclusion criteria: 
1) The article discussed leopard poaching or leopard killing either in general terms or cited a 
specific event. 
2) The main subject of the article did not have to be leopard poaching or killing, as long as it 
referenced either. 
Of the 267 articles, only those describing events in India during the 2012 calendar year 
were included in the final sample, a total of 68 cases. A content analysis of these 68 articles was 
performed using the same codes as part 2 of this research. The reason for limiting the number of 
cases was two-fold. First, a preliminary analysis of the first 90 of the original 267 articles and 
found that their content was very similar. A subsequent comparison of the first 30 articles in the 
sample of 68 and the next 38 articles found no difference in their findings, suggesting that 
including more cases was unlikely to produce additional information. Second, leopard attacks on 
humans and livestock vary seasonally based on rainfall, prey availability, and the mating season 
(Butler, 2000; Graham et al., 2005; National Wildlife Research Center, 2010). A full year of 
articles was therefore necessary to draw reliable conclusions from the data. 
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Media data has several limitations worth noting. First, the H-LCs reported online will not 
be representative of all H-LCs that occur. The media tends to focus on more sensational cases so 
the sample for this analysis could be biased (Entman & Gross, 2008; Gordon, 2000). This is 
especially relevant for India where leopard attacks on humans, rather than livestock, are often 
reported (Raina, 2011; Singh, 2014). Second, the PageRank algorithm may rule out web pages in 
developing countries, which tend to be relatively new and have fewer links to them (Strickland, 
2014). Results might therefore be biased towards western world sources that report on H-LCs in 
developing countries (for example, the New York Times published an article on Indian leopard 
attacks on humans on August 5th, 2011 (Raina, 2011)). 
After looking at the Google Alerts results, there appears to be little western world source 
bias, as most of the of the articles come from developing countries in Southeast Asia. The 
majority of these stories come from India. As for sensational case bias, a review of the scholarly 
and grey literature on Indian H-LCs suggests that these articles capture the different H-LC 
scenarios described by Indian researchers and government personnel: leopard attacks on humans 
and leopard attacks on livestock (Athreya & Belsare, 2007; Athreya et al., 2010; Chauhan, 2011; 
Marker & Sivamani, 2009). Although leopard attacks on humans do get more column inches 
than attacks on livestock, both are still reported with enough frequency and diversity of scenarios 






4. Analysis part 4: GIS analysis of South African illegal leopard deaths 
 
 The final part of this research identifies the geospatial factors that contribute to H-LCs 
and retaliatory leopard killings by mapping the location of killings, creating a database of 
locations’ environmental situational factors, and then running non-parametric tests on the data. A 
case-control design (CCD) is used to compare locations with retaliatory leopard killings to two 
types of matched controls without. 
The retaliatory leopard killings in this analysis took place near Wildcliff Nature Reserve 
and the town of Heidelberg (same as part 2, figure 5.2), and around Baviaanskloof conservation 
area and the Greater Addo Elephant National Park in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. 
The Baviaanskloof and Greater Addo areas are mountainous, but contain all the major South 
African vegetation biomes57 except for desert (McManus, 2009). A large part of the land is split 
into fruit orchards and irrigation-based agriculture or sheep and goat livestock farms, with a 
small percentage of cattle farms. Numerous reports of leopard predation on livestock and 
retaliatory leopard killings in the area suggest that tolerance for leopard killing is widespread 
there (McManus, 2009). 
The location of retaliatory leopard killings comes from GPS collar and carcass recovery 
data from a small-scale NPO, The Landmark Foundation, that focuses on preventing retaliatory 
leopard killings in rural communities. This information is in the form of a GPS point where a 
																																																								
57 Biomes are groupings of plants based on dominant species and climatic factors (South African 
National Biodiversity Institute, 2010). 
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conflict was reported or a carcass was found or reported to be58. Research has shown that counts 
of observed crimes are not the same as the number of crimes actually occurring (Maxfield & 
Babbie, 2008). This is true of H-LCs and retaliatory leopard killings. Known cases probably 
reflect a small percentage of the actual number of incidents that take place every year. 
Retaliatory leopard killings may be at higher risk of under-reporting because offenders are able 
to bury or conceal any evidence. The illegality of leopard killing and the stigma and anger 
surrounding it in certain communities make it difficult to bypass this data problem.  
One advantage of the data from The Landmark Foundation is that researchers involved 
with its work are so embedded in the local community that most cases of illegal leopard killing 
eventually surface through informants and gossip (Farmer 1, personal communication, August 
17, 2011; NPO worker 1, personal communication, July 31, 2011). The Landmark Foundation 
researchers live in the area where they protect leopards and, as such, are part of the fabric of the 
community, much like beat cops involved in community policing (Lindberg, 2008; Weisheit, 
Edward Wells, & Falcone, 1994). As with community policing, non-profits working in rural 
communities succeed because they gain the trust of local residents by acting as problem solvers 
rather than punitive enforcement agents (Weisheit et al., 1994). Local residents share information 
with them on the problems in their area (including leopard poaching) and work with them to find 
solutions (Lindberg, 2008; Weisheit et al., 1994) (Government wildlife official 2, personal 
																																																								
58 There are multiple ways to know if a leopard has been illegally killed and where this incident 
took place: 1) The body of a leopard is discovered showing signs of non-natural death (including 
poisoning which can be determined at autopsy). 2) A leopard wearing a radio collar disappears 
and the age of the leopard precludes death from old age and the radio collar is too far from its 
expiration date to have stopped working. 
3) An individual reports that someone has killed a leopard. 
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communication, August 19, 2011). The Landmark Foundation therefore provides one of the most 




 The dependent variable for this analysis is whether or not a 5.5 km x 4.7 km area has 
experienced H-LC resulting in a retaliatory leopard killing. The number of cases is 13: 15 cases 
of retaliatory leopard killings in 13 different locations from November 1st, 2005 to April 1st, 2011 
(see table 5.6 for a list of these cases). In table 5.6, there are four cases where a H-LC occurred 
but no leopard died. These cases are included in the analysis as retaliatory leopard killings 
because the only reason the leopard lived was that Landmark Foundation employees rescued it 
from either a gin trap or a farmer willing to shoot it. Had they not intervened, the leopard would 
have died. 
All data were aggregated to a 5.5 km x 4.7 km area to map them and create the database 
of location characteristics59. This area is referred to in the remainder of the text as a “grid cell” 
(see figure 5.5 for a map grid cell distribution). The grid cell size is 5.4 km x 4.7 km for three 
reasons: 
1) The biggest resolution for the data in the shapefiles is 1 km x 1 km (Arkansas Forest 
Resources Center & University of Arkansas, n.d.), requiring that the grid cell be at least 
that size. 
																																																								
59 The data for this analysis were generally available as GIS shapefiles and, if not, a shapefile 
was manually created (see the “data sources” section, below, for more information). The 
shapefiles were projected with the geographic coordinate system GCS_WGS_1984 and the 
projected coordinate system Africa_Albers_Equal_Area_Conic. 
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2) The GPS locations for leopard retaliatory killings were accurate, but not always exact. 
They sometimes corresponded to the location of the farm where the conflict or death 
occurred. The 5.4 km x 4.7 km size allowed for this amount of error. 




Table 5.6. List of the H-LCs and retaliatory killing cases used for the dependent variable 
 
Date Location Province Conflict Outcome Leopard sex Leopard age 
4/1/11 Ladismith area Western Cape Unknown Died Male Adult 
3/9/11 Potberg/Dehoop Western Cape Caught ostrich on ostrich farm. Collared Female Adult 
Early 
9/10* 
Patensie Eastern Cape Shot by farmer on his farm. Died Male Sub-adult 
Mid 8/10* Patensie Eastern Cape Shot by farmer on his farm. Died Male Adult 
Late 7/10* Patensie Eastern Cape Shot by farmer on his farm. Died Male Adult 
6/9/10 Heidelberg Western Cape Fell into farm’s water reservoir. Farmer wanted 
to shoot. 
Collared Male Adult 
6/8/10 Winterhoek 
Mountains 
Western Cape Caught in gin trap. Died Male Sub-adult 
10/08 Cockscomb Eastern Cape Killed. Died Male Adult 
4/13/08 Glenconner 
Stellenbosch 
Western Cape Caught in gin trap. Collared Male Adult 
1/29/08 Baviaanskloof Eastern Cape Shot by farmer on his farm. Died Male Adult 
11/28/07 Kammanasie Western Cape Caught in gin trap. Died Male Adult 
6/19/06 Baviaanskloof Eastern Cape Caught in gin trap and hunted with dogs. Died Male  Adult 
4/1/06 Cockscomb Eastern Cape Caught in gin trap. Released Female Adult 
2/1/06 Baviaanskloof 
Kouga 
Eastern Cape Hunted with dogs. Died Unknown Juvenile 
11/1/05 Baviaanskloof 
Kouga 
Eastern Cape Hunted with dogs. Died Male Adult 
*These three cases occurred at the same geographical location and were therefore treated as one case for the analysis.
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 To determine what environmental situational factors contribute to retaliatory leopard 
killings, it is necessary to compare the characteristics of locations with killings to those without. 
Case-control design (CCD) is the best method to do so for three reasons. First, CCD is meant to 
generate hypotheses about causal connections when dealing with causal variables that result in a 
rare outcome (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002; Stretesky, 2009). The outcome variable in this 
analysis, retaliatory leopard killings, is rare (based on sample size) in the study area (N = 13). 
Second, CCD is also used in cases when the outcome is rare and cannot be simulated to obtain a 
bigger sample size (Shadish et al., 2002). As the purpose of this research is to help determine 
where these killings occur, it is premature to try to simulate additional cases. Third, CCD 
preserves degrees of freedom necessary for statistical analyses. 
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 Matched controls were chosen because the analysis’ theoretical framework and 
hypotheses suggested the locations of retaliatory leopard killings are linked to environmental 
factors found only in these locations and not elsewhere. These matched controls are cells 
adjacent to the experimental grid cells where killings occurred. Yet Shadish et al. (2002, p. 129) 
state that a common problem with matched controls is that they “still differ from cases in 
unobserved ways that can be confounded with the presumed cause and can be the actual cause of 
the outcome.” To avoid this type of error, two control groups are used: 1) controls sampled from 
an adjacent cell and 2) controls sampled randomly from a buffer zone of cells within 4 grid cells 
of the experimental cells and excluding adjacent cells (buffer length = 48.6 km, width = 42.3 km, 
diagonal = 64.43 km). The size of the buffer zone was chosen for two reasons: 
1) It had to be equal or smaller than the average home range size of a female leopard in the 
region, 88.39 km2.60 The female home range size was used because it is smaller than a 
male’s (157.27 km2) and the sex of the leopard involved in H-LC in an experimental cell 
was not always known. 
2) A smaller buffer was more appropriate because it is assumed that leopards were more 
likely to be in cells closer to the location of the original H-LC than in cells further away. 
 
Two types of independent variables are used in this analysis: 1) variables relating to 
where a H-LC incident took place (i.e. vegetation cover) and 2) variables describing when it took 
place (i.e. season). Both types of environmental situational variables are important to this 
analysis because the characteristics of a location change over time and leopard predation on 
																																																								




either humans or livestock is seasonal (Butler, 2000; Graham et al., 2005; National Wildlife 
Research Center, 2010). The weather at a particular time of year affects variables like vegetation 
cover and prey availability, which then determine how suitable a location is for leopard survival 
and whether or not a leopard will go after non-natural prey. 
 
Land-use overlap and bordering 
 
Leopards generally shy away from human contact, even more so than the average wild 
animal (Gates, 2013). Given this, there is little opportunity for H-LC, unless the location of a 
leopard’s food and/or its territory is adjacent to or overlaps human settlement (Bailey, 2005). 
Previous research has shown that leopards are threatened by habitat loss (Al-Johany, 2007; 
Ghoddousi et al., 2010), suggesting that land-use overlap between leopards and humans may be a 
growing problem. The hypotheses below describe the expected relationship between human-
leopard land-use overlap and retaliatory leopard killings (see table 5.7 at the end of this section 
for a list of all the concepts, variables, data sources, and coding methods used in this analysis): 
 
H4.1: Retaliatory leopard killings are more likely to occur where human settlements overlap with 
leopard territory or habitat. 
H4.2: Retaliatory leopard killings are more likely to occur where human settlements border 




 The concept of human settlement is measured using the Global Human Influence Index 
database (version 2) from the Last of the Wild Project. This database calculates a Human 
Influence Index from nine different datasets with four types of data as proxies for human 
influence: population density, land transformation, accessibility, and electrical power 
infrastructure. It also normalizes this index within geographical biomes to control for how the 
type of ecosystem and human histories in different regions influenced human presence 
(Sanderson et al., 2002). The source data dates from 1995-2004, with the latest version of the 
dataset published in 2005 (National Aeronautics and Space Administration Socioeconomic Data 
and Applications Center & Columbia University, 2005). Human Influence Index values vary 
between 0 and 100 (0 = no human influence). The human influence score for each grid cell 
corresponds to the mean of all the Human Influence Index values found within it (one index 
value for each 1km2 of area). 
Leopard territory is measured by grid cell proximity to the leopard’s range as determined 
by the IUCN Red List of Endangered Species (IUCN, 2012). All the grid cells used in this 
analysis are within leopard territory. This territory is also measured by the presence or absence of 
protected areas in the grid cell because wildlife in general prefers wild land to semi-wild land. 
Grid cells with no protected areas in them are coded as 0, those where less than 50% of the cell is 
a protected area as 1, those where 50-90% is a protected area as 2, and those where more than 
90% is a protected area as 3. GIS shapefiles indicating the location of government-controlled 







 Without reliable worldwide estimates of leopard numbers to determine the likelihood of 
human-leopard interactions (Al-Johany, 2007; Liberg et al., 2011) (NPO worker 3, personal 
communication, July 2011), it is necessary to rely on studies by NPOs that estimate leopard 
numbers in small geographical areas. The problem with these estimates is two-fold. First, their 
accuracy depends on how pro-active organizations were at collaring leopards and, second, if the 
study area is large, they do not assess where leopards are more likely to congregate and conflict 
with humans. 
Prime leopard habitat (like mountain slopes in South Africa) will attract more leopards 
and can also support larger numbers of leopards per square mile than sub-par habitat. As such, 
the location of prime leopard habitat is a better proxy measure of leopard abundance than 
potentially inaccurate population counts. 
Having larger numbers of leopards per square mile increases the chances of human-
leopard contact. This increase in human-leopard contact creates a greater potential for livestock 
predation or leopard attacks on humans and can trigger larger numbers of retaliatory leopard 
killings. Based on this, the following hypotheses is made: 
 
H4.3: Leopards are more likely to be illegally killed in areas of prime leopard habitat, when 




 For this hypothesis, the location of prime leopard habitat is based on vegetation cover and 
road and river location. Prime leopard habitat includes sufficient vegetation to stalk prey 
successfully and a water source for hydration, where prey also congregate (Bailey, 2005; 
Panthera, 2015). It would not include large multi-lane roads, with or without high levels of 
traffic, as many large cats avoid going near or crossing roads that are 2 lanes or more (Dickson, 
Jenness, & Beier, 2005; Schwab & Zandbergen, 2011; Schwartzstein, 2014). 
Vegetation cover data come from the South African National Biodiversity Institute’s 
(SANBI) National Vegetation Map of South Africa Project (VEGMAP). SANBI created this 
map of South African vegetation types in 2006 using data from 60 individual contributors (South 
African National Biodiversity Institute, 2006a, 2006b). It identifies 440 types of vegetation and 
11 biomes. The biome type that covers the largest percentage of a grid cell is recorded as the 
biome for that cell. 
The road and river location data come from The Landmark Foundation. The presence of a 
road is coded differently based on the type of road: primary, secondary, or tertiary road, and 
other access (i.e. driveways or farm access roads). Two different road variables were created 
from the data: total length of all roads in a grid cell and total length of main roads (in 
kilometers). Main roads were those classified as “main roads”, “street”, or “national route” in the 
shapefiles. The reason for this coding is that the number of roads in a grid cell is less important 
to leopard and human movement than the amount of road surface a leopard may have to cross to 
get from point A to point B or the amount of road a human can use to travel in that cell. The river 
variable is coded as the length of all rivers within a grid cell (in kilometers). Perennial and non-
perennial rivers were included in the analysis based on the date of the H-LC for an experimental 
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grid cell or the date randomly assigned to a control cell (see the Analytical Strategy section 
below for more information on control grid cells). Non-perennial rivers were excluded if the date 
associated with a control cell or the date of a H-LC was during the dry season. 
 
Poor leopard habitat 
 
An alternate explanation is that leopards living in poor habitat are more likely than 
leopards in prime habitat to resort to livestock predation and, therefore, that livestock owners 
living within poor leopard habitat are more likely to kill leopards in retaliation for livestock 
predation. Hence, the alternate hypothesis: 
 
H4.3b: Leopards are more likely to be killed in areas that provide poor leopard habitat, when 
controlling for human settlement and road location61. 
 
For this hypothesis, the location of poor leopard habitat is based on vegetation cover and 
road and river location, but also includes prey availability and prey abundance. Availability and 
abundance are important to include because a wider range of available prey species implies more 
potential prey to eat, as does larger numbers of individuals per prey species per square kilometer. 
Availability is measured as the number of prey species whose range overlaps with a grid 
cell, coded as a number from 0 onwards. The list of leopard prey species comes from a meta-
																																																								
61 H3 and H4 discuss the idea that leopard numbers determine the chance of an interaction and 
potential H-LC. H5 and H6 have to do with the ease of catching prey and the chance that a 
leopard will resort to livestock predation if it cannot feed itself from natural resources. 
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analysis of all leopard prey studies done by Hayward et al. (2006). 96 prey species were selected 
after excluding possible prey species that leopards never ate in the meta-analysis studies or that 
leopards avoided unless no other prey were available (i.e. prey of last resort). The prey range 
shapefiles come from the IUCN Red List of Endangered Species (IUCN, 2012). Shapefiles were 
found for 74 out of the 96 prey species. Of these, 47 resided within the study area. 
Abundance is measured as the sum of all prey species abundance scores within a grid 
cell. For example, if bushbuck abundance is 15 individuals per km2 and hyrax abundance is 30 
per km2 for a grid cell, the prey abundance score for that cell is 45. The abundance scores come 
from Hayward et al. (2006). They calculated mean percentage abundance scores for all leopard 
prey species using data from 29 published and four unpublished studies of leopard diet in 25 
conservation areas in 13 countries. Both variables, prey availability and prey abundance, were 
tested for spatial auto-correlation since there was a risk that adjacent grid cells would have the 
same values. 
 
  Weather and poor leopard habitat 
 
 Poor habitat conditions are exacerbated by seasonal changes in weather between the dry 
and wet season. Certain seasons provide worse hunting conditions for leopards within poor 
habitat. There is less foliage, for example, during the dry season, making it more difficult for 
leopards to successfully stalk prey. Many prey species also migrate to better habitat during the 
dry season, leaving non-migratory leopards living in poor habitat with less prey to hunt. Given 
this, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
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H4.4: Leopards are more likely to be killed in areas that provide poor leopard habitat during the 
dry season, when controlling for human settlement and road location. 
 
The South African Rain Atlas is used to determine whether or not a retaliatory leopard 
killing occurred during the dry season (Kratz, Zucchini, & Nenadic, n.d.). It provides simulated 
rainfall averages for each week anywhere in South Africa (Kratz et al., n.d.). Each grid cell was 
given a date based on when a H-LC occurred there or assigned a random date for control cells. 
Dates were classified into wet versus dry season based on whether or not a cell’s monthly rainfall 
was above or below the monthly average (calculated using the annual rainfall value divided by 
12). Grid cells where a H-LC took place during the dry season received a code of 0. They 
received a 1 if the H-LC was during the wet season. 
 
 After creating and uploading the shapefiles for all these independent variables into 
ArcGIS (see figure 5.6), a dataset of retaliatory leopard killing locations and their characteristics 
was produced. It includes independent variable data for the dependent variable grid cells 
(experimental cells) and the two types of matched control grid cells. 
Non-parametric tests were then run to determine which environmental situational factors 
influenced where retaliatory leopard killings took place62. Non-parametric tests were necessary 
because all the independent variables were not normally distributed for at least one of the grid 
cell types. Non-parametric tests were also better suited to a small sample size (see chapter 6 part 
																																																								
62 Exact significance was used for the non-parametric test results because of the small sample 
size (N = 39). 
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4 for further justification of the statistical test choices). Correlations were run on the independent 
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Concept measured Hypothesis Data source Data date63 Variable coding 
Human settlement Land-use overlap & 
bordering 
H4.1, H4.2 Last of the Wild Project  1995-2004 0-100 
0 = no human influence 
Protected areas  The Landmark Foundation 2009 0 = no protected areas 
1 = less than 50% of cell is 
protected area 
2 = between 50-90% 
3 = more than 90% 
Vegetation Leopard abundance 
(proxy: prime leopard 
habitat) 
H4.3-H4.4 South African National Biodiversity 
Institute 
2009 11 biome types 
Roads  The Landmark Foundation 2009 Two variables (in km): 
Length of all roads 
Length of main roads 
Rivers  The Landmark Foundation 2009 Length of rivers in km 
Prey availability Poor leopard habitat H4.3b, H4.4 IUCN Red List 2006-2011 # prey species whose range 
overlaps cell 
Prey abundance H4.3b, H4.4 Hayward et al 2006 Sum of species abundance 
scores for grid cell 
Season H4.3b, H4.4 South African Rain Atlas NA 
(simulation) 
0 = rainy season 
1 = dry season 
																																																								
63 Using data from different years can be problematic if there is temporal variation in the values for each variable. This could be the 
case, for example, with vegetation if a forest is being logged and no longer exists from one year to the next. Every effort was made to 
find data from the same year, but as this research is dependent on publicly available data sources, this was not always possible. 






H-LC and retaliatory killing data 
 
Table 5.7 summarizes the variables and data sources. 
 
The Landmark Foundation 
 
The dependent variable data come from The Landmark Foundation, an NPO that runs 
small-scale leopard conservation programs and fits leopards with GPS collars to track their 
movements. The Foundation promotes leopard conservation and leopard-friendly livestock 
farming. The Landmark Foundation researcher Jeannine McManus studies the effectiveness and 
ecological and economic viability of non-lethal predation prevention methods on livestock farms 
(Landmark Foundation, n.d.). The Foundation supplies farmers with bell collars to ward off 
leopards and works with them to reduce livestock losses (Farmer 2, personal communication, 
August 5, 2011). 
Foundation employees record all non-natural leopard deaths in the Heidelberg area and 
the areas around Baviaanskloof conservation area and the Greater Addo Elephant National Park 
(in the Eastern and Western Cape Provinces of South Africa) (see appendix E for an example of 
their data). They learn of these deaths either through informants, government officials, or when a 
collared leopard disappears. The Foundation’s records contain the approximate date and location 




method by which it was killed (gin trap, shot by farmer, etc.). They compile GPS movement data 
for the leopards they collar. The Foundation provided the GIS shapefiles for local roads, rivers, 
and protected areas, based on research done by Jeannine McManus for her Masters thesis at 
Rhodes University (McManus, 2009). 
 
Land-use overlap data 
Last of the Wild Project 
  
The Last of the Wild Project produced a dataset that calculates a Human Influence Index 
for each 1km2 of the earth and gives that location a score from 0 to 100 (0 = no human 
influence).64 “The Human Influence Index (version 2) is […] created from nine global data 
layers (source data from 1995-2004) covering human population pressure (population density), 
human land use and infrastructure (built-up areas, nighttime lights, land use/land cover), and 
human access (coastlines, roads, railroads, navigable rivers)” (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center & Columbia University, 2005) (see 
Sanderson et al. (2002) for a list of data layers). The Wildlife Conservation Society and the 
Columbia University Center for the International Earth Science Information Network produce 
the database. It is publicly available in ArcGIS shapefile format. 
 
																																																								




IUCN Red List Spatial Data 
 
  The International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) Red List of Threatened 
Species has researchers assess the conservation status of species based on published literature, 
expert testimony, population trend data, remote-sensing data on habitat loss, and direct 
fieldwork. These researchers compile a profile of the species with ecological characteristics, 
including range, and submit it to the appropriate Red List Authority for review. This assessment 
is done every 5 to 10 years depending on the species (IUCN, 2012). The last assessment for 
leopards took place in 2008. For the leopard’s prey species, the assessments date from 2008 to 
2011. The IUCN Red List provides publicly available GIS shapefiles of species’ range (map 
scale 1:1,000,000). This data is used to map the leopard’s range and that of its prey species to 
determine their availability within its range. 
 
Leopard abundance data 
National Vegetation Map of South Africa Project 
 
 The National Vegetation Map of South Africa Project (VEGMAP) is a collaborative 
initiative managed by the South African National Biodiversity Institute and completed in 2006 
(South African National Biodiversity Institute, 2006a). It brings together 60 individual 
contributors from several organizations to build a comprehensive map of South African 




identifies 440 zonal and azonal vegetation types at a working scale of 1:250,000 or better (South 
African National Biodiversity Institute, 2006b). It also classifies this vegetation into 11 biomes: 
albany thicket, azonal vegetation, desert, forests, fynbos, grassland, Indian Ocean coastal belt, 
nama-karoo, savanna, succulent karoo, and water bodies (South African National Biodiversity 
Institute, 2010). 
 
Poor habitat data 
Hayward et al. (2006) article 
 
 Hayward et al. (2006)’s article is a meta-analysis of 29 published and four unpublished 
studies of leopard diet that included local prey abundance estimates. The data from these studies 
came from 25 conservation areas in 13 countries. Based on these data, Hayward and his 
colleagues calculated a mean Jacobs’ index value for every prey species to determine which prey 
leopards preferred. The list of leopard prey species used in this analysis is based on this article. 
The Jacobs’ index value (D) was calculated using the following formula: 
 
D = r - p / r + p - 2rp 
 
“where r is the proportion of the total kills at a site made up by a species and p is the proportional 




p. 5)). Jacobs’ index values range from +1 to -1, with +1 indicating maximum preference for a 
prey and -1 maximum avoidance. 
 As part of their study, Hayward et al. (2006) also calculated a mean percentage 
abundance for each prey species. These values are used to measure prey abundance for this 
analysis. 
 
South African Rain Atlas 
 
 The South Africa Rain Atlas provides web users with rainfall-related statistics for South 
Africa for every 1 minute of a degree of latitude and longitude in the region (424,646 sites and 
about 1.9 km x 1.6 km surface area per site) (Geosystems Global Corporation, 1998; Zucchini & 
Nenadic, 2006). The creators of the Atlas, Oleg Nenadic, Gunter Kratz, and Walter Zucchini, 
used data from the South African Weather Bureau, the Department of Forestry, the Department 
of Agriculture, the South African Sugar Association, and information from farmers and members 
of the public to create a model estimating rainfall patterns at each site for any time of year. To 
verify the accuracy of their model, the creators compared model rainfall estimates and actual 
rainfall data for 5070 locations (Kratz et al., n.d.; Zucchini & Nenadic, 2006). 
Besides monthly rainfall projections, the South African Rain Atlas also provides the 
estimated number of rain days and storm days for each location, the amount of rain per day, and 
the probability of dry runs (consecutive days with no rain) for 5-day increments up to a month 
(Kratz et al., n.d.). The data is publicly available on the South Africa Rain Atlas website: 




monthly rainfall estimates to determine when poor leopard habitat becomes especially 




This research identifies the situational factors that contribute to retaliatory leopard 
killings and where they occur in three study locations: the Amboseli and Tsavo West National 
Parks area in Kenya, the Heidelberg, Baviaanskloof, and Greater Addo Elephant National Park 
regions of South Africa, and India. Three research questions drive the analysis: 
1) What is the scope and nature of illegal leopard killings within the study areas? 
2) What forms do H-WC driven retaliatory leopard killings take? 
3) What geospatial factors contribute to retaliatory leopard killings? 
Content analyses of interview data from Kenya and South Africa and 68 media articles 
from India are used to determine the human situational factors of H-LC and retaliatory leopard 
killings in parts 1-3 of the analysis. Part 4 maps 13 locations of retaliatory leopard killings in the 
Heidelberg region of South Africa to better understand their environmental situational factors. 
The independent variables for this spatial analysis include river length, prey availability, prey 
abundance, road length, main road length, human settlement score, main biome type, park 
overlap, and season. Data on these variables come from 6 different academic and NPO sources. 






Chapter 6: Results 
 
1. Analysis part 1: Kenyan interviews 
 
 The results from the first 3 analyses (parts 1, 2, and 3) focus on the human context of H-
WC and H-LC. The purpose of these analyses is to understand what human situational factors 
contribute to these conflicts and to tolerance for leopard killing. As stated in the previous 
chapter, the hypotheses for these analyses are: 
H1: Individuals who have livestock are vulnerable to H-WC. 
H2: Individuals who experience H-WC and its costs are less likely to support conservation. 
H3: Support for conservation is low in areas where distrust among actors is high and government 
oversight is poor. 
H4: If an individual has previous exposure to conservation initiatives, he is more likely to 
support conservation. 
To understand why a place tolerates leopard killing, one first needs to understand the H-
WC situation in that area. 87% of respondents in the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem reported that 
they suffered costs from wildlife, while only 28% received any benefits from wildlife (N = 234). 
When asked how they suffered costs from wildlife, respondents stated that wildlife was 
destructive.65 Wild animals attacked their livestock, their crops, their property, and sometimes 
their neighbors or themselves (see table 6.1 below). 
																																																								
65 All interviewees responded to whether or not they experienced costs or benefits from wildlife 




Understanding the full impact of H-WC requires putting these numbers in the socio-
economic context of the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem. The majority of respondents, and the 
majority of the population, are pastoralists (43%) or agro-pastoralists (30%), with only 27% 
depending on agriculture alone (2% cited other livelihood strategies) (N = 234). All local 
residents therefore live with the risk of losses from H-WC because of their livelihood strategy. 
Table 6.1 shows that pastoralists were actually the most at risk: 41% of those who suffered costs 
from wildlife were pastoralists and 30% were agro-pastoralists (H1) (see table 6.1). 
 
Table 6.1. Socio-economic characteristics of respondents living in the Tsavo-Amboseli 
ecosystem 
 
Variable Response (in %) N 
 Category of respondent  
Pastoralist Agro-pastoralist Agriculturist 
Livelihood strategy* 43% 30 27 234 
Suffered costs from 
wildlife? 
41% 30 29 234 
 Self-perceived sufficiency of livelihood  
Highly sufficient Sufficient Not sufficient 
Needs met by 
livelihood strategy? 
3% 67 30 234 
 Self-perceived economic status  
High Medium Low 
Economic status 8% 69 23 234 
*2% of respondents indicated other types of livelihood strategies. 
 
Agriculture and pastoralism, though, are two ways of life that are at odds with each other 
in terms of resource consumption. The Kenyan government has been encouraging pastoralists to 
sedentarize and convert to agriculture (Poole, 2006). Unfortunately, the region’s semi-arid and 
arid climate does not lend itself to high-yield agriculture (Berger, 1993). It is possible to grow 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
234). Despite this lower sample size, the general themes that come out of these responses can be 
useful in understanding the challenges some local residents face from H-WC, especially as these 




crops, but they are highly dependent on rainfall and lack of rainfall can have devastating 
financial consequences for farmers. Most agriculturalists therefore supplement natural rainfall 
with artificial irrigation creating shortages of water and shortages of food when crops fail. 
Clearing the land for agriculture also reduces the amount of habitat for grazing livestock, 
competing with pastoralists’ livelihood, and reduces the amount of habitat available to wildlife, 
increasing the amount of H-WC everyone in the region suffers. Meanwhile, human densities and 
settlements in the area are increasing because of population growth and migration of 
agriculturalists to the area, only exacerbating the resource competition among pastoralists, 
agriculturalists, and wildlife (Berger, 1993). 
While most respondents felt that their livelihood strategy met their needs (67%, 
compared to 30 % not sufficient and 3% highly sufficient), they ranked their economic status as 
“medium” (69%) suggesting they are able to support themselves but are not wealthy (N = 234). 
Another 23% ranked their economic status as low, while only 8% thought their economic status 
high (N = 234) (see table 6.1). There was no statistically significant difference between the 
different livelihood strategies on both these points (X2 = 4.287, df = 6, p = 0.638 for livelihood 
strategy meeting their needs and X2 = 3.595, df = 6, p = 0.731 for economic status). These 
numbers suggest a socio-economic context where local farmers are able to support themselves 
but do not necessarily have an economic cushion to sustain constant financial losses from 
carnivore killings of livestock and elephants trampling crops. 
The financial difficulties and resource competition described above are among the 
reasons why local farmers are not supportive of conservation efforts (H2). In fact, they are the 




to conservation was. 66% of respondents believed H-WC was the biggest challenge to wildlife 
conservation in this region66 (N = 224). 34% identified H-WC conflict directly while others 
talked about the reasons for H-WC, i.e. limited resources (24%) and limited space (8%). Those 
that suggested other challenges discussed issues like corruption, lack of knowledge about the 
importance of wildlife, and insufficient funding. 
The political context and previous conservation attempts in the region are vital to 
understanding the current situation. Amboseli National Park was created as part of the fortress 
conservation model. Amboseli originated as a game reserve created in 1948 and managed by the 
National Park Service (Barrow & Murphee, 1998). “The purpose of game reserves was to protect 
wildlife in the areas that could not be established as national parks because they were already 
allocated for other purposes” (Viollaz, 2006, p. 5). Both local farmers and wildlife could use the 
resources in these multiple-use areas freely (Kameri-Mbote, 2002). In 1961, the reserve’s 
management and revenue were handed over to the Kajiado County Council so local group ranch 
members could receive direct benefits from wildlife and encourage them to support conservation 
(Barrow & Murphee, 1998). 
Upon the success of the venture, though, the Kenyan government reclaimed the reserve 
and created Amboseli National Park in 1974, forbidding local farmers to use natural resources 
within the park (Lange, 2006). The decision strained relations between local farmers and the 
KWS, especially when KWS refused to compensate them for the lost resources as promised 
																																																								
66 Surprisingly, 79.1% of respondents said they had never been exposed to wildlife conservation 
issues (N = 233). This result is unusual given the prevalence of conservation initiatives in the 
area. Furthermore, most interviewees responded coherently to questions requiring an 
understanding of what conservation initiatives are, suggesting that they understood the concept 




(Poole, 2006). At the time of the interviews, 2006, Amboseli National Park generated $3.4 
million U.S. dollars a year in tourism revenue, but only 2% of this money was returned to local 
communities. Talks were ongoing since 2005 to devolve control of the park back to the Kajiado 
County Council (Lange, 2006). The presence of such a lucrative conservation venture nearby and 
the large number of respondents who suffered costs from wildlife may explain why 74% of 
respondents indicated that they would not support wildlife conservation if it were not for 
economic benefits (24% would support wildlife conservation without economic benefits while 
2% did not know, N = 227) (H3). 
Given this context, it comes as no surprise that respondents resented the government for 
not sharing the revenue from Amboseli National Park with them and suggested that 
conservation-based income generating activities had brought corruption to the area (see table 
6.2). Some respondents suggested that wildlife only benefited group ranch officials. 44% of 
respondents felt that KWS was mismanaging the park. 27% disagreed and 29% did not know (N 
= 233). KWS’ renewed ownership of the park only added to local community members’ anger 
when the government failed to protect them from the destruction and injuries “its” wildlife 
caused to them, their crops, livestock, and property. Given the large profits generated by the 
park, respondents felt they should at least be compensated for their losses, something that 








Table 6.2. The positive and negative aspects of living with wildlife 
 








See no benefit from wildlife 72% Bursaries 54 











No compensation for losses 88% Occasional compensation for losses 12 
Failure of government to control 
wildlife 
NA*   
Corruption NA*   
* Not applicable here because not quantified in the analysis; simply noted as a recurring concept 
during the content analysis. 
 
Although generally frustrated, respondents did identify some benefits they derived from 
wildlife conservation. Of those who benefited from wildlife (N = 68), the most common benefit 
was bursaries for their children’s education (54%). 24% of respondents also mentioned that 
wildlife created opportunities for employment (see table 6.1). 12% cited the compensation they 
received for livestock and crop losses. Overall, respondents identified the same benefits and 
costs from wildlife for other community members. 
 
H-WC interventions suggested by local stakeholders 
 
Despite 79% of respondents saying they had no experience with conservation (H4, N = 
233, see footnote 66), many respondents suggested methods for mitigating H-WCs in keeping 
with conservation principles (N = 229). The majority of these responses involved fencing 




fences around villages to keep wildlife out. 16% supported the idea of compensation for any 
damage suffered from wildlife and 3% of those suggested that fences in combination with 
compensation would limit damages. Only about 5% suggested killing problem animals; 8% 
responded “I don’t know”. 
This last finding is perhaps the most important. The results from part 1 of this analysis 
suggest that, based on the 4 above-mentioned hypotheses, the residents of the Tsavo-Amboseli 
ecosystem are inhospitable to conservation initiatives. The costs from wildlife are high and affect 
a large percentage of the population, while local residents’ livelihood strategies increase the 
chances of H-WC. The constant and increasing H-WC conflict in the region stokes the public’s 
resentment of wildlife. Meanwhile, distrust among government officials, conservationists, and 
local residents is longstanding due to historical events, and local residents claim not to have 
much exposure to conservation initiatives. They feel let down by local authorities and are 
unlikely to call them for help when they suffer H-WCs. Local residents have little direct 
experience of the financial benefits of wildlife conservation, such as shared revenue from 
national parks, and the long-term environmental benefits of a healthy ecosystem, like better crop 
returns. Wildlife is an inconvenience for them, one that the government will do nothing to 
protect them from. 
This deep resentment and lack of positive associations with wildlife create an 
inhospitable environment for wildlife conservation. Yet, despite this, only 5% of respondents 
suggested killing problem animals such as leopards (Makonjio Okello, 2005). Local residents 
primarily chose non-confrontational measures to handle H-WC, despite increasing conflicts with 




It is possible that more than 5% of respondents would kill problem animals if given the 
chance. In this case, though, respondents had few reasons to misrepresent their intentions and 
actions since they were not being asked about an illegal behavior, but rather about a possible 
solution to H-WC, one common elsewhere. Culling animals in protected areas is legally 
practiced in a number of African countries when animal populations become too large for a 
habitat and risk damaging it (Fuller & Johnson, 2005; Southern African Legal Information 
Institute, 2007). The practice of killing animals is therefore not, in itself, taboo. Although, social 
desirability may have led to the underreporting of killing problem animals as a solution to H-
WC, there were no retaliatory killings reported in the study area during the time of the 
interviews, suggesting the practice is not widespread in the region. 
 
 To understand what situational factors influenced local farmers’ opinion of wildlife 
conservation, a logistic regression was run with attitude towards wildlife conservation-based 
income generating activities (negative or positive) as the dependent variable. The interview 
question on which the dependent variable is based was worded as “what is your attitude towards 
wildlife conservation-based income generating activities?” This choice of words, instead of 
simply asking “attitude towards wildlife conservation activities,” is due to the local culture. The 
conservation initiatives in the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem, Amboseli and Tsavo West National 
Parks and a few other small ecotourism ventures, all generate income through ecotourism and 
wildlife conservation (Viollaz, 2006). Local residents know of these initiatives and the income 
they generate. Since, in their experience, conservation initiatives are always income generating, 




this community, wildlife conservation-based income generating activities are a proxy for wildlife 
conservation. 
The 6 independent variables in the regression were wildlife cost (Is wildlife imposing a 
cost to you?), wildlife benefit (Do you benefit from wildlife?), economic status, education level, 
mismanagement (Is KWS mismanaging Amboseli National Park?), and exposure to conservation 
(Have you been exposed to wildlife conservation issues?). Table 6.3 provides frequencies for 
each of these variables. 
 
Table 6.3. Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables in the regression 
 
Variable Response (in %) 
 Yes No Don’t know N 
Wildlife cost 87% 13 NA 234 
Wildlife benefit 28% 72 NA 234 
Exposure to 
conservation 
21% 79 NA 233 
Mismanagement 44% 27 29 233 
 Positive Negative   
Attitude 51% 49 NA 225 
 Low Medium High  
Economic status 23% 69 8 234 
 No education Primary Secondary  
Education 61% 24 15 233 
 
 Logistic regression requires that three assumptions be met: 1) the absence of sparse data, 
2) no collinearity between independent variables, and 3) no multi-collinearity between variables 
(Field, 2005). Sparse data is defined as 5 cases or less in any variable response category (Field, 
2005). Crosstabs indicate if poor distribution of cases among coding categories could cause 
sparse data problems. Frequencies (see table 6.3) and crosstabs run between the dependent 




economic status was borderline with 6 cases in the category of high economic status but negative 
attitude towards wildlife. Correlations between the independent variables (see table 6.5) revealed 
only three significant correlations between wildlife benefit and exposure to conservation, 
economic status and mismanagement, and exposure to conservation and mismanagement. Since 
all three were < 0.9, though, they would not adversely affect the results of the logistic regression 
model (Field, 2005). No multi-collinearity was found between the variables. 
 
Table 6.4. Crosstabs between the dependent variable and the independent variables in the logistic 
regression model 
 
Variable Attitude N 
 Positive (in %)  
Wildlife cost  225 
Yes 48% 196 
No 69% 29 
Wildlife benefit  225 
Yes 85% 62 
No 37% 163 
Exposure to conservation  224 
Yes 63% 46 
No 47% 178 
Mismanagement  224 
Yes 45% 101 
No 64% 58 
Don’t know 48% 65 
Economic status  225 
Low 43% 51 
Medium 52% 157 
High 65% 17 
Education  224 
No education 44% 137 
Primary 57% 53 




















Wildlife cost 1 -0.044 -.084 .013 .006 .015 
Wildlife benefit -.044 1 .015 .041 .198** .048 
Economic status -.084 .015 1 .021 -.039 -.229** 
Education .013 .041 .021 1 -.022 .015 
Exposure to 
conservation 
.006 .198** -.039 -.022 1 .139* 
Mismanagement .015 .048 -.229** .015 .139* 1 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 (sig. 2-tailed). 
  
The results of the logistic regression suggest that three variables significantly influenced 
local farmers’ attitudes towards wildlife conservation-based income generating activities: 
wildlife cost (p < 0.1), wildlife benefit (p < 0.001), and education (p < 0.05) (see table 6.6). 
Based on the Wald Statistic, it appears that wildlife benefit (Wald = 31.674) most influenced 
respondents’ attitude towards wildlife conservation-based income generating activities.67 The 
model was significant at the p < 0.001 level. It is a fairly strong model: its goodness of fit when 
including predictors was 33.9% better than for the null model. The model was able to accurately 
predict the observed values for 71.6% of the respondents (N= 222 instead of 234 because of 12 
cases omitted for missing data). 
																																																								
67 Field (2005, p. 239) suggests using the Wald statistic cautiously because “when the regression 
coefficient (b) is large, the standard error tends to become inflated, resulting in the Wald statistic 
being underestimated.” Nevertheless, given that this variable is highly significant and its Wald 
statistic is much higher than that of the other variables, there is little chance that the variable does 
not influence attitude towards wildlife conservation-based income generating activities. The 




 Local farmers who suffer costs from wildlife are less likely to have a positive attitude 
towards wildlife conservation (H2). Meanwhile, those benefiting from wildlife, economically or 
in other ways, are much more likely than people who do not benefit to support wildlife 
conservation. Finally, respondents with higher levels of education were more likely to have a 
positive attitude towards wildlife conservation. 
 
 
Table 6.6. Results of the logistic regression measuring what variables influenced respondents’ 
attitude towards wildlife conservation-based income generating activities 
 
Variable B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
       
Constant -1.113 .674 2.731 1 .098 .328 
       
Wildlife cost -.890 .481 3.433 1 .064* .411 
Wildlife benefit 2.382 .423 31.674 1 .000*** 10.832 
Economic status .504 .307 2.697 1 .101 1.655 
Education .683 .229 8.919 1 .033** 1.979 
Mismanagement   1.497 2 .473  
Exposure cons. .428 .412 1.081 1 .299 1.535 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.001. 
Note: R2 = .254 (Cox & Snell), .339 (Nagelkerke). Model X2(7) = 65.021, N = 222, p < .001. 
 
Based on these findings, support for wildlife conservation is primarily dependent on how 
much local farmers suffer costs or receive benefits from wildlife. The communities where H-
WCs occur are often cash-poor, like the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem where income can vary 
drastically based on rainfall. Most local residents earn at least 79% of their income from selling 
crops and livestock (Kelly, 2010; Minister & Lands, 2010). They are thus unwilling/unable to 





As for education, respondents with at least a primary education were more likely to 
support wildlife conservation initiatives. Approximately 39% of the respondents had at least a 
primary education so there is potential for developing a strong support network for wildlife 
conservation in the area. Education did not seem to play a role in whether or not a respondent 
had been exposed to conservation initiatives ( = -.022, p = 0.723). Knowledge of how important 
conservation is for biodiversity and ecosystem health may therefore not be why more educated 
farmers supported conservation initiatives. Perhaps educated respondents simply had a better 
grasp of the financial benefits they could receive from ecotourism and wildlife conservation-
based income generating activities. 
 
2. Analysis part 2: South African interviews 
 
 The Heidelberg area in South Africa is, like the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem in Kenya, 
rife with H-WC. The difference between the two is that farmers and NPO personnel in the 
Heidelberg area readily admit that retaliatory leopard killings take place locally, while in the 
Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem only 5% of respondents suggested this as a solution to H-WC. 
Granted, there is a difference between an opinion that killing is a solution and a belief that 
killings are taking place. But for a killing to take place, the person committing the killing has to 
think of it as a potential solution (Kansky & Knight, 2014). If killing a problem animal is not a 
solution to H-WC, there is little reason to kill, especially given the effort required to track an 




Of the 16 people interviewed in the Heidelberg area, only 1 farmer out of 7 denied the 
existence of retaliatory leopard killings in the region. This particular farmer was part of the local 
conservancy and thus had a vested interest in denying such illegal behavior or may simply have 
been too disconnected from the experience of local, and perhaps poorer, farmers to hear about 
these killings. The majority of government officials, on the other hand, openly denied that 
leopards were being illegally killed in the area. 
 The purpose of this analysis is to understand why this location tolerates leopard killing, 
especially retaliatory leopard killings. This study passes no judgment on whether or not the 
respondents’ claims are truthful. Rather, its purpose is to find the common threads in the actors’ 
stories and determine how to use this common ground to reverse the tolerance for leopard killing 
and reduce H-LC and illegal leopard killings. 
Respondents agreed that the main reason why local farmers illegally killed leopards was 
in retaliation for livestock predation (H1). NPO and government personnel specified that farmers 
sometimes killed leopards out of spite without any proof that they were responsible for attacks 
on their livestock. Conversations with farmers yielded a lot of anger at leopards, with several 
calling leopards “criminal” for attacking their private property when wild prey was plentiful. The 
general feeling was that livestock losses to tick fever and other natural causes were acceptable 
but that leopard predation on livestock would not be tolerated. This feeling was exacerbated by 
the belief that H-WC had not been a problem in the area until 20 years ago and so farmers felt 
that leopards had suddenly invaded what had been pristine livestock farming territory (H2). 
Leopards in the area were primarily shot or caught via gin traps and left to die of 




skins because farmers preferred to bury any evidence of wrongdoing in the bush. A farmer 
explained that one community member had a pack of leopard-hunting dogs68. When a farmer lost 
livestock to a leopard, he called this person to hunt the leopard on his property. Reasons given 
for shooting “problem leopards” were that permits to legally kill them took too long to obtain, 
farmers did not want to risk more losses, and that they feared not being able to catch the leopard 
if they waited (H2). 
 The two main emotions expressed during the interviews were anger and distrust. Anger at 
the hardships imposed by leopards, ongoing land tenure and land-use issues, and the lack of 
government support. The overarching emotion, though, was distrust. Two levels of distrust were 
apparent: 1) general distrust and 2) H-WC solution-specific distrust. 
The general distrust stemmed from historical events in the region. Farmers were angry 
that they received no support from the South African government. From 1867 to 1947, the 
mining industry subsidized farming. Expanding African markets and government protections 
turned South Africa into one of the few countries that exported food despite fickle rainfall 
(Wilson, 2009). South Africa, though, is no longer the farming superpower it once was, 
especially since its economic decline from the 1960s to the mid-1990s and its history of 
extractive policies and overgrazing that destroyed farmlands and their topsoil (Wilson, 2009). 
Those protectionist measures no longer exist, but farmers still felt that they should receive 
subsidies to keep their crops and beef competitive on the world market. 
																																																								





Farmers also resented the giving of land to black “inexperienced” farmers to diversify 
land ownership after apartheid, a practice they felt was doomed to fail because the government 
provided land but no training in farming practices. This general distrust is present in the Tsavo-
Amboseli area as well when local residents talk about how the government mismanages 
Amboseli National Park and how the profits from it are poorly distributed. In the case of Kenya, 
though, it stems from the government’s forceful appropriation of land to create the national park 
and the reneging on promises to allow grazing within it and share revenue from it. 
Adding to this general distrust is solution-specific distrust because of the failure of 
government responses to H-LC. This failure is partly due to the lack of organizational capacity in 
government institutions and a weak local government characteristic of post-apartheid South 
Africa (Wilson, 2009). The general belief among respondents was that the government’s 
response to leopard predation and retaliatory killings was inadequate. The specific complaints 
expressed by both farmers, government workers, and NPO personnel were very similar, although 
none of the parties recognized this. Everyone’s complaints focused on four main problems: the 
government’s response was slow and unwilling, it involved inefficient methods, there were 
inadequate resources to respond, and there lacked clear laws or a clear application of those laws 




Table 6.7. Respondents’ complaints about the government’s response to leopard predation and 
retaliatory killings 
 




Using inefficient methods Feeding meat to leopards during 
translocation 
Using ineffective methods 
Do not relocate far enough Using “one size fits all” 
enforcement 
Trapping cages too small Prevention measures 1 more 
burden for farmer 
 Penalties not a deterrent 
   
Laws inadequate Unequal application of laws No national legislation makes 
enforcement tough 
   
Not enough resources No compensation from Cape 
Nature 
Not enough money to do things 
properly 
 Short of enforcement personnel 
 Not enough training 
   
Slow & unwilling Toothless Wait too long to act 
Corruption Corruption 
Uninterested in solving problem No one will talk to help 
investigators and/or wildlife 
management personnel 
 Inconsistent help, slow  
 
Inefficient methods were the main complaint. Farmers cited this as a reason why most of 
them would not call Cape Nature for help when they had a problem leopard on their property 
(H3). The main difference between the government/NPO personnel’s description of this problem 
and that of the farmers is that farmers tended to give more specific examples of how the 
government’s response was failing. 
For example, farmers complained that government officials used cage traps that were too 
small, reducing the chances of capturing problem leopards on their property. With such small 
cages, the leopard felt the trap door come down on its tail and ran out of the cage before its door 
could fully close. In the event that a problem leopard was caught in a cage trap, farmers argued 
that Cape Nature officials did not relocate the animal far enough to prevent it from coming back 
to their farm. One farmer described how he had asked a veterinarian to tag a leopard trapped in a 




relocate the animal too far away for it to return. A few weeks later, this farmer once again had 
leopard predation problems. Cape Nature again set up a cage trap on his land and caught 
“another leopard.” The veterinarian confirmed that this “other leopard” was actually the original 
animal, which had simply returned to the farm after relocation. Farmers also thought that Cape 
Nature was feeding leopards beef during translocations and that this habit was causing them to 
eat livestock upon their release. 
Although government/NPO personnel disagreed with farmers on the fact that cage traps 
were too small69, they did acknowledge broader failures in their response to H-LC. Some 
government personnel recognized that the “one size fits all” techniques that they often used (like 
trapping or bell collars) did not always prove effective, causing tensions in the community. They 
realized that each farm was a unique environment. Recommending one prevention technique 
across all locations was ineffective because it was sometimes not suited to the terrain or to the 
type of livestock farming there. They empathized, to a certain extent, with the fact that the 
predation prevention measures they offered farmers were just one more burden for them. They 
understood that livestock farming was a difficult activity and that predation prevention measures 
were time consuming to implement effectively. They also realized that the penalties they warned 
farmers about should they kill a leopard illegally were no deterrent given the lack of any easy 
alternative solutions to H-LC. 
Government actors acknowledged struggling to respond fast enough to H-LC complaints. 
Their justification was that they were short of enforcement personnel and simply did not have 
																																																								
69 In fact, personnel from the local NPO, The Landmark Foundation, regularly and successfully 




enough resources (including vehicles) to send a Cape Nature employee out every time a farmer 
reported a leopard had eaten his livestock. Money was tight in the department and personnel 
often did not receive adequate training to deal with H-WC. Farmers saw the flip side of these 
problems. They rarely received monetary compensation from Cape Nature. The haphazard nature 
of Cape Nature’s response left them feeling like the government was toothless and uninterested 
in solving their H-LC problems. If they did receive help, it was often inconsistent, breeding even 
more distrust between the parties. 
This distrust was compounded by an inadequate legislative framework and ongoing 
corruption. Farmers and NPO personnel felt that wildlife crime/hunting laws were unequally 
enforced. Meanwhile, government personnel found it difficult to know which laws to apply and 
when because no unified national legislation exists in South Africa. Each province is free to 
enact its own wildlife protection laws. This caused confusion because a farmer caught with an 
illegal carcass could claim that the animal had been hunted in a province where it was legal to do 
so. Although this is not the case with leopards, this uncertainty in how to apply wildlife crime 
laws for other species meant that local farmers had little trust in the local justice system. The fact 
that corruption was common, and contributed to the unequal application of laws, also made it 
difficult for farmers and NPO personnel to trust government officials and vice versa. It created a 
setting were all the actors were pitted against each other. Government personnel described the 
deadlock well when they complained that local residents refused to talk with them when leopards 
were illegally killed, making any investigation quasi-impossible. 





These failures with the government’s response to H-LC created an atmosphere where 
farmers refused to call government/NPO personnel when they had a problem leopard on their 
land because they did not trust them to solve the problem. This led them to resort to their own, 
sometimes ill-informed methods, to stop leopard predation on livestock. Surprisingly, though, 
when asked directly what solutions were helpful in reducing H-LC, all the actors often agreed on 






















Table 6.8. Responses to H-LC cited by interviewees and their perceived effectiveness 
 
Predation prevention method Farmers Government/NPO personnel 
Translocation Leopard comes back Stress hurts survival 
Fed meat = eats livestock Inter-leopard conflict 
																																																								
70 There was also general agreement on why and when leopard predation and H-LC occurred 
(see table A4 in the Appendix). Farmers and government/NPO personnel only disagreed on 
who/what was to blame for these conditions: farmers tended to blame poor prevention methods 




   
Kill problem leopard Kill right away If trapping ineffective, issue kill 
permit 
Use poison collars  
Not dominant male  
   
Trap & release Hate this! Trap & release with GPS, hope 
for fear of humans 
   
Anatolian sheep dogs Cause problems by hunting small 
prey 
Good when hunting instinct bred 
out 
Donkeys Ok, not 100% effective Work well 
   
Wire collars Ineffective Ineffective 
Bell collars Ineffective Good when used randomly 
   
New ideas Suggest alternative solutions: 
 Tourism not an option 
 Keep horns on meat cattle to 
protect them 
 Farming diversification 
 Compensation fund that 
farmers pay into 
 Move livestock to different 
pastures regularly 
 Leopard-friendly products 
 Predator-proof enclosures 
 Research what other countries 
have done 




Farmers and government/NPO personnel in general agreed that translocation is an 
ineffective response, but for different reasons. Farmers argue that translocation methods that 
involve feeding leopards beef during transport cause them to develop a taste for livestock and 
that translocation is only a temporary solution because leopards return to their original territories. 
Government/NPO personnel believe that translocation stresses leopards and sparks inter-leopard 
conflict when an animal is moved into another’s existing territory, both of which hurt a leopard’s 
chance of survival. Interestingly, inter-leopard conflict can drive leopards to return to their 
original territory. So farmers and government/NPO personnel partly agree on why translocation 
is ineffective; they just express it differently. Their views on the subject, though, are not entirely 




the same location hoping fear of humans would keep them away from livestock, while knowing 
this is not the case (as seen with translocations). Farmers, on the other hand, recognized the 
similarities and rejected this solution outright. 
Farmers and government officials also agree that killing a damage-causing leopard is 
sometimes a viable solution, but differ on when this is appropriate (NPO personnel do not agree 
with this). Farmers prefer to shoot first to avoid further immediate conflict71 while 
government/NPO personnel prefer to try non-lethal methods first before issuing a kill permit. All 
actors recognized that alternative predation prevention methods like Anatolian sheep dogs, 
donkeys, wire and bell collars, if they worked, were often hit or miss and required careful 
implementation and follow-up. 
Farmers came up with innovative ideas on how to prevent leopard livestock predation, 
shown in the final row of table 6.8. Ideas included farmer-sponsored insurance schemes and 
leopard-friendly product designations for farms that used leopard-friendly predation prevention 
methods. Farmers also suggested diversifying farming practices to avoid being so vulnerable to 
livestock losses and moving livestock around to different pastures to stay one step ahead of 
leopards and avoid predation. Meanwhile, government/NPO personnel tended to be less creative 
when it came to alternative solutions. Their main solution at the time was to research what other 
countries had done to deal with H-WC. Given this, it seems appropriate to harness farmers’ 
knowledge of the land and husbandry practices to come up with innovative solutions to H-LC. 
																																																								
71 Killing a problem leopard often leaves a territory vacuum that is quickly filled by another 
leopard. Killing therefore just delays the H-LC cycle from starting all over again. Some farmers 
seem to recognize this issue because they advocate not killing dominant males to prevent this 
territorial vacuum (females often share territory with males so they believe killing a female is 




Currently, though, the anger and distrust between farmers and government/NPO personnel is 
largely preventing any collaboration or sharing of knowledge between them. 
 Since both farmers and government/NPO personnel agreed that the government’s 
response to H-LC was failing, it is not surprising that conservation initiatives were not well 
received in the region. Previous exposure to conservation initiatives likely only encourages 
individuals to support conservation if those conservation initiatives have proven benefits for the 
community (H4). 
 
3. Analysis part 3: Indian media articles 
 
 H-LC conflict in India takes a slightly different form from H-LC in the Tsavo-Amboseli 
ecosystem and the Heidelberg area. Studies conducted by Vidya Athreya and her colleagues 
found leopards regularly strayed into human settlements in India. For example, they “found one 
of [their] radio-collared leopards visited a particular house every few days without ever 
disturbing its residents, who sleep in the open” (Gates, 2013). When leopards approach villages, 
they often attack livestock (cattle, goats, and sheep) and stray animals (H1). For instance, CCTV 
footage from an apartment building in Mulund (northeast of Mumbai) shows a leopard entering 
its lobby and capturing a live dog before dragging it off and killing it (Emirates 24/7, 2013). 
 A large percentage of the H-LC in India, though, is leopard attacks on humans. These 
attacks occur both inside and outside of villages, even inside houses (see figure 6.1). The media 
articles in this sample described leopard attacks on people as they were collecting firewood and 




village, while sleeping inside their houses at night, and while defecating outside. There were 
reports of children being dragged away by leopards while playing 500 meters or less from their 
houses. A leopard killed one woman less than 50 meters away from forest guards that were 
looking for it (Dahat, 2013). These attacks on humans are a departure from the H-LC seen in 
either the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem or the Heidelberg area. Although leopard attacks on 




Figure 6.1. Leopard sitting on a store shelf in Sonepur District, Orissa, India in 2012 (picture by 
the Associated Press) 
 
 In India, the media reports that leopards are killed for a number of reasons. They are 
killed by local residents in retaliation for human deaths and livestock losses, shot by forest 
department officials to rid communities of man-eaters, they are poached for their hide and parts, 




crops or hunt bushmeat (Fernandes, 2013). Sometimes, these distinctions are not so clear as in 
the case of three tribal men who “poisoned a full-grown male leopard in the forests of Dhar 
district of Madhya Pradesh on June 1, 2013 to avenge the killing of a cow” (A. Singh, 2013) but 
who made off with the cats’ whiskers, presumably to sell. 
 Leopards in India are pelted with stones, shot, hunted with dogs, poisoned with 
carbofuran (an over-the-counter pesticide), electrocuted, axed, set on fire, and trapped with 
snares and speared through the mouth and bludgeoned. Local residents sometimes consume 
leopard meat (Goswami, 2013; S. Mishra, 2013). The most common scenarios in cases of H-LC 
conflict, though, are the shooting of leopards by community leopard hunters or forest department 
officials or the beating to death of leopards by angry mobs of local residents. For the most part, 
groups of angry villagers or poaching gangs kill leopards unless the killing is by a state 
sanctioned actor. In one case, “a full-grown female leopard was beaten to death by tea garden 
workers […] in Jorhat district after four workers, including a woman, sustained severe injuries in 
the big cat's attack” (The Times of India, 2013a). In another, “when [a leopard] was trapped in 
October, villagers from Lingarasanahalli reportedly pelted stones at the caged animal, killing it 
on the spot” (Mendonsa, 2013). 
 
 Although expressions of anger and distrust dominate in the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem 
and the Heidelberg area, the first emotion triggered by H-LC in India is fear. As one reporter 
said, “fear looms large on the minds of villagers” (Dahat, 2013). Leopard sightings trigger panic 
because villagers feel helpless to protect themselves (Sonawala, 2013). They are afraid to go 




avoid going out at night, and carry sticks to protect themselves (Dahat, 2013). They also avoid 
entering the forest to collect firewood or other forest produce (Nayak, 2013). Yet, the most 
troubling change in behavior is that “villagers are reluctant to send their children to school 
fearing leopard attacks” according to a local teacher (Baitadi, 2013). The fear of attacks has 
literally changed the fabric of society. 
 The sense of fear and helplessness experienced by local residents also fuels anger at 
government officials, much like in South Africa. Local residents suffering from H-LC are angry 
at forest department officials’ inaction in the face of leopard attacks on humans (H2, H3). As one 
villager put it: “[the] lackadaisical attitude of the wildlife officials has put our lives at stake” 
(Aarif, 2013). People feel that the forest department cares more about the wildlife than about the 
people. Since their actions are more reactive than preventive, if they act at all, local residents 
often say things like “you are waiting for something to happen, and only then you will act” 
(Overdorf, 2013). 
 The feeling that the government is failing them, the lack of official response, and the 
panic leopard sightings produce, gives local residents a rational to kill leopards themselves (H3). 
Community hunters who kill leopards at local residents’ request, consider their work a public 
service (Gusain, 2013). The gratitude they receive from villagers validates their behavior, only 
adding to the problem of retaliatory killings. 
Furthermore, the Wildlife Protection Act (WPA), which bans the hunting of all animals 
on Indian soil without a permit, gives local residents the impression that all wildlife is the 
responsibility of the government. As a result, they feel government officials should prevent 




compounded by denials from government officials that H-LC is a problem and their attempts to 
blame villagers for causing attacks. In one such example, the Deputy Director of the Buffer Zone 
of the Tadoba Andhari Tiger Reserve, called leopard attacks on humans “accidents [and] a result 
of casualness on the part of villagers” (Dahat, 2013). In another, the forest department 
maintained that 8 human killings had only occurred in the forest when local villagers went to 
collect forest produce, when most of the attacks actually occurred within villages or on nearby 
roads. One reporter suggested “the culture of denial is so deeply embedded in forest bureaucracy 
that most officers refuse to accept that poachers continue to be a threat in their territory” 
(Mazoomdaar, 2013), even when newspaper articles regularly report on arrests of poachers and 
leopard carcasses found missing paws, claws, and teeth. 
 This culture of denial has led to general distrust between the forest department officials 
and local residents. Communication between actors, already poor to begin with, is now almost 
impossible, compromising conservation efforts (H3). Local residents complain that they report 
H-LC to forest department officials only to be told by them that they’ve received no reports 
(Nayak, 2013). Meanwhile, forest department officials complain that “people don’t cooperate 
with the department when it comes to catching these wild animals” (Aarif, 2013) and argue that 
they are attempting to solve the problem. Adding to their defensiveness is the fact that some 
families of forest department officials are involved in poaching (Shalya, 2013a). 
Compared to the Tsavo-Amboseli ecosystem and the Heidelberg area, the level of 
animosity between the actors in India is much stronger. Villagers’ anger and distrust has resulted 
in local protests, beatings of forest department officials, and attacks on leopard 




removed (H3) (Dahat, 2013; Mendonsa, 2013; Overdorf, 2013; Rafiq, 2013). Even when forest 
department officials take steps to prevent H-LC, villagers take action into their own hands. In 
one such case, a forest official described the chaos engendered by villager-official animosity: 
"We got information about the leopard's appearance in the tea garden […]. Our staff 
[was] patrolling the entire tea garden to foil any attacks by the animal but due to the 
ruckus created by the locals, the situation turned out of control today. We finally opened 
fire in the air, but the garden workers brutally attacked the animal and killed it" (The 
Times of India, 2013a). 
Meanwhile, official investigations of local residents who take matters into their own hands in 
such a way only add to the animosity between the parties. 
 This animosity also shapes the official response to H-LC in negative ways. Forest 
department officials often feel pressured by local residents and politicians to respond to leopard 
attacks quickly, without proper strategizing or requesting assistance from other departments that 
have implemented successful solutions. This pressure is both the social outcry when leopards kill 
humans but also the risk of violence from angry villagers. For instance, 
“A forest official requesting anonymity said the department was forced by agitated 
villagers to kill leopards. On one occasion, eight of his men were doused with kerosene 
and confined to a room by villagers who threatened to set them on fire if the man-eating 
leopard wasn’t killed. The official had to deal with the situation with no direction from 
his boss who had switched off his phone. With no space for negotiations, the man said he 
was forced to sacrifice a leopard. He agreed it was illegal and didn’t solve the problem, 





 Generally speaking, the media reported that the government response to H-LC had failed 
for a multitude of reasons. The first is a general tendency among forest department officials to 
delegate the problem to others without ever solving it. Such is the case in the above-mentioned 
quote where the official’s boss was unavailable to handle villagers’ anger at H-LC. Another 
examples is the “standard practice to play the jurisdiction card and disown animals that step out 
of park limits” (Mazoomdaar, 2013). Once an animal is no longer part of your jurisdiction, you 
are no longer required to find a solution to its problematic behavior or its death. 
 This “passing the buck” method comes in several other forms. One form is when 
“officers shy away from registering a poaching case. Instead a common reason is put forth [for a 
leopard death] like ‘killed in territorial war’ to avoid action from their higher-ups” (Naveen, 
2013). Another is government officials who are told by their juniors of a H-LC and the need for a 
solution, say “yes we will do it,” and never take action (Overdorf, 2013). It seems that at every 
point in the chain of command, individuals are afraid to acknowledge that the system is broken, 
that there are insufficient resources to address H-LC, and that nobody knows what to do and how 
to do it well.  
Even when a poaching or retaliatory leopard killing case is recognized as such and forest 
department officials investigate, poor investigations by inexperienced and un-resourceful rangers 
make prosecutions difficult (Naveen, 2013). Conviction rates in Madhya Pradesh, for example, 
are less than 5%. The media regularly publicize arrests of poachers (mainly based on tips), but 
rarely report convictions. Meanwhile, there is little official incentive to do better. There is no 




consistent field results (Mazoomdaar, 2013). 
 Media articles often report mistakes on the part of forest department officials, mistakes 
that only add to local residents’ and NPO personnel’s distrust of government actors (H4). They 
are seen as less than competent. For example, attempts by forest department officials to 
tranquilize problem leopards have resulted in their death from medication overdoses (Mendonsa, 
2013). In another case, forest department officials killed a leopard cub and injured another while 
trying to hunt a leopard that had attacked humans. Instead of admitting they had shot the wrong 
animal, they claimed they had accidentally hit the cubs while driving (The Times of India, 
2013b). Attempts to cover up these mistakes, usually revealed by the media, only aggravate the 
distrust. 
 Government officials are struggling to protect wildlife and humans outside protected 
areas, but their approach sometimes goes against their own principles. Forest department 
officials often do not respect wildlife protection laws (WPA) or their own departmental 
guidelines on how to handle H-LC. Fayyaz (2013), for example, explained that one former 
wildlife department official told him that, “fearing action from the government and attacks from 
the public, wildlife officials rarely observe the law.” Forest department officials will bypass 
getting a permit72, and ask the police and security forces to shoot a problem leopard on sight 
(Fayyaz, 2013). 
Adding to the problem is the general confusion among forest department officials about 
what the best practices are to deal with H-LC. There is a belief that one should spare leopards 
																																																								
72 Only the Chief Wildlife Warden can declare a predator a man-eater and issue permission to 




that “accidentally” attack humans, but should shoot man-eaters, but there is neither a clear 
definition of what a man-eater is nor a foolproof way to identify one. As one reporter blatantly 
put it, “everyone -conservationists, villagers, and the Forest Department- agrees a man-eater has 
to be removed, but no one can say how to identify one” (Lenin, 2013a). This confusion only adds 
to the distrust, anger, and general animosity among actors as the “wrong” leopards are killed and 
human and livestock killings continue. 
Throughout the articles in this analysis, man-eaters were described in conflicting terms. 
Man-eaters were leopards with abnormal eating patterns that ate when not hungry. At the same 
time, they were starving animals that could not catch wild prey because they were either too old, 
sick/hurt, or there was simply not enough wild prey around. Man-eaters attacked humans on 
purpose while also attacking them accidentally because they either mistook them for prey or 
were startled when trying to take cover in patchy forests during the day (First Post, 2013; Lenin, 
2013b). 
Regularly, media articles describe how the forest department killed a man-eater, only to 
have a human attacked near the previous kill sites the next day, presumably by the actual man-
eater. Meanwhile, the forest department compounds its problems by using questionable local 
hunters to kill man-eaters and failing to fire them when they kill the wrong animal (V. J. Singh, 
2013a). These hunters, often labeled “trigger-happy” or “reckless” in news articles (First Post, 
2013; V. J. Singh, 2013a), described entirely ineffective ways of catching the “right” leopard. 
Their methods ranged from killing the leopard whose territory overlapped with the attack sites to 
killing any leopard seen next to a livestock carcass/human body to tracking the man-eater using 




method. Leopard territories can overlap so the presence of a leopard in a location does not 
guarantee it was responsible for the attacks in that area. Leopards are scavengers and will 
therefore eat a carcass they have not killed and pugmarks are not accurate to identify a particular 
leopard (V. J. Singh, 2013b). 
 
H-LC interventions suggested by local stakeholders 
 
 When it comes to solutions to H-LC, translocations and killings of problem leopards 
seem to be the most common techniques used, but there is no consensus on their effectiveness or 
which local actors prefer. Some want translocations as a last resort when leopards attack people, 
others prefer killing problem leopards, and some want neither and prefer removal to captivity. 
Translocations seem to be causing more leopard attacks on humans according to Athreya et al. 
(2010). Identifying the right leopard to kill is problematic and has met with little success, while 
researchers argue that such killings create a territory vacuum that another leopard soon fills 
(Balme et al., 2009; Overdorf, 2013). Removal to captivity was successful in one case with no 
subsequent leopard attacks on humans when new leopards moved into the area, but this is more a 
stop-gap measure than a solution since space in zoos is limited (Lenin, 2013b). 
The media and the actors they interviewed suggest a number of other possible solutions 
(see table 6.9). They fall into three categories: wildlife patrols, managing H-WC, and 
environmental education. Patrols focus on law enforcement efforts to prevent leopard killings 
through intelligence gathering and the creation of division-specific legal cells to help in proper 




movements to prevent leopard attacks on humans and livestock, but that is not their main focus. 
 
Table 6.9. H-LC solutions suggested in media articles in 2013 
 
Categories of H-LC prevention methods Methods suggested in media 
Kill problem leopards Use camera traps to identify man-eaters 
 
Translocation Translocate to wild area 
Take into captivity 
 
Patrols Train forest department officials in anti-poaching 
measures 
Create legal cell for every forest division 
Smart patrol* 
Informants 
More inter-state cooperation for gathering & analyzing 
data 
 
Manage H-WC Better secure/protect livestock 
Floodlights near schools 
Round up stray dogs & keep in kennels outside villages 
Relocate villagers 
 
Environmental education Teach how to live with leopards 
Awareness programs after leopard sightings 
 
* Patrol using special software combining satellite imagery and GPS to track animals and patrol 
where most needed. 
 
Solutions to manage H-WC and environmental education focus on community 
empowerment and reducing attacks by teaching communities predation prevention measures. 
Lenin (2013b), for example, suggested that forest department official’s efforts are ineffective 
because they focus too much on leopards. the focus of forest department officials’ efforts is to 
blame for their lack of effectiveness (H4). He felt that the wildlife department should do more to 
help local residents and leopards co-exist without incident. “To live alongside leopards, farmers 




[forest] department focused its attention on leopards” (Lenin, 2013b). Similarly, leopard 
researcher Vidya Athreya suggested that officials provide local residents with better tools to 
address H-LC: “Locals are familiar with the area and can keep a good vigil. They should be 
given facilities to alert the forest department immediately in case there's anything amiss” 
(Shalya, 2013b). Sonawala (2013) also reported that awareness programs, where local residents 
were taught about leopards and how to avoid H-LC, were particularly helpful at reducing the 
panic common after leopard sightings. These measures reduce local residents’ helplessness in the 
face of H-LC and prevent retaliatory leopard killings. They also encourage local residents to 
become the eyes and ears of the forest department and report illegal killings. 
 Ultimately, though, media articles emphasized that the main problem with H-LC in India 
stemmed from the government’s civic failures, not leopard behavior (First Post, 2013). Overdorf 
(2013) depicts the problem accurately in the following paragraph. 
“Local news stories of bloodthirsty man-eaters obscure an all too familiar reality: India's 
notorious civic failures, not Mumbai's leopards, are to blame for the killings. […] As 
many as a million tribal people and migrant laborers live in and around the urban 
wilderness and, because these communities have been ignored and neglected by the 
government, their settlements have actually spurred an increase in the leopard population 
and drawn the animals into the city, rather than driving them deeper into the forest. […] 
There is no garbage pickup and no plans to provide it, so the villages and slums attract 
legions of stray dogs. Fat and boisterous, these dogs have replaced the fleet deer and shy 
wild pigs to become the leopards' primary food source. There are no street lights, no 




the dark near the rubbish heap — where leopards mistake them for their dogs, or settle 
for them, just the same.” 
India’s urban planning, environmental conservation, and population management choices have 
created a landscape where human and leopard co-existence is necessary but fraught with 
problems, including leopard attacks on livestock and humans (H1). Its wildlife department’s 
policies have either aggravated the problem or done nothing to address it. Public resentment 
against leopards (and other wildlife) has reached a tipping point and local residents are apathetic 
or unwilling to protect leopards or are complicit in illegal leopard killings (the definition of 
tolerance for leopard killing). A large overhaul of conservation and wildlife management 
practices is necessary to prevent such killings, be they from retaliatory killings or poaching. 
 
4. Analysis part 4: GIS analysis of South African illegal leopard deaths 
 
The last part of this analysis mapped environmental factors that contributed to H-LCs 
near Heidelberg (Western Cape Province) and in the areas surrounding Baviaanskloof 
conservation area and Greater Addo Elephant National Park (Eastern Cape Province). The 
purpose of this analysis was to examine what situational factors contribute to where humans and 
leopards conflict. 
Two types of environmental situational variables are part of this analysis: 1) variables 
relating to where a H-LC incident took place and 2) variables describing when it took place. 
Eight variables center on location: main biome, parks overlap, river length, available prey, prey 




includes only the variable season. These variables were recorded for three grid cell categories: 
(1) grid cells were a H-LC occurred between November 1st, 2005 and April 1st, 2011 
(experimental cells), (2) control grid cells adjacent to experimental cells (adjacent cells), and (3) 
control grid cells within a 4-grid cell distance of experimental cells (buffer cells). 
As stated in the previous chapter, the hypotheses for this last analysis are: 
 
H4.1: Retaliatory leopard killings are more likely to occur where human settlements overlap with 
leopard territory or habitat. 
H4.2: Retaliatory leopard killings are more likely to occur where human settlements border 
leopard territory or habitat. 
H4.3: Leopards are more likely to be illegally killed in areas of prime leopard habitat, when 
controlling for human settlement and road location. 
H4.3b: Leopards are more likely to be killed in areas that provide poor leopard habitat, when 
controlling for human settlement and road location73. 
H4.4: Leopards are more likely to be killed in areas that provide poor leopard habitat during the 
dry season, when controlling for human settlement and road location. 
 
 Pre-analysis diagnostics were run to determine if the variables were normally distributed. 
Specifically, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that all continuous variables were not 
normally distributed (see table 6.10). As a result, non-parametric tests were used for this 
																																																								
73 H3 and H4 discuss the idea that leopard numbers determine the chance of an interaction that 
could turn into a H-LC. H5 and H6 have to do with the ease of catching prey and the chance that 




analysis. Non-parametric tests were also employed because they require less perfect data than 
parametric tests and have fewer assumptions. They are thus better suited to dealing with small 
sample sizes (here N = 39), where error could be a major concern when interpreting the results 
(Field, 2005). Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests were run on the continuous variables: 
river length, available prey, prey abundance, road length, main road length, and human 
settlement score.74 Chi-square and non-parametric correlations were used for the nominal and 
ordinal variables: season, main biome, and parks overlap. Exact significance was used to 
interpret the non-parametric test results because of the small sample size (N = 39). 
 
Table 6.10. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality for continuous variables 
 
Variable Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test^ 
Statistic Sig. 
River length .211 .000* 
Available prey .247 .000* 
Prey abundance .340 .000* 
Road length .163 .010* 
Main road length .324 .000* 
Human settlement score .219 .000* 
^ df = 39 for all variables. 





74 Another option would have been to use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test. This test tends to 
have better power than the Mann-Whitney test in cases with sample sizes of less than 25 per 
group (Field, 2005). Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z tests were run and the same variable came out 
significant as in the Mann-Whitney tests. As the minimum sample size for Mann-Whitney is N = 




 The differences in environmental factors between grid cell types were calculated in 
several stages. First, both types of control grid cells (adjacent and buffer) were grouped together 
and compared to the experimental grid cells. At this point, control cells did not seem to 
significantly differ from the experimental cells on any of the continuous environmental variables 
(see table 6.11). This suggested that locations were H-LC occurred did not have significantly 
different environmental characteristics (like river length, road length, prey availability and 






Table 6.11. Mann-Whitney test comparing the environmental factors of experimental grid cells 




Z r75 Exact Sig. (1-
tailed) 
River length 154.000 -.460 -.074 .331 
Available prey 159.000 -.307 -.049 .381 
Prey abundance 166.500 -.075 -.012 .474 
Road length 166.000 -.089 -.014 .471 
Main road length 136.000 -1.122 -.180 .136 
Human settlement score 144.500 -.730 -.117 .237 
 
																																																								




A Kruskal-Wallis test was then performed to compare the three grid cell types separately. 
The rational for testing the control groups separately was that adjacent control cells might have 
very similar environmental characteristics to experimental cells because of their proximity and 
might thus prevent us from seeing any significant results in the analysis. The Kruskal-Wallis test 
revealed that the location of H-LC was significantly affected by only one environmental 
determinant: main road length (H(2) = 5.842, p = 0.05) (H4.3 and H4.3b) (see table 6.12). To 
explore this relationship further, Mann-Whitney tests were done to compare experimental cells to 





Table 6.12. Kruskal-Wallis test comparing the environmental factors of all three cell types 
(experimental, adjacent control, and buffer control) 
 
Variable Kruskal-Wallis H^ Exact Sig. (1-tailed) 
River length .237 .444 
Available prey .099 .476 
Prey abundance .018 .496 
Road length 2.150 .171 
Main road length 5.842 .027* 
Human settlement score .546 .381 
^ df = 2; * p < 0.05. 
 




to those of adjacent control grid cells found no significant difference between the two groups for 
any variables (see table 6.13). One possible reason for this, as mentioned previously, is that the 
adjacent control grid cells have too many similar environmental characteristics because they are 
located so close to each other. 
 The buffer control cells (median = 2.76), though, did significantly differ from the 
experimental cells (median = 0) for the length of main road that traversed them (U = 51.000, p < 
0.05, r = -.299) (see table 6.14). r = -.299 represents a small to medium effect size; the threshold 
for a medium effect size is .3 (Field, 2005). These results suggest that buffer control cells, where 
no H-LC took place, had more mileage of main roads in them than experimental cells where a H-
LC did take place. Although, this seems counter-intuitive because more main roads would mean 
more potential for humans and leopards to cross paths and a faster way for humans wishing to 
kill leopards to reach them, it is consistent with research by Dickson et al. (2005) and Schwab 
and Zandbergen (2011). These researchers found that large cats will rarely cross roads that are 2 
lanes or larger (i.e. main roads), but will travel on dirt roads, which are most common in rural 
South Africa. More leopards are therefore likely to reside in areas with fewer main roads, so 
conflicts with humans would be more likely in such areas. 
 
Table 6.13. Mann-Whitney test comparing the environmental factors of experimental grid cells 




Z r Exact Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
River length 78.000 -.343 -.055 .372 




Prey abundance 82.500 -.103 -.016 .465 
Road length 69.000 -.796 -.127 .220 
Main road length 84.000 -.035 -.006 .500 
Human settlement score 73.500 -.564 -.090 .294 
 
 
Table 6.14. Mann-Whitney test comparing the environmental factors of experimental grid cells 




Z r Exact Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
River length 76.000 -.453 -.073 .337 
Available prey 79.000 -.289 -.046 .393 
Prey abundance 84.000 -.026 -.004 .495 
Road length 72.000 -.641 -.103 .272 
Main road length 51.000 -1.869 -.299 .031* 
Human settlement score 71.000 -.692 -.111 .251 
* p < 0.05. 
Nominal and ordinal variables 
 
 There was no statistically significant difference in main biome type, park overlap, or 
season for the three types of grid cells (X2 = 2.730, df = 6, exact sig. (2-tailed) p = 1.000 for 
main biome type, X2 = 3.398, df = 6, exact sig. (1-tailed) p = 0.396 for park overlap, and X2 = 
2.476, df = 2, exact sig. (1-tailed) p = 0.175 for season). Non-parametric correlations run 
between these variables and the three grid cell types were also not significant. As such, it appears 
that no season, specific biome type, or amount of protected area in a location plays a role in the 







The results of this analysis paint three different, yet similar pictures of the human and 
environmental situational factors that create tolerance for leopard killings and facilitate H-LC 
and retaliatory killings in Kenya, South Africa, and India. In each of these locations, H-WCs and 
H-LCs are common, but retaliatory leopard killings only occur in South Africa and India. Table 
6.15 below provides an overview of the situational factors in each of these places and organizes 




Table 6.15. Results summary table organized by research question 
 
Research questions Part 1: Kenyan interviews Part 2: South African interviews Part 3: Google Alert articles Part 4: H-LC GPS 
locations 
 What is the scope and 
nature of illegal leopard 
killings within the study 
areas? 
 
 What form does H-WC 
driven retaliatory leopard 
killings take? 
 No reported illegal leopard 
killings 
 Retaliatory leopard killings for 
livestock losses common 
 Leopards shot or caught in gin 
traps, hunted with dogs 
 Retaliatory leopard killings 
for human attacks common 
 Government shoots man-
eaters 
 Leopards mainly shot or 
attacked by angry mobs  
 Retaliatory leopard 
killing for livestock 
losses common 
 Leopards shot or 
caught in gin traps, 
hunted with dogs 
 
What situational factors 
contribute to retaliatory 
leopard killings? 
 
 Most suffered costs from 
H-WC  
 1/3 received benefits from 
wildlife 
 All risked losses because 
pastoralists or crop farmers 
 Majority’s economic status 
is medium  
 Biggest challenges to 
conservation: financial 
difficulties & resource 
competition 
 Resentment at government 
for corruption & not 
sharing revenue from 
national parks 
 Benefited from wildlife 
through bursaries, 
employment, & some 
compensation for losses 
 Fencing most popular 
solution to H-WC 
 More education & benefits 
 Belief that leopard predation 
should not occur 
 Killing rational: permits took 
too long, afraid of more 
losses/not catching leopard 
 Anger at costs from leopard & 
lack of government support 
 General distrust of authority 
 H-WC solution-specific distrust 
 Failure of government response 
to H-LC 
o Slow & unwilling 
o Inefficient methods 
o Inadequate resources 
o Inconsistent 
application of laws 
 Stakeholders generally agreed 
on best response: predation 
prevention methods  
 Farmers had innovative H-LC 
solutions 
 Most did not support 
conservation 
 Leopard sightings trigger 
panic 
 People feel helpless 
 Fear fuels anger at 
government 
 Failure of government 
response to H-LC 
o Passing the buck 
o Lack of training 
o Confusion over best 
practices 
o Mistakes & cover-
ups 
 Most common response: 
translocation, culling 
 Killing rational: public 
service, lack of official 
response, protection 
 Belief government owns 
wildlife & should prevent H-
LC 
 Government denial of 
problem 
Leopard killings more 
likely in locations with 




from wildlife = support 
conservation more 
 Costs from wildlife = 
support conservation less 
 Blame public for H-LC 
 Strong distrust of & attacks 
on government  





Chapter 7: Discussion and conclusion 
 
Results summary 
Similarities between study locations 
 
The results from chapter 6 provide three different, yet similar pictures of what tolerance 
for leopard killing looks like. These locations in Kenya, South Africa, and India share several 
human and environmental situational factors that define locations where H-LC turns into 
retaliatory leopard killings. 
In all three locations, the majority of the population is suffering from H-WC. In Kenya 
and South Africa, the conflict is leopard livestock predation, while in India it is a combination of 
human and livestock attacks. Local residents live with the daily threat of H-WC and constantly 
fear losses, financial or human, from wildlife. They also fear increasing economic and land-use 
pressures that jeopardize their livelihoods. Most local residents in Kenya and South Africa earn a 
livable income but lack the economic cushion necessary to sustain losses from H-WC. As result, 
tolerance for wildlife and its costs is limited. 
The analysis of environmental factors that influence retaliatory leopard killings found 
that most killings in South Africa took place far from main roads. This is consistent with 
research on leopard behavior that found that large cats will rarely cross roads 2 lanes or larger, 




Schwab & Zandbergen, 2011). In Kenya and India, where rural infrastructure is limited, the same 
pattern would be expected. Government neglect and a lack of access to basic services 
exacerbates an already tenuous relationship between humans and wildlife in these areas. 
At the same time, local residents fail to consider the natural consequences of co-
habitation with wildlife, like H-WC. Increased competition between humans and wildlife for 
natural resources is exacerbating these conflicts, yet residents in all three locations refuse to 
accept losses from H-WC. These unrealistic expectations leave them frustrated and angry when 
the inevitable conflicts occur, brought on by resource shortages and population pressure. 
Meanwhile, antagonism between government, conservation, and public actors in the 
region continue to foster anti-conservation feelings in Kenya, South Africa, and India. The 
government’s general denial that retaliatory killings and H-LC exist in South Africa and India 
frustrates local residents who bear the brunt of these problems. In all three locations, a history of 
problematic government policies for wildlife conservation has also frayed residents’ relationship 
with authority. Through these policies, the government took ownership of wildlife either by 
passing laws to protect it or by appropriating public land to create conservation areas. This 
created an expectation among local residents that the government is responsible for protecting 
them from “its” wildlife. Unfortunately, government actors have invested little in H-WC 
prevention, leaving local residents to fend for themselves. 
While taking away wildlife ownership and land rights, government actors have also 
refused or failed to provide needed financial support to these regions. South African livestock 
farmers receive no subsidies for their beef. There is little revenue sharing from successful 




provide for basic infrastructure, let alone compensation for losses due to H-WC, which can take 
16-18 months to process (World Wildlife Fund, 2010, December). Fortress conservation’s failure 
has left local residents feeling resentful for this government intrusion that does nothing to solve 
their conflicts with wildlife. 
When conservation and government actors have tried to address H-WC in Kenya, South 
Africa, and India, their responses have generally failed. Local residents therefore associate 
conservation efforts with negative rather than positive outcomes (with the exception of bursaries 
in Kenya). These failures are two-fold. Some solutions have failed in practice for a variety of 
reasons: ineffective methods, general confusion on best practices, lack of resources, 
communication breakdowns, poor information/intelligence sharing between agencies and 
locations, inadequate application of laws, and low personnel morale or commitment to the job. 
Other H-WC solutions, although moderately successful, have failed in the eyes of local 
residents because they do not meet their needs or expectations. One such example is bell collars 
in South Africa. Although some livestock farmers use bell collars, they report many problems 
with their use, while conservation organizations consider them an excellent predation prevention 
method. Farmers suggest they are ineffective for leopards but effective for caracal. They note the 
difficulty of using them correctly, by taking them on and off livestock regularly, because they 
put livestock out to graze several days at a time with limited human contact. Farmers are also 
unimpressed that they are not 100% effective against livestock predation, although they do 
reduce attack frequency. Regardless of why a solution failed, every failure adds to the negative 




In Kenya, South Africa, and India there is deep anger and distrust of wildlife 
conservation authorities, both government and NPO. These emotions are the byproduct of 
conservation actors’ failure to acknowledge the high costs of H-WC for local residents, the 
exclusionary and misleading nature of previous conservation policies, and the failure of proposed 
solutions to H-WC. That anger and distrust, though, is mutual. This is especially evident in India 
and South Africa when government and NPO personnel blame the victims of H-WC for being 
careless and shame local residents that retaliate against wildlife. 
In all three locations, there is culture of distrust among the parties that gets in the way of 
conservation goals and renders everyone unable to see and acknowledge their common ground, 
which is often substantial. Each actor is entrenched in his/her mindset and unwilling to consider 
alternate viewpoints. They also have a hard time acknowledging the weaknesses of their 
solutions, making it difficult to improve on the status quo. Despite this unfavorable environment, 
these locations were also the best places to find solutions because local residents had ideas about 
how to deal with H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings. In fact, their solutions had a higher 
chance of acceptance and success because they took into account local lifestyles, mindsets, the 
physical environment, and were informed by past failures. 
 
Differences between study locations 
 
The reasons why retaliatory leopard killings are more common in India and South Africa, 
rather than Kenya, lie in the differences between these three locations. In Kenya, local residents 




also through employment opportunities and revenue sharing. Most of the conservation initiatives 
in this area generate income and are therefore linked with economic opportunities in local 
residents’ minds, especially for those with higher levels of education. At the same time, the 
government is taking steps to communicate with communities about their conservation strategies 
and asking for local input, creating a forum to discuss grievances and problems that arise from 
H-WC and conservation initiatives. This area also has small grassroots NPO programs that 
involve local residents in protecting the wildlife and natural habitat in which they live (the Lion 
Guardians program is one example of this). These programs foster goodwill among local 
residents by meeting an ongoing social and/or infrastructure need, like tracking lost livestock or 
helping reinforce corrals, while also educating residents about the need to protect carnivores for 
the good of the ecosystem. 
This combination of open communication, sustainable economic incentives76, and local-
run grassroots programming, help residents accept the costs of living with wildlife. It gives them 
a stake in protecting the wildlife and natural habitat around them and empowers them to find 
non-lethal solutions to H-WC. Although problems of distrust among actors and talk of corruption 
among KWS exist, they do not dominate the conservation landscape in the area. 
 In South Africa, on the other hand, there are few income-generating conservation 
initiatives and ecotourism in the area is limited. Livestock/crop farming and game farms are the 
main sources of income, all of which suffer from leopard predation. Just like the juxtaposition of 
game and livestock farms causes problems when carnivores breed on game farms and feed on 
livestock farms, farmers also oppose conservation initiatives because they increase the leopard 
																																																								




population and thus the frequency of H-LCs. Local residents view carnivore conservation as 
detrimental to their livelihoods because it increases the risk of livestock predation and decreases 
their ability to get rid of problem leopards. 
 H-LC is a recent problem in South Africa because rural population density was still low 
as of 20 years ago. As a result, local residents believe that H-LC “should not be happening” 
because it was not a problem before. This belief exacerbates local resistance to conservation 
initiatives, a resistance largely fueled by anger and distrust between government/ NPO actors and 
local residents and their shaming and blaming of each other for H-LCs. In contrast to Kenya, 
there are no positive incentives for wildlife conservation to counter-balance the antagonism and 
no efforts to put aside grievances and communicate openly. In this context, South Africa’s 
fragmented and often poorly enforced wildlife protection laws and the corruption that hampers 
effective law enforcement only add to the problem. 
 Although South African government, NPO, and public actors combined have the 
knowledge and experience to prevent H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings, they do not trust 
each other enough to agree on and implement effective solutions. The lack of economic 
incentives only increases livestock farmers’ unwillingness to embrace conservation since they 
feel they are being asked to risk financial losses from leopard livestock predation with no way to 
recoup those losses. 
 The gravity of leopard attacks on humans in India, in comparison to livestock predation, 
creates a deeper level of fear, anger, and resentment than in either Kenya or South Africa. The 
Indian government’s failed response to H-LC and their lack of accountability, with obvious 




feel fearful and helpless in the face of a problem that they believe the government is responsible 
for solving, yet the government is shirking its obligations and failing to respect its own wildlife 
protection laws. Local residents’ desperation and anger at being left to their own devices is 
driving assaults on government and NPO personnel as well as retaliatory leopard killings. 
 When Indian forest department officials do act, their confusion over best practices and 
the official H-LC response strategy erodes any trust local residents’ may have in them. This 
confusion over best practices is reflected in the quotes officials give journalists and the fact that 
many news articles are filled with ecological inaccuracies. Contradictory beliefs about what 
leopards are “man-eaters” and how to identify them is just one example of this. Another is the 
forest departments’ focus on relocating/culling leopards instead of teaching local residents 
predation prevention methods. Forest department officials’ confusion often leads them to act 
before they think, resulting in mistakes when handling H-LCs. The subsequent cover-ups and 
defensive behavior to avoid public shaming for these mistakes only strain their relationships with 
local residents and other conservation actors further. 
 
Each of these locations is at a different step in the process of preventing H-LC and 
retaliatory leopard killings. In Kenya, continuing to develop communication channels and small-
scale community-driven conservation programs that meet local social and infrastructure needs is 
essential for protecting carnivores. In South Africa, the focus should be on beginning that 
process of open communication and building bridges between knowledgeable parties before 
discussing possible H-LC solutions. In India, education to empower local residents is the first 




both those goals are accomplished, working to reverse the anger and distrust between 




Solutions to the problem of H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings will require a 
coordinated effort between species experts, local populations, national wildlife management 
authorities, and NPOs. These solutions should abide by the following principles: 
 They should be interdisciplinary, multi-pronged, and self-sustaining (Klenke et al., 
2013). No solution is 100% effective, therefore it is best to approach the problem with 
multiple strategies. These solutions will also require long-term implementation so 
they should not rely on possibly unreliable outside funding to continue to operate. 
 Local residents with a vested interest in protecting their communities and ecosystem77 
should drive and evaluate their implementation, with international actors’ support 
(Klenke et al., 2013). Combining the expertise of international conservation actors 
and local residents who suffer from H-LC and commit retaliatory killings will result 
in more targeted and better designed conservation interventions that local residents 
are more likely to support and which are therefore more likely to succeed (Kansky & 
Knight, 2014). 
																																																								
77 Generally speaking, this research found that local residents are invested in the future of their 
environment, even if their behavior does not always reflect this because they have difficulty 





 Choosing the right type of solution for the right location is key to the success of 
conservation interventions. 
Governments’ responses to illegal wildlife killings tend to focus on their corrosive effect 
on national security and link to other transnational organized crimes like narcotics and human 
trafficking. In doing so, they ignore the fact that most killings are linked to social issues rather 
than crime (Lin, 2005). Leopards are illegally killed in communities where local residents have 
no reason to protect leopards that impose costs on them and add to their struggles to earn a 
living. H-LC adds to the existing social strains these individuals face, especially as H-LC is on 
the rise because of global population growth and the industrialization of developing countries 
(Schaller, 2011). Applying targeted strategies to reduce H-LC is one thing, but, ideally, local 
residents also need to receive other forms of social support, like improved access to basic 
services or farming subsidies, to reverse tolerance for leopard killings. Solving the social issues 
behind illegal leopard killings is beyond the scope of this research, but SCP can provide the tools 
to reduce H-LC and its costs to a minimum, as well as some interventions to reduce social strain 
(see the “Reduce the provocations” column of table 7.2 below), thereby preventing most 
retaliatory leopard killings. 
Past solutions have also tended to neglect landscape factors and failed to recognize that 
H-WC is not evenly distributed across the landscape (Klenke et al., 2013, p. 2). This research, 
identifying what situational factors make H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings more likely in an 
area, is meant to help conservation actors focus their limited resources on the most at-risk 
locations. Knowing where efforts should be targeted then allows them to come up with location-




deter the offender. Changing the environment is the fastest solution to prevent H-LC and 
retaliatory leopard killings; interventions aimed at changing mindsets and criminal dispositions 
take far longer. SCP also provides more specific and practical measures to reduce H-LC and 
retaliatory killings than most other theoretical frameworks in criminology. Given the little time 
left to prevent leopard extinction, the more targeted, practical, and rapid the solution, the better. 
 
 Informal guardians and participatory crime analysis 
 
 The first step in designing an SCP-driven intervention to H-LC and retaliatory leopard 
killings is to create informal guardians to protect leopards (Pires & Moreto, 2011). One of the 
main findings of this research is that formal infrastructure to combat wildlife crimes is failing, be 
it legislation or law enforcement efforts. Wildlife authorities everywhere lack the money, 
resources, and training to adequately prevent illegal leopard killings. Although efforts to 
overhaul law enforcement and legislation are necessary, they could take decades, and other 
options, like informal guardians, are readily available now. 
Every study area in this research had its own informal infrastructure to deal with H-LC. 
In South Africa, livestock farmers had a local farmer with leopard hunting dogs they used to 
track and shoot problem leopards. In Kenya, Maasai hunters knew how to track carnivores in the 
area and some local residents knew how to build fortified corrals to protect livestock from 
predators. In India, specific villagers act as designated hunters for problem leopards; even the 
government uses their services. This existing informal infrastructure is not always leopard 




where government and law enforcement initiatives have failed. Working within this existing 
infrastructure is the first step. The second step is to work with community members to make this 
infrastructure more effective and leopard conservation friendly. 
Working within this informal infrastructure means empowering local residents to use 
their knowledge of the area to find H-LC and retaliatory leopard killing solutions that work for 
them, yet also abide by conservation principles. Participatory crime analysis offers a an ideal 
framework for this because it is based on the premise that local people know their communities 
best and that a collaborative process bringing together analytical skills and local knowledge 
produces better solutions (Liebermann & Coulson, 2004). During a participatory crime analysis 
workshop, local residents learn about crime prevention principles, draw where they live, and 
identify hot spots of crime. A moderator groups these locations onto one detailed map and 
residents visit the sites to photograph hot spots and discuss why crimes occur there. They then 
analyze the information and work together to find responses, creating a toolkit for preventing 
local crimes (Liebermann & Coulson, 2004). 
The same approach could be used to brainstorm ways to prevent H-LC and retaliatory 
leopard killings. The SCP framework provides a starting point from which local residents, NPO 
personnel, and government actors can build a toolkit of predation prevention methods and 
retaliatory leopard killing solutions to use in their communities (Table 7.1 shows the SCP 
framework with examples of each technique). Combining local knowledge with SCP allies 
theoretically tested tools and practical knowledge for a better solution to H-LC and retaliatory 




to achieve the maximum reduction in H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings. Table 7.2 offers a 
range of possible SCP-driven solutions to both problems based on the results of this research. 
 







Table 7.2. Possible SCP solutions to leopard livestock predation and retaliatory leopard killings 
  










Keep livestock about to give 
birth in protected enclosures 
until they can rejoin the herd 
 
Encourage neighborhood 
“adoption” of local leopards to 
foster willingness to protect 
 
Conceal targets* Reduce frustrations: 
Subsidize farmers who set aside 
part of their land for 
conservation 
 
Offer lower beef prices to 
communities that ban bushmeat 
hunting 
Set rules: 
Empower local residents to 
create their own rules 
Support local leadership for 
conservation projects 
 
Micro-loans for community 
conservation initiatives or 
local predation prevention 
efforts 
 




Fence in villages 
Assist natural surveillance: 
Create phone app that predicts 
likely predation locations 
based on environmental 
conditions 
Remove targets Avoid disputes: 
Roundtables to discuss 
grievances and restore trust 
 




Host workshops on how to 
live with/near leopards 
Screen exits: 
Immediately investigate 
cases of “missing 
collared leopards” and 
canvas location of 
disappearance to prevent 
disposal of body 
 
Reduce anonymity: 
Shame individuals who kill 
leopards using social media 
and elders (only in areas where 
distrust is NOT a problem) 
Identify property Reduce emotional arousal: 
Tick fever prevention efforts to 
reduce livestock mortality 
 
Insurance schemes to lessen 
economic blow 
Alert conscience: 
Provide alternative benefits 
Bursaries 
 
Revenue sharing from eco-
tourism 
 
Land restoration projects 
 
Deflect offenders: 
Use “lion lights” 
(motion-sensitive strobe 
lights) that turn on when 
predators roam near 
corrals 
Utilize place managers: 
Game-scouts & shepherds to 
track leopard movements and 
guard livestock when leopards 
nearby 
 
Disrupt markets Neutralize peer pressure:  
Harness peer pressure  
 
Develop label for livestock 
products recognizing leopard-
friendly farms (like “organic” 
Assist compliance: 
Anonymous cell phone app 








Trap and neuter stray 
dogs, relocate them to a 
facility outside of 
village 
Predation response team to 
respond to complaints of H-LC 





Regular visits by wildlife 





sales of pesticide, 
specifically carbofuran 
Strengthen formal surveillance: 
Equip livestock with cell 
phones that track movement 
and call farmers when animals 
run from predators 
Deny benefits:  
Develop livestock feed that 
makes animals taste bad to 
predators 
 
Immediately dispose of 
livestock carcasses to prevent 
leopard return to kill 
 
Discourage imitation: 
Randomly move livestock 
around to different grazing 
areas to prevent recurrence of 
predation 
Control drugs and alcohol 




 Designing SCP-driven interventions 
 
 Only select parts of the 25 techniques are relevant for H-LC and retaliatory leopard 
killings, but all 5 main principles apply. Techniques for reducing the rewards of H-LC and 
retaliatory killings are limited because you cannot require livestock owners and local residents to 
stop raising livestock or move elsewhere (i.e. remove targets, human and livestock). Concealing 
targets is also difficult because leopards are expert trackers and can smell prey even if concealed. 
Identifying property is impossible since leopards have no sense of ownership and do not abide by 
human moral principles. Disrupting markets does not apply since perpetrators of retaliatory 
leopard killings rarely resell a leopard’s carcass for fear of being caught. Finally, controlling 
drugs and alcohol (under “removing the excuses”) is also irrelevant since these substances do not 
play a role in leopard behavior. They also rarely play a role in local residents’ choice to kill a 
leopard in retaliation for livestock losses; deep-seated anger is the primary motivator here. 
Although alcohol can certainly exacerbate this anger, it is not the cause of it, as explained in 
chapter 6. 
 The remaining techniques offer some innovative and wide-ranging solutions to both H-
LC and retaliatory leopard killings. There is no need to separate solutions to H-LC and to 
retaliatory leopard killings because both stem from the same root causes. It is just a question of 
where in the chain of human-leopard interactions you choose to intervene to prevent illegal 
leopard killings. In fact, working jointly on these different places in the chain can have a stronger 





  Increasing the effort for H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings 
 
 The majority of solutions in the “increase the effort” category of table 7.2 focus on 
limiting opportunities for leopard predation. Bell collars and donkeys protect the herd. Donkeys 
are already semi-accepted in South Africa and are cheap to buy. Bell collars are ill suited to the 
husbandry practices there, where farmers leave their livestock to graze in remote pastures for 
multiple days at a time. Nevertheless, they can be useful in Kenya where herders stay with the 
flock while grazing and so have the opportunity to take collars on and off regularly. Predator-
proof corrals, ideally with wire mesh roofs and fencing at least a foot deep in the ground to 
prevent leopards from jumping or digging into enclosures, can be used at both locations. They 
will be easier to incorporate into the local lifestyle in Kenya, though, because agro-pastoralists 
there already bring their livestock in at night.  
Fencing of villages is a possibility in India. Although fences can be difficult to maintain 
and pose some problems for migrating animals, they could be a first line of defense in 
communities where leopards wander into villages, especially if villages are small and far 
between. In India, trap and neuter programs to reduce stray dog populations near villages would 
go a long way to reducing leopard attacks on humans. Leopards roam near villages to feed on 
stray domestic animals. Limiting the number of stray animals would deplete this leopard food 
source and reduce leopard presence near villages. “Lion lights” with motion sensitive sensors 
could also deflect predators away from livestock corrals and from houses in both Kenya and 




 Increasing the effort to commit retaliatory leopards killings can be done in two ways. One 
is to make killing tools less accessible. Banning over-the-counter sales of pesticides used to 
poison livestock carcasses and the use of wire/snare traps for hunting small game would help 
prevent some leopard deaths. They would not prevent shooting deaths in South Africa, but they 
would eliminate the more indirect and easy ways of killing leopards. The second method is to 
immediately investigate any cases of missing collared leopards to increase the risk that an 
offender is caught in the act before he can dispose of the body. If a collar suddenly goes silent 
and is far from the end of its battery life, chances are a leopard has been killed and its collar 
destroyed. Canvassing this leopard’s last known location might increase the chances of arrest. 
This would require partnering with researchers and NPOs that track local leopard populations 
and could help wildlife officials build valuable relationships with conservation partners. 
 
  Increasing the risks for H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings 
 
 Solutions for “increasing the risks” of H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings focus on 
teaching livestock farmers and agro-pastoralists how to identify and manage leopard predation 
risk factors in their environment. The purpose of these interventions is to make leopard attacks 
on livestock and people more difficult so people are less likely to commit retaliatory leopard 
killings, thereby reducing both behaviors. South African livestock farmers noticed that leopards 
often attacked cows that wandered from the herd to give birth. A simple solution to preventing 
these deaths is to keep birthing cows indoors until they can rejoin the herd (Farmer 1, personal 




Technology can play a role in managing these predation risks. A simple cellphone 
application that predicts likely predation locations, based on some of the environmental factors 
discussed in this research, could allow livestock owners to make better decisions about where to 
graze their livestock and when to corral them for safety. This application can be combined with 
game-scouts that track leopard movements and warn farmers or selectively guard livestock when 
leopards are nearby (similar to the Lion Guardians’ model (Lion Guardians, 2012)). Researchers 
that collar leopards might even consider sharing general leopard movement patterns78 with 
livestock farmers if they see a risk of leopard predation on a particular farm. In India, where 
leopards and humans often live alongside each other without knowing it (Gates, 2013), education 
efforts in schools might focus on “adopting” local leopards and tracking their movements as part 
of the science curriculum to give families a sense of ownership and a positive connection to the 
wildlife around them. This might help create a willingness to protect leopards. 
Another technological solution for thwarting leopard predation is equipping livestock 
with cellphones that track herd movement (Agence France Presse, 2012b). The cell phones are 
attached to sheep’s neck and are set to turn on and call the farmer if the animal runs, often 
because a predator startled it. The farmer can then go scare off the leopard and/or bring his 
livestock to a protected enclosure until the danger passes. This invention is an example of local 
ingenuity: a South African farmer named Erard Louw created it after losing 27 sheep and 13 
lambs to livestock thieves (Agence France Presse, 2012b). 
																																																								
78 Sharing too much information with livestock farmers can be detrimental, though, if they 
decide to use the information to track a leopard and kill it (which has happened in the Heidelberg 




 To deter farmers from taking matters into their own hands and killing leopards in 
retaliation for livestock losses, communities should consider implementing predation response 
teams to immediately address complaints of H-LC and work with livestock farmers to create a 
predation prevention plan that works for their farm. These teams do not have to be government-
run. They can be an informal group of trusted community leaders, senior farmers, NPO 
personnel, and even government wildlife officials that choose to support farmers struggling with 
H-LC. The team should deploy as quickly as possible after a complaint to offer alternative 
solutions to retaliatory killings. The Corbett Foundation created a similar model for tiger 
predation near India’s Corbett Tiger Reserve with positive results (World Wildlife Fund, 2010, 
December). In their case, they provided immediate financial compensation for losses while 
livestock owners waited for government compensation. A similar model might be possible in 
Kenya and other parts of India, where government compensation is an option. A better model, 
though, would be one where response teams focus on preventing future losses since 
compensation for past losses is not always possible and is generally unsustainable. Such a model 
could incorporate a farmer-run insurance scheme where each farmer in the community 
contributes to the fund and receives compensation based on the extent of his livestock losses. 
This could be an alternative to government compensation provided H-WC is not rampant in the 
area and all farmers agree to apply basic predation prevention methods on their farms to 






  Reducing provocations for H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings 
 
 A possible predation prevention plan for a farm suffering from H-LC could include 
several solutions suggested under the “reduce the provocations” column of table 7.2. For 
example, the response team could suggest ways to reduce the farm’s livestock losses like 
randomly moving livestock around to different grazing areas to avoid repeat predation. Team 
members could also work with a farmer to reduce tick fever losses, which account for far more 
livestock deaths than leopards (Farmer 4, personal communication, August 18, 2011). If a farmer 
suffers less livestock losses overall, he may be more willing to tolerate the occasional leopard 
attack. Other predation prevention methods could fall under “reducing the rewards” of predation 
for leopards. It might be possible to develop livestock feed that makes their meat taste bad for 
predators and so discourages predation. Certain plants already deter herbivore predation by 
producing bitter-tasting toxins like caffeine and quinine, so developing this genetic technology is 
not impossible (Meadows, 2009). Response team members might also suggest that farmers 
monitor their flock regularly and immediately dispose of any carcasses to dissuade leopards from 
returning to a kill site and potentially eating more livestock. 
 Another option to reduce the provocations for both H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings 
is to give farmers incentives to conserve leopards. South African farmers complained of the lack 
of government subsidies during their interviews. Government wildlife officials could consider 
subsidizing famers who set aside part of their land for conservation and agree to implement 
certain predation prevention techniques. This would give farmers a financial incentive to tolerate 




label their meat as “leopard-friendly” and sell it for higher prices to buyers, much like “organic” 
foods in the United States. South Africa is a developing economy (United Nations Secretariat, 
2011) and the market for “luxury” and “organic” items is on the rise there ("Luxury brands turn 
to Africa as the next growth frontier," 2014; Nsehe, 2014). Creating a “leopard-friendly” label 
for meat products may provide a lucrative outlet for livestock farmers, one that could counter the 
losses they see from H-LC. In places like India, where bushmeat hunting of ungulates and other 
leopard prey is exacerbating H-LC, the government could offer lower beef prices to communities 
that ban bushmeat hunting, encouraging local residents to buy domesticated instead of wild meat. 
 
  Removing the excuses for H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings 
 
 Lastly, part of any SCP-based solution to H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings should 
include removing the excuses for these behaviors. The five relevant SCP techniques in this 
category are “set rules”, “post instructions”, “alert conscience”, and “assist compliance.” Setting 
rules and alerting one’s conscience should be modified because of the study area’s human 
context. Setting rules is problematic because most local residents resent that NPOs and 
government personnel in these areas come in and tell they what they can and cannot do on their 
land while failing to offer useful help for H-WC. A better option is to empower local residents to 
set their own rules for preventing H-LC and conserving wildlife. Two possible ways to empower 
them could be: 1) government wildlife officials and NPO personnel could support local 
leadership for conservation projects and 2) they could offer local residents micro-loans to 




Alerting one’s conscience is also ill suited to these locations because residents are too 
focused on their immediate survival and that of their flock and livelihood to consider the long-
term consequences of their actions (see footnote 17) (Leader-Williams & Milner-Gulland, 1993). 
They also do not consider killing leopards that attack humans or livestock to be wrong. Pangs of 
conscience are therefore unlikely to move them, but if local residents received some benefits 
from wildlife, they might be less willing to kill the reasons why they receive those immediate 
benefits. Possible benefits could include bursaries for school fees in Kenya and India or land 
restoration projects for farmers in South Africa. Several farmers, government officials, and NPO 
personnel mentioned sites where illegal vegetation clearing, soil degradation, and soil erosion 
into streams were a problem for crop farming and livestock raising (Farmer 1, personal 
communication, August 17, 2011; Government wildlife official 2, personal communication, 
August 19, 2011; NPO worker 4, personal communication, August 21, 2011). These sites were 
usually the result of unsustainable farming techniques by previous generations of landowners. 
Offering to clean up these sites would increase the value of farmer’s land. It would also 
encourage farmers to consider the long-term consequences of their farming practices and might 
be the start of a discussion on protecting leopards and considering alternative predation 
prevention methods to retaliatory killings. In India, such discussions could take place during 
workshops on how to live with or near leopards. Several media articles noted that such 
awareness workshops, held right after leopard attacks on humans, helped calm local populations 
and were welcomed by communities (Singh, 2014; Sonawala, 2013). They provide an avenue for 
local people to vent their frustrations and fears, while also learning how to protect themselves 




Perhaps one of the most important ways to remove excuses to retaliatory leopard killings 
is to assist in the reporting of these events. Communities where these killings occur are often 
tight-knit, and local residents, even if they are against retaliatory killings, will probably have a 
hard time reporting neighbors without reprisal (Government wildlife official 2, personal 
communication, August 19, 2011). In such harsh environments, one must be able to depend on 
one’s neighbors for help, which makes reporting them all the more difficult. Government 
wildlife officials can help by creating websites and cell phone applications where local residents 
can report illegal killings anonymously.  
Government wildlife officials also need to establish a neutral and amicable presence in 
the community, in the vein of community policing officers. They should make a point to stop by 
every farm to introduce themselves and learn about farmers’ struggles with H-WC and other 
issues. Alternatively, they could designate a community member to be a law enforcement liaison 
and act as a go-between between law enforcement and local residents. This latter option might 
work best in communities where elders play a leadership role and could act as impartial and 
respected go-betweens. This type of initiative has been helpful in Indonesia where wildlife 
officials regularly visit rural communities to monitor their problems with wildlife (Government 
wildlife official 4, personal communication, November 26, 2013). 
 
Addressing distrust through conflict resolution techniques 
 
 Before any of these solutions and programs can be implemented, though, stakeholders 




conservation NPO personnel. Part of creating informal guardians to prevent H-LC and retaliatory 
leopard killings requires fostering the willingness to intervene to protect leopards. According to 
Reynald (2010), the ultimate test of an informal guardian’s capability, once a guardian is familiar 
enough with his or her environment and identifies an offender or crime in commission79, is 
whether or not he or she chooses to intervene to disrupt the crime event. Willingness to 
intervene, though, is partly based on trust between informal and formal guardians. An informal 
guardian intervening to prevent a retaliatory leopard killing must trust that intervening will help 
protect the leopard, that local authorities will provide additional help if necessary (including 
prosecuting the perpetrator or providing alternative and effective H-LC solutions to retaliatory 
killings), and that he or she will not face retaliation from peers. Willingness to intervene also 
depends an informal guardians’ sense of ownership of the animal and responsibility to protect it 
(Reynald, 2010). These requirements are not met in most of the study areas because of ongoing 
distrust between local residents, government wildlife officials, and NPO personnel. 
In every study location, some level of distrust between actors hampered conservation and 
H-WC prevention efforts. The level of distrust in South Africa and India was crippling to the 
point where local residents would rather resort to their own stopgap measures than call in 
wildlife officials. Unless these tensions are aired in the open and fences are mended, recruiting 
informal guardians and implementing any of the above-mentioned solutions effectively will be 
nearly impossible. Lewicki and Tomlinson (2014, p. 104) state that “if individuals or groups trust 
each other, they can work through conflict relatively easily. If they do not trust each other, 
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conflict often becomes destructive, and resolution is more difficult.” Stakeholders in the study 
areas are failing to prevent H-LC because of this lack of trust and because they refuse to 
acknowledge its existence. By failing to acknowledge the distrust, the conflict continues to 
generate animosity and pain, neither of which is easily forgotten and which prevents parties from 
listening to each other and believing what each other says. It is a circular problem because 
serious conflict often destroys trust and increases distrust, thereby making any conflict resolution 
more difficult to achieve (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2014). 
 Part of the solution for retaliatory leopard killing in the study areas should include 
conflict resolution techniques80 to reduce distrust and foster cooperation between local residents, 
government wildlife officials, and NPO personnel. In Kenya, the KWS has started holding 
community outreach workshops with the help of researchers, where they discuss what they are 
doing to prevent H-WC with local residents (Viollaz, 2006). This information-sharing forum 
helps local residents understand what solutions government officials are implementing. It also 
makes the KWS’s actions seem less arbitrary and allows local residents to give feedback on 
whether or not these solutions are making a difference. Similarly, participatory crime analysis 
workshops improve relations between people and local law enforcement by empowering local 
residents to take an active role in protecting their communities from crime (Liebermann & 
Coulson, 2004). These sorts of events can be a place to openly discuss conflicts, but also to 
																																																								
80 Conservation conflict transformation offers a similar framework with which to improve the 
effectiveness of conservation efforts. According to Madden and McQuinn (2014, p. 97), 
“principles and processes from the peace-building field inform conservation conflict 
transformation and offer useful guidance for revealing and addressing social conflicts to improve 





showcase common ground between parties. Trust can then develop as stakeholders gain 
knowledge of each other and the reasons for each other’s behavior (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 
2014). These sorts of efforts are part of the SCP principle of reducing provocations by avoiding 
disputes. 
 During these information-sharing forums, there is always a risk that some actors will 
resort to shaming others for their beliefs and behavior. This is something that NPOs, like The 
Landmark Foundation, have attempted to reduce the anonymity behind and increase the risks of 
retaliatory leopard killings. They do so by either by outing illegal leopard hunters on social 
media or by reporting offenders to elders in indigenous communities. The Landmark Foundation, 
for example, posts pictures and names of local residents who have killed leopards on their 
Facebook page. Although this does reduce anonymity and could lead to criminal sanctions, it 
also adds to the anger and distrust that exists between stakeholders and reduces the chances of 
cooperation between local residents and NPO personnel. Limited shaming of entities, like 
governments or corporations, that exacerbate H-LC or fail to protect leopards is sometimes 
helpful to encourage a change in behavior, but such shaming should be used strategically and 
only in areas where distrust is not a crippling problem to leopard conservation. 
  
Limitations of this research 
 
 While this research provides valuable information on the situational factors that influence 




 Data on wildlife crimes, especially illegal killings, are traditionally difficult to obtain and, 
if data exist, their quality is often poor (Clyne, 2014). The retaliatory leopard killing data used in 
part 4 of this research, although better than average, still suffers from some limitations. The first 
is the inevitable problem of observed versus unobserved cases of leopard killings. Like for crime 
in general (Maxfield & Babbie, 2008), observed leopard killings are likely only a small 
percentage of the actual number of killings that occur. This is especially true 1) for retaliatory 
killings because the perpetrator hides the carcass to avoid discovery and 2) for leopards because 
few accurate leopard population estimates exist. In an effort to reduce the number of unobserved 
killings, this research uses GPS collar and carcass recovery data from a small-scale NPO that is 
actively embedded in the life of the community. This NPO tracks the leopard population in the 
Heidelberg area and, like community policing officers, engages local residents to solve H-LC 
problems. Between their knowledge of local leopards and their ties to the community, NPO 
personnel collect some of the most accurate data available on H-LC and retaliatory leopard 
killings in the area, but unobserved cases are of course still possible. 
 The data for the independent variables in part 4 of this analysis come from different 
years. This is part of the difficulty with primarily using open-source data. The retaliatory leopard 
killing cases date from 2005 to 2011. All of the independent variable data come from a mixture 
of those same years, with the majority from 2009 (see table 5.7 for more details). Every effort 
was made to get data from the same year whenever possible, since data from 2009 are a fair 
middle ground for this range of leopard killing dates. The two most problematic variables were 
human settlement (dating from 2005) and prey abundance (dating from 2006). Both these 




change in predictable ways: increases in human settlement and a decrease in prey abundance due 
to habitat destruction (Graham et al., 2005; Schaller, 2011) (Woodroffe, 2000 in (Henschel, 
Hunter, Breitenmoser, Purchase, et al., 2008)). The influence of these variables on H-LC and 
retaliatory killings is thus probably under-represented in this study. 
 Part 4 was able to examine only a limited number of cases, 15 killings in 13 locations. 
The case-control design added 24 units from two control groups. Non-parametric tests were used 
because they are better suited to small sample sizes. The Mann-Whitney test, for example, has a 
minimum sample size of N = 7 (Field, 2005). Furthermore, the results from part 4 show that the 
only variable that was significant, main road length, had a strong exact significance value 
compared to other independent variables’ significance values. If anything, this small sample size 
could have resulted in false negatives for other variables, but the fact that main road length was 
so strongly significant suggests that it plays an important role in the location of retaliatory 
leopard killings. 
 The snowball sampling method for the South African interviews and the small number of 
interviews (16 in total) is another potential limit, but snowball sampling was necessary to get 
such a tight-knit rural community to talk to a foreign researcher (Goodman, 1961). Being 
vouched for by a community member meant that farmers were willing to open up about their 
problems with leopards and their conflicts with NPO and government personnel. The amount of 
distrust between stakeholders described in chapter 6 might have affected some respondents’ 
answers. This is more likely in email communications with government personnel where there 




person interviews and the range of opinions expressed, including controversial ones, suggest that 
most interviewees were honest in their responses. 
That this researcher was female and young also helped obtain accurate information 
during interviews because, in such a male-dominated profession, a young woman was not 
considered much of a threat (Government wildlife official 3, personal communication, August 
23, 2011). Farmers could therefore share sensitive information with this researcher because, even 
if repeated, her credibility among their peers would be limited. The choice not to take notes 
during these interviews likewise made interviewees more comfortable and allowed for more 
open communication about their problems with leopards. The downside of this method was 
possible content error when writing up interviews from memory, but the general points made by 
the interviewees would have been hard to forget. Any hesitation on content was noted in the 
interview transcripts and that information was excluded from the analysis. 
Although the number of South African interviews is small, the diversity of the 
respondents and the depth of interviews (sometimes lasting 2-3 hours) helped produce more 
detailed information. The livestock and dairy farmers, conservation NPO workers, and 
government officials interviewed were chosen because of their varied positions on illegal leopard 
killings. Some were friendly towards local conservation efforts, but several others were strongly 
opposed to them. A couple of farmers were also actively involved in illegal leopard killings. The 
amount of detail discussed in these interviews provided good reference points from which to 
crosscheck facts based on data from other locations and scholarly and grey literature. Generally, 
the information given by respondents was consistent with known patterns of H-LC and 




 The sample of Indian media articles used in part 3 of this research could have been biased 
in two ways. Media bias could have resulted in only the more sensational cases of H-LC and 
retaliatory leopard killings being included in the sample (Entman & Gross, 2008; Gordon, 2000). 
Any cases of H-LC not reported in the press would have gone unnoticed. Using Google Alerts to 
collect these articles could also lead to the inclusion of more western world sources because of 
Internet access and usage patterns (Strickland, 2014). The latter turned out not to be true, most 
articles came from developing countries’ newspapers, especially Indian media, and the cases 
cited came from all over the continent, from small villages to large cities. Media bias was present 
because leopard attacks on humans rather than livestock received more column inches, but the 
range of H-LC scenarios reported, including livestock attacks, was consistent with what the 
scholarly and grey literature described (Athreya & Belsare, 2007; Athreya et al., 2010; Chauhan, 
2011; Marker & Sivamani, 2009). As such, the articles presented a fairly accurate picture of the 
H-LC and retaliatory leopard killing situation in India, as good as possible without doing 
fieldwork in country. 
 Some measurement problems exist with the Kenyan interview data. The use of translators 
when conducting interviews adds a potential source of error if the translator mistranslated or 
misrepresented the interviewees’ response. Translators were necessary because of the many 
dialects spoken in the Kenyan study area. Despite their downside, they were instrumental in 
putting local residents at ease and understanding the nuances of local opinions. 
A more important measurement problem, though, was the use of the question “what is 
your attitude towards wildlife conservation-based income generating activities?” to assess 




structure and reference to a specific type of conservation initiative. A better question would have 
been “How do you feel about wildlife conservation?” with possible answer categories of 
negatively, positively or neutral. Responses to other questions about conservation in general, 
though, showed that there was some confusion about what “conservation” was (see footnote 65). 
Since most respondents were aware of local conservation-based income generating activities, 
asking their opinions on such initiatives was the next best alternative. 
 There are a number of limitations to the spatial analysis performed in part 4 of this 
research. The first is that the GPS points given by The Landmark Foundation for leopard killing 
locations were not always exact. Sometimes, they simply referred to the location of the farm 
where the leopard was killed. This was part of the reason for choosing a grid cell size of 5.4 km x 
4.7 km. Since the average subsistence farm size in the Heidelberg area was 8.32 km2 (Vink & 
Tregurtha, 2003)81, the impact of an inexact leopard killing location is limited. The advantage of 
using a 5.4 km x 4.7 km grid cell as the unit of analysis was that it provided more environmental 
context. Unfortunately, this also meant aggregating some spatial data to that level of 
measurement. For example, biome type had to be aggregated to this level of measurement even 
though an area of 5.4 km x 4.7 km can include multiple biome types. The most common biome 
type was chosen when a grid cell had multiple biome types within it, thus introducing some error 
into the analysis. Fortunately, this problem only affected the variables biome type and human 
settlement (where the cell’s mean value was used). The rational for allowing this type of error is 
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that the general environmental context is more important to this analysis than minor variations in 
biome or human settlement. 
 Second, measuring the variables prey availability and prey abundance also posed some 
challenges. Due to a lack of prey population counts in the study area, this research made two 
assumptions: 1) that if a prey’s habitat overlaps a grid cell, that prey is available there and 2) that 
an average prey abundance score from a meta-analysis of all leopard prey studies was 
representative of prey abundance in the study area. These measurements are not ideal, but 
represent the best available data for the area. Future research might focus on getting proper prey 
population estimates in the study location. 
 Third, one risk of spatial analysis is the propagation of error from one processing stage to 
another. According to Burrough and McDonnell (1998), “the quality of outputs from a spatial 
analysis is a function of (1) the quality of the data, (2) the quality of the model, and (3) 
interactions between the data and the model. When data from different sources are combined, the 
effects of many different kinds of uncertainties (i.e. measurement errors, scale differences, 
temporal differences, and other factors) may also combine” (Lloyd, 2010, p. 19). Since this 
analysis involves data from 6 different sources, it is subject to such propagation of errors. Every 
effort was made to reduce the amount of error at each stage, as detailed through chapters 5 and 6. 
 
 A notable strength of this research is its use of multiple analytical approaches, study 
areas, and data sources. The scarcity of illegal leopard killing data and the poor quality and small 
sample sizes of existing data were the reasons for choosing this strategy. Replicating the results 




research’s findings. Using data from 3 different countries also had the added benefit of cross-
country comparisons. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the results of this analysis are 
meant to draw broad conclusions about H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings, not specific ones. 
The field of H-WC and retaliatory killing research, especially from a criminological perspective, 
is still young and more specific conclusions can be drawn as better data is collected. This is a 




 Despite growing awareness of the problem of H-WC and retaliatory killings, specifically 
H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings, NPOs and governments focus on poaching/wildlife 
trafficking and law enforcement responses. This focus is detrimental because it fails to recognize 
the important role H-WC plays in illegal wildlife killings and the potential local populations have 
to prevent them. Oftentimes, researchers discount the value of local contextual knowledge and 
practical experience. 
 This research offers a broad overview of the human and environmental factors that 
influence where and why H-LC and retaliatory leopard killings take place. Its major strengths are 
its focus on local residents’ opinions on these issues and its application of SCP techniques to find 
solutions to both problems. 
It emphasizes the importance of participatory crime analysis as a framework for 
identifying and implementing solutions to retaliatory leopard killings. It also suggests targeted 




predation prevention methods and incentives to conserve wildlife. The goal of these responses is 
to increase acceptance of predators and the costs they inflict, while also reducing those costs to a 
minimum. 
Future research should focus on finding effective ways to build trust among stakeholders. 
It should also focus on refining predictive models of where H-LC and illegal leopard killings are 
likely to take place so prevention efforts can be targeted to the most at-risk areas. Finally, 
collecting more quality data on illegal wildlife killings, retaliatory and poaching-related, is key to 
continuing research in this area. Isolated datasets exist, but a more concerted effort is necessary 
to collect data on a global scale and share it openly between researchers so conservationists have 

















7/15/96 estimated India Arunachal Pradesh  leopard skin 4  
8/19/96  India Ambedkar Nagar, Bihar 3 leopard skin 1  
9/9/96  India Rishikesh, Uttar Pradesh 2 leopard skin 1  
9/17/96  India Delhi 1 leopard skin 2  
10/26/96  India Dangs District, Gujarat  leopard 3 1 leopard and 
two cubs 
poisoned 
11/1/96  India Delhi 1 leopard skin 1  
11/3/96  India Indore, Madhya Pradesh 1 leopard skin 1  
12/9/96  India Chandigarh  leopard skin 2 taxidermist 
7/11/96  India Bomdila, Arunachal Pradesh  leopard skin 4  
10/31/96  India New Delhi 2 leopard head 1  
3/13/97  UK Portsmouth 1 leopard medicinal 
ingredients 
  
12/30/96 estimated India Pithorgarh and Uttar Pradesh (UP)  leopard 5  
1/20/97  India Kohlapur, Maharashtra 1 leopard skin   
1/31/97  India Satna, Madhya Pradesh (MP) 2 leopard skin 3  
2/1/97  India Satna, Madhya Pradesh (MP) 1 leopard skin 11  
2/2/97  India Satna, Madhya Pradesh (MP)  leopard skin 2  
2/10/97  India Satna, Madhya Pradesh (MP)  leopard skin 5  




2/18/97  India New Delhi 2 leopard skin 1  
2/19/97  India Khatauli (UP) 1 leopard skin 1  
2/19/97  India Satna, Madhya Pradesh (MP) 2 leopard skin 2  
2/20/97  India Sundernagar, Himachal Pradesh (HP) 2 leopard skin 1  
3/17/97  India Darjeeling, West Bengal 1 leopard skin 2  
3/18/97  India Corbett National Park (UP) 2 leopard bones 2.5 kg  
4/5/97  India Calcutta 3 leopard skin 1  
4/13/97  India Kondli, East Delhi  leopard skin 4  
4/17/97  India Deeddag village, Sirmour District (HP)  leopard skin 3  
5/14/97  India Bhuvaneshwar, Orissa  leopard skin 1  
5/15/97  India Bhuvaneshwar, Orissa 2 leopard skin 3  
5/16/97  India Vikas Nagar, Dehradun (UP) 5 leopard skin 8  
5/20/97  India Vikas Nagar, Dehradun (UP) 1 leopard skin 2  
5/22/97  India Dehradun (UP) 1 leopard skin 3  
5/23/97  India Dehradun (UP) 1 leopard skin 4  
5/28/97  India Cuttack, Orissa 1 leopard skin 1  
5/29/97  India Nagpur, Maharashtra 1 leopard skin 3  
6/11/97  India Bijnore District (UP) 1 leopard skin 1  
7/4/97  India Shimla (HP) 2 leopard skin 4  
11/1/96 estimated South Korea Seoul  leopard skin 2  
11/6/97  India Meghalaya, Assam  leopard skin 4  
12/18/97  Malaysia Taman Datuk, Kandan Baru 1 leopard meat 1 kg  
4/15/98 estimated Belgium Zaventem airport  leopard skin 1  
4/15/1998* estimated India India 68 leopard skin 42  
4/15/98 estimated India India 68 leopard 7  
2/6/99 estimated China Yunnan Province  leopard skin   
7/7/99  China Fuzhou, Fujian Province  leopard skin   
2/15/99  India Hoshangabad District, Madhya Pradesh (MP) 15 leopard skin 3  




4/19/99  India Near Kanha Tiger Reserve, Balaghat District 
(MP) 
15 leopard skin 6  
5/25/99 estimated India Near Melghat Tiger Reserve, Maharashtra 8 leopard skin 2  
11/8/99  France Roissy airport, Paris  leopard skin 2  
12/20/99  India Ghaziabad 3 leopard skin 50  
1/12/00  India Khaga, Uttar Pradesh 7 leopard skin 70 taxidermist 
1/12/00  India Khaga, Uttar Pradesh 7 leopard claws 18000 taxidermist 
7/15/1999* estimated Thailand Betong, Yala Province  Clouded leopard 
skin pieces 
100+  
7/15/99 estimated Thailand Betong, Yala Province  leopard skull 1  
7/15/99 estimated Thailand Betong, Yala Province  leopard jaw 1  
9/15/99 estimated Vietnam Vietnam  leopard 1  
1998  UK London 1 leopard skull 1  
6/15/00 estimated India India  leopard skin 86  
6/15/00 estimated India India  snow leopard skin 1  
10/1/00 estimated Belgium Brussels  leopard skin 3 antiquers 
6/8/01  Djibouti Djiboutiville  leopard skin 9  
4/27/01  India Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh 4 leopard skin 19  
4/27/01  India Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh  leopard skin 5  
4/27/01  India Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh  leopard claws 10  
8/8/01  China Baoshan, Yunnan 2 leopard skin 
(pieces) 
33  
4/9/02  Taiwan Chiang Kai-shek airport  leopard skin 1  
2/15/02 estimated India Katni, Madhya Pradesh 2 leopard skin 4  
2/12/03  India Matigara, North Bengal  leopard skin 20  
4/1/03  India Dharchula  leopard skin 15  
4/4/03  Nepal Halchowk, Swayambhu, Kathmandu 1 leopard skin 109  
10/8/03  China Sansan, Angren County 3 leopard skin 581  




9/15/04  France Roissy airport, Paris  leopard skin 1  
2002-7/2004 Italy Rome, Prato, Bologna, Reggio Emilia, Milan  leopard medicinal 
ingredients 
  
6/1/04  Russia Altai 2 snow leopard skin 15  
7/15/04 estimated India Chennai 1 leopard skin 2  
10/16/04  India Rajasthan 1 leopard claws   
6/15/04 estimated India Shahdol 2 leopard skin 7  
2/1/05  India Patel Nagar, Delhi 4 leopard skin 38  
2/1/05  India Patel Nagar, Delhi 4 snow leopard skin 1  
2/1/05  India Patel Nagar, Delhi 4 leopard paws   
2/1/05  India Patel Nagar, Delhi 4 leopard bones   
1/15/05 estimated Ethiopia Addis Ababa 66+ leopard skin   
9/2/05  Nepal Rasuwa District 3 leopard skin 36  
9/2/05  Nepal Rasuwa District 3 leopard bones   
8/15/05 estimated Nepal Kathmandu  leopard skin 1  
8/15/05 estimated Nepal Kathmandu  leopard bones   
3/8/05  India Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi 2 leopard skin 3  
4/6/05  India Delhi 3 leopard skin 45  
7/29/05  India Chhatarpur, Madhya Pradesh 1 leopard skin 30  
7/28/05  India Bhopal 1 leopard skin 1  
1/10/06  India Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh  leopard skin 14  
1/10/06  India Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh 3 leopard skin 2  
4/15/07 estimated Taiwan Taiwan 1 leopard skin 1  
2/12/07  Nepal Dhangadi, Nepal 3 leopard skin 5  
7/27/07  China Xining, Qinghai 1 snow leopard skin 27  




7/27/07  China Xining, Qinghai 1 snow leopard 
skeleton 
2  
7/27/07  China Xining, Qinghai 1 clouded leopard 
skin 
1  
10/25/07  India Karaundhi, Sonbhadra District, Varanasi, Uttar 
Pradesh 
2 leopard skin 10  
8/10/07  Nepal Nepal  leopard skin 2  
9/15/05 estimated Nepal Syphru Bensi, Langtang National Park 2 leopard skin 37  
1/29/08  Thailand Khub Pung village of Tambon Nam Kham  leopard 3  
1/29/08  Thailand Khub Pung village of Tambon Nam Kham  clouded leopard 2  
3/12/08  France Paris 1 leopard skin  taxidermist 
3/12/08  France Paris 1 leopard 1 taxidermist 
4/15/08 estimated Cameroon Douala, Littoral Province 2 leopard skin   
3/15/08 estimated China Xinjiang 6 snow leopard 4  
1/15/08 estimated China Shanghai 1 clouded leopard 
skin 
1  
7/22/08  India Almora 2 leopard skin 1  
7/27/08  India Saharanpur 3 leopard skin 8  
7/28/08  India Vikasnagar 1 leopard skin 1  
7/30/08 estimated India Chhattisgarh 2 leopard skin 1  
8/1/08  India Delhi 1 leopard skin 1  
8/6/08  India Vikasnagar, near Dehradun 1 leopard skin 1  
8/13/08  India Dehradun, Uttarakhand 2 leopard skin 3  
8/6/08  United States Denver, Colorado 3 leopard skin 2  
8/6/08  United States Denver, Colorado 3 leopard skull 1  




11/15/08  Kenya, Congo, 
Ghana, Uganda, 
Zambia 
 57 leopard skin   
12/13/07  India Gujarat 1 leopard skin 23  
3/20/09  India Manas National Park, Barpeta District 16 leopard skin   
3/20/09  India Manas National Park, Barpeta District 16 leopard bones   
10/15/05 estimated United States Minnesota 1 clouded leopard   
10/15/05 estimated United States Minnesota 1 clouded leopard   
2/24/09  United States Smyrna, Georgia 1 snow leopard 1  
8/20/09  UK London  leopard medicinal 
ingredients 
  
11/23/09  UK Manchester 1 leopard medicinal 
ingredients 
  
7/21/09  Cameroon Bafoussam 2 leopard skin 2  
10/19/09  China Linchang, Yunnan Province  leopard skin 1  
7/15/00 estimated India Pinjore, Haryana 1 leopard skin 2  
7/26/09  India Birhi, Chamoli 1 leopard skin 3  
9/16/09  India Chhattisgarh, Kanker District 2 leopard skin 1  
10/10/09  India Vikasnagar, near Dehradun 2 leopard skin 2  
9/20/10  UK Aberystwyth 2 leopard 1 zoo owners, 
illegal display 
of live leopard 
2/1/10 estimated South Africa North West Province 6 leopard parts   
10/11/10  Tanzania Tanzania 3 leopard skin 8  







1/15/10 estimated China Luntai 5 snow leopard 2  
11/15/08 estimated China Yining 3 snow leopard 4  
4/14/10  China Dehong State, Yunnan Province 2 leopard skin   
4/14/10  China Dehong State, Yunnan Province 2 leopard skeleton   
2/26/10  India Solan, Himachal Pradesh 4 leopard skin 4  
3/18/10  India Basti (UP) 3 leopard skin 3  
6/28/10  India Devgadh Baria Taluka, Dahod District 2 leopard skin 4  
6/28/10  India Devgadh Baria Taluka, Dahod District 2 leopard nails 4  
1995 estimated India Delhi 1 leopard skin 1  
9/15/10  India Chakrata Dehradun district  leopard skin 2  
9/15/10  Vietnam Hanoi, Hoang Mai District 2 clouded leopard 
skeleton 
1  
9/15/10  Vietnam Hanoi, Hoang Mai District 2 clouded leopard 
skull 
3  
1/19/11  Gabon Gabon  leopard skin 12  
8/20/11  Thailand Mekong River, Ban Tarn Choom, Ratana Wapi 
District 
 leopard  1  
5/16/11  Malaysia Kampung Ayer Molek, Bukit Ibam, Muadzam 
Shah, Pahang 
1 leopard parts 5  
5/13/11  Thailand Suvarnabhumi International Airport 1 leopard 2 live baby 
leopards 
drugged and in 
suitcase 
        
Key:        
*Incidents in bold with the 
same date correspond to the 
same incident involving 
multiple types of seized 
objects. 
Leopard: Snow leopard: Clouded 
leopard: 
Amur leopard:   








 Table A2. Existing published studies with reliable illegal leopard killing counts 
 
Study (Examples 
& excerpts in 
Appendix) 











Reasons for Reliability 
Score 
Grey Publications        
Environmental 
Investigation 
Agency & Wildlife 
Protection Society 
India (2006) 
# of leopards and 
leopard products 
seized, # of individuals 
charged with poaching, 













Fair Data gathered from biased 
sources like the media but 
range of sources may 
provide a good selection 




# of leopards and 













Fair Data gathered from biased 
sources like the media but 
range of sources may 
provide a good selection 
of cases, just not 
exhaustive. 
Google Alerts # of leopards poached, 
# of leopards and 
leopard products 
seized, # of humans 




News outlets Worldwide 4/28/12-
2/9/13 
Fair Data gathered from biased 
sources like the media, 
news outlets limited to 







# of leopards and 
leopard products seized 




Poor Bulletins represent only a 
partial list of incidents 
based on preferences of 
its editor. Provides a good 
highlight of mediatized 
cases of poaching.   
Peer-Reviewed 
Publications 
       
Balme et al (2010) # of leopards poached, 
leopard mortality rates, 


















Strong Data primarily taken from 
Panthera Munyawana 




       
The Landmark 
Foundation 
Leopard & Predator 
Project 













Strong Researchers are 
embedded in communities 
where they are gathering 
data allowing them to 
access far more cases than 





The Cape Leopard 
Trust Leopard 
Projects 
















Strong Researchers are 
embedded in communities 
where they are gathering 
data allowing them to 
access far more cases than 






















Strong Researchers are 
embedded in communities 
where they are gathering 
data allowing them to 
access far more cases than 
those reported to law 
enforcement. 
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# of leopards poached, 
# of leopards and 
















Fair Data gathered from wide 
range of sources but 
comparison with Google 
Alerts and The Landmark 
Foundation data suggests 
many cases are not 




 Figure A1. Kenyan interview questions82 
 
1) Date & interview no. 
 
2) Group ranch:  




4) Sex:  
a) Female, b) Male 
 
5) Ethnicity:  
a) Maasai, b) Kikuyu, c) Kamba, d) Tanzanian, e) Other 
 
6) Level of education:  
a) No education, b) Primary, c) Secondary, d) University 
 
7) Age:  
a) < 20, b) 21-30, c) 31-40, d) 41-50, e) 51+ 
 
8) Style of proprietorship:  
a) Owner, b) Tenant, c) GR member 
 
9) What is your primary livelihood strategy? 
a) Agriculture, b) Pastoralism, c) Agro-pastoralism, d) Wildlife conservation,  
e) Other 
 
10)  List other important strategies:  
a) Agriculture, b) Pastoralism, c) Agro-pastoralism, d) Wildlife conservation,  
e) Other 
  
11)  How do you rate your economic status? 
a) High, b) Medium, c) Low, d) N/A 
 
12)  How do you rate the appropriateness of your primary livelihood strategy. 
To your needs:  
a) Not sufficient, b) Sufficient, c) Highly sufficient 
To environmental integrity:  
																																																								
82 Please note that the word choice used in this questionnaire is based on the idioms and 
expressions commonly used in Kenyan English and may therefore be unfamiliar to an American 




a) Not appropriate, b) Appropriate, c) Highly appropriate 
   
13)  Do you benefit in any way from the presence of wildlife in the area?  
a) Yes, b) No 
If yes, explain. 
If no, what are the hindrances? 
 
14)  Is wildlife beneficial to other people? 
a) Yes, b) No 
If yes, who and how? 
 
15)  In what ways would you like to see wildlife utilized? (only give options if participant 
cannot give clear answer) 
a) Ecotourism lodges, b) Hunting, c) Community sanctuary, d) Revenue sharing from 
government-controlled parks, e) Traditional uses, f) Other 
  
16)  Are you aware of any initiative involving wildlife utilization? 
a) Yes, b) No 
If yes, identify the initiatives 
 
17)  Is wildlife imposing a cost to you? 
a) Yes, b) No 
If yes, how? 
 
18)  Is there a public/communal cost to wildlife? 
a) Yes, b) No 
If yes, how? 
 
19)  Are there any measures put in place to improve human-wildlife interactions? 
a) Yes, b) No 
What are the initiatives and who has been responsible? 
Have they succeeded? 
 
20)  Do you have any suggestions as to how the negative impacts can be reduced? 
 
21)  What have been the wildlife population trends? 
a) Increased, b) Decreased, c) Stayed the same 
 
22)  Have you noticed any differences in ways in which Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) or 
other stakeholders react to human-wildlife interactions? 
 
23)  Generally, have you been exposed to issues touching on wildlife conservation? 




24)  What is your attitude towards wildlife conservation-based on income generating 
activities? 
a) Positive, b) Negative 
Elaborate on your choice 
  
25)  If not for economic benefits/incentives, would you still support wildlife conservation? 
a) Yes, b) No 
 
26)  Have you heard of the proposal by the government to hand over Amboseli National Park 
(ANP) to the Kajiado County Council? 
a) Yes, b) No 
If yes, from what source? 
 
27)  Irrespective, do you support or not support this proposal? 
a) Support, b) Not support, c) Ambivalent 
Why? 
 
28)  Is KWS mismanaging ANP? 
a) Yes, b = No 
How? 
 
29)  If the proposal fails, what would you want KWS to do in regard to ANP to gain your 
support? 
 
30)  Will the county council improve its management? 
a) Yes, b) No 
How? 
 
31)  If the proposal succeeds, how do you want the Park managed? 
 
32)  At a personal level, are you going to benefit from the envisioned change of 
management? 
a) Yes, b = No 
If yes, how? 
If not, who will benefit? 
  
33) In your opinion, what has been the biggest challenge to wildlife conservation in this 
region? 
 
34)  How should it be resolved? 
 





 Figure A2. South African interview questions 
 
Questions for farmers with knowledge (first or secondhand) of poaching: 
 
1) Why do you think poaching occurs?  
1. What factors make it easier/possible for poachers to operate? 
 
2) What do local residents think about poaching? 
1. Are they for it or against it? 
2. Do they see the ills or just don’t care much because the consequences of poaching 
do not directly affect them? 
3. Do they view the land and its resources as theirs to use as they please? 
 
3) Do you know of anyone who poaches? If so, who are they (no names just background 
information on the person)? 
1. How many are there? 
2. Do they work in groups (organizational structure loose or strictly defined)? 
3. What are their financial circumstances? 
4. Do they have any specific knowledge or experience with wildlife? 
 
4) Why do these people poach? What incentives do these individuals respond to (with an 
eye to using that to find an alternative to poaching)? 
 
5) What negative effects have you personally felt in your community from poaching? 
1. Are there any indirect effects from poaching that you’ve noticed and that 
wouldn’t be evident to the casual observer? 
2. Do most people in your community experience any negative effects from 
poaching?  
3. Is this a topic that comes up among community members? 
 
6) Do you know where poachers unload their products (identify markets)? 
1. Who has access to these markets? 
2. Ask if possible to see such a market. 
 
7) What do you believe would be the best methods to combat poaching in your area? 
1. What would it take to implement these methods? 
2. Who should be responsible for these efforts? 
 
8) What obstacles currently exist to effectively combating poaching in your area? 
1. Are there any issues of corruption, cultural practices, lack of resources, or lack of 
interest from authorities? 




3. What perception do community members have of current anti-poaching efforts or 
of wildlife management personnel in general? 
 
9) Have there been any previous efforts made to stop poaching in your community? 
1. Were they successful? 
2. What made them successful/unsuccessful? 
3. What would you have done differently than they did? 
4. Are they still being implemented? If not, why not? 
 
 
Questions for law enforcement personnel who deal with poaching: 
 
1) How does law enforcement determine whether or not a product is illegally poached? 
 
2) How do you determine the point-of-origin of illegal wildlife products (apart from 
species/habitat location) so that you can combat poaching more effectively in that area? 
 
3) Do you feel you have enough resources to work with? 
 
4) What current policies and strategies do you have in place to stop poaching of local 
wildlife? 
 




 Table A3. Example of the leopard data collected by The Landmark Foundation 
 
The Landmark Foundation Leopard 
Captures  
            
Date Number Sex Age Location Status GPS 
Location 
  Notes 
9-Jun-10 1 Male Adult Heidelberg Collared     Caught in a water reservoir and released 
on site. 
8-Jun-10 1 Male Sub Adult Winterhoek 
Mountains 




Gin trap, between 24 - 36 hours, 
exposure and stress. 
5-Jun-10 1 Male Sub Adult Rheenendal Uncollared     23kg, good condition. Saw mother as it 

















 Table A4. South African respondents’ beliefs about when and why leopards kill livestock 
 
Why leopards kill livestock Farmers Government/NGO personnel 
Lack of prey Anatolian sheep dogs eat small 
prey 
Farmers killing all small prey 
   
Natural animal behavior Grouping behavior of sheep, easy 
prey 
Leopards acclimatizing to 
humans 
Cows leave troop for 2-3 days to 
give birth 
 
   
Husbandry Dairy farmers see cattle more, 
cattle bigger 
Insufficient checks on grazing 
livestock 
Small farms cannot rotate grazing 
locations 
No clear headcount 
   
Landscape & neighbor issues Buffer farms Buffer farms 
Game farm animals escaping, fed 
meat 
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